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Abstract 
Human trafficking has recently become visible on the European agenda as a security 
problem, integrated in a continuum of organised crime, illegal migration, drug trafficking, 
and terrorism. This thesis unpacks the problematisation of human trafficking as security 
and attempts to rethink modes of unmaking security and disrupting its effects. Security 
practices have constitutive effects in terms of subjectivity and political effects in terms of 
the constitution of political community. The securitisation of trafficking in women entails 
practices that, for the purpose of governing the phenomenon, turn 'victims of trafficking' 
from suffering bodies into 'abject', risky others. Victims of trafficking are the locus of 
'imputations of dangerousness', risky subjects who can engage in renewed migratory 
projects. Despite the depoliticising, inegalitarian, and exclusionary effects of security, 
political strategies that can unmake them are still lacking. This research proposes a 
politics of equality, liberty and universality, formulated as prescriptions against the state 
and enacted through forms of collective organisation. It draws on the work of Alain Badiou 
and kienne Balibar to flesh out the implications of a politics of equality and universality in 
its relation to liberty and their disruption of practices of security. Equality and liberty 
suspend the practices of inequality and unfreedom that govern the situation of trafficking. 
A politics of equality and universality is formulated as the equality of work. Prostitution-as- 
work reconfigures the situation of trafficking, by making illegal migrant sex workers count 
where they had counted for nothing and changing forms of exploitation and abuse of 
victims in the margins of law from the perspective of work. 
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Introduction 
Six women who were rescued by police from a brothel in Birmingham 
during a high-profile operation last week and were due to be removed 
from the UK by immigration today, last night had their expulsion deferred 
following pressure from campaigners... 
Sarah Green, for Amnesty International, said: 'We are seriously 
concerned about the process the women rescued have been through. 
We are concerned there may not have been enough time to adequately 
assess what happened to them, and what risks they face if returned to 
their countries. These cases illustrate the vulnerability of victims of 
trafficking and the lack of protection in Britain. This is why Britain should 
sign up to the European Convention against Trafficking, which it has so 
far failed to'. 
It is understood that the 13 other women had leave to remain in the 
country and told police that they were voluntarily working in the sex 
industry. They are no longer in custody (The Guardian 5 October 2005). 
This is one of the recent stories of trafficking that have not only gripped public attention in 
the UK, but have also created institutional and media confusion. Police, human rights 
activists, journalists, lawyers, and immigration officials have attempted to provide different 
rationales and interpretations of what happened and, more generally, to tell consistent 
stories about what human trafficking is. I have chosen this recent story to introduce my 
research, as it contains the contradictory ingredients that have prompted my thinking on 
trafficking, both in terms of the politics it instantiates and the politics it denies. What 
politics does human trafficking make possible and what politics does it deny and render 
6 
impossible? In the various accounts, trafficking appears as a new reality, though not 
unrelated to other social problems. Most often, trafficking is simply juxtaposed to illegal 
migration, prostitution and organised crime. In the words of a Radio 4 reporter 
commenting on the Birmingham case, it is also a story of exploitation and violence. ' 
A first contradiction is embodied by trafficked women themselves: migrants to be 
deported and bearers of human rights to be protected. Uttering the sentence 'I have been 
trafficked' can remove women, at least temporarily, from one category to another. In the 
wake of the Birmingham raid, Anti-Slavery and Amnesty International have started a 
campaign for the UK to sign up to the European Convention against Trafficking (Amnesty 
International and Anti-Slavery International 2005), as the Convention grants a thirty-day 
reflection period to suspected victims of trafficking (Council of Europe 2005). The 
reflection delay is the time span within which trafficked women, with the professional help 
of psychologists and NGOs, can achieve the self-identification of 'victims of trafficking' and 
eventually name their traffickers and testify against them. Yet, the UK government has 
been wary of the provisions of the European Convention and a recent consultation paper 
on trafficking raises concerns that the automatic granting of reflection periods and 
residence permits to victims might act as a 'pull' factor for illegal migrants (Home Office 
2006). The UK is not, however, singular and most European Union (EU) countries, even 
Convention signatories, try to tackle the fuzzy boundary between human trafficking and 
illegal migration. The distinction between victims of trafficking and illegal migrants appears 
as an unstable one and the suspicion of illegal migration will continue to hover over stories 
of exploitation and abuse. 
Moreover, some of the women identified by the police as suspected victims of 
trafficking in the wake of the raid in Birmingham have refused to utter the sentence 'I am a 
victim of trafficking'. BBC Radio 4 has broadcast an interview with one of the women 
1 This research focuses on trafficking in women, as it is the dominant construction at the European 
level. Therefore, it will use 'trafficking in women'. 'human trafficking', and 'trafficking' 
interchangeably. Although trafficking In children, trafficking for domestic work or trafficking in 
organs are gaining increasing prominence, this thesis does not explicitly engage with them. 
Questions of subjectivity and the construction of political agency would need to be thought in these 
concrete contexts. 
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'freed' from the Birmingham brothel. An illegal migrant, she was waiting in a detention 
centre to be deported back home, somewhere in Eastern Europe. Her decision not to 
admit to having been trafficked and to present herself as a free choice prostitute appeared 
even more contradictory when she admitted that 'nobody is happy there [in the brothel]' 
(BBC Radio 4 2005). The interviewer noted it as an 'inconsistency' in the story. Can 
supposedly free subjects 'choose' not to be happy? Another contradiction reminds us that 
the free choice subject is an abstraction that is doubled by the particularity and constraints 
of socio-economic conditions. 
The debate between human rights activists and the Home Office on the 
deportation of the six women has pointed out yet another contradiction that the stories of 
trafficking expose, namely that of 'legality. Trafficking is solely related to those who are 
illegally resident. The remaining women appear as free-choice workers in the sex industry. 
They do not have to justify their work or the extent of their free choice, as long as they 
work in regulated brothels. Trafficking becomes a problem most prominently in relation to 
illegality. Illegal migrants are under suspicion of having been trafficked; legal residents are 
'uninteresting' for the state in this situation. 
Simultaneously, the reality of trafficking introduces a split, a shortcut in the logic of 
how the state deals with illegal migrants. Victims of trafficking are vulnerable and insecure 
and should not be further victimised by the state. Hence victims of trafficking are allowed 
to stay until they decide whether they testify against their traffickers, or longer, depending 
on the European country in case. While the UK, for example, has a rather strict 
conditionality on granting permits to stay to victims of trafficking, Italy has been singled out 
as a model for granting residence permits to victims of trafficking independent of their 
willingness to testify. Nevertheless, the so-called 'social path' that allows victims of 
trafficking in Italy to train for a job and reintegrate has been shown to entail constraints 
upon victims to testify (Anti-Slavery International 2002: 144). The European Commission 
itself has made the granting of short-term resident permits to suspected victims of 
trafficking dependent upon their usefulness for the judicial process and the conviction of 
traffickers (European Commission 2001b). The differences between the EU Member 
8 
States are less important for trying to understand how practices of security are deployed. 
Although I rely on the interventions devised by the EU and on developments regarding 
trafficking in women in the UK, I consider these cases as paradigmatic of the functioning 
of security and of its logic. The logic of security structures the field of practices that govern 
human trafficking, showing apparently different practices as symbiotic ones. 
The contradictions that subtend the subjectivity of victims of trafficking and the 
location of trafficking as a phenomenon among specific social and economic problems will 
be approached from the perspective of discourses and practices that meta-structure these 
debates, namely security. Security practices allow for a symbiosis between these 
contradictions and lay the ground for their smooth functioning. The logic holding together 
the stories of trafficking and the institutional practices that 'order these stories is that of 
(in)security. 2 This research will unpack the logic of security, its functioning and effects in 
structuring the social field and constituting the phenomenon of trafficking in women as a 
social problem. While issues of illegal migration and human rights - to limit these initial 
considerations to the introductory story I have chosen - are hotly debated, security 
assumptions remain taken for granted. The Home Office measures concerning illegal 
migrants remain perfectly acceptable, as long as victims of trafficking are clearly 
differentiated from the category of illegal migrants and receive a more humane treatment. 
It was therefore important to open up what 'security' does, what the effects of (in)security 
are and how practices and discourses of insecurity can buttress or undermine the 
institutional and discursive construction of trafficking. 
These contradictions or tensions function, however, smoothly together, embedded 
in a series of legitimate practices, in the unquestioned logic of security. The contradiction 
between the fact that the same women can walk freely or be deported, can be allowed to 
work or helped to recognise themselves as victims of trafficking, depending on a specific 
construction of legality or illegality has hardly been noticed. This contradiction becomes 
manifest only when decisions about who these women really are need to be taken. Are 
21 paraphrase here a question formulated by Slavoj 2i±ek contra Michel Foucault's analysis of 
micro-practices. While 2-ilek would agree with analyses of micro-practices, of the local functioning 
of power relations, he would ask: 'what holds together this pluralityT (2-ilek 1995: 198). 
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they illegal migrants or victims of trafficking, how is the decision to be made? The decision 
translates into an institutional struggle, where various professionals use their expertise to 
identify women as genuinely trafficked or illegally residing. If induced to admit to having 
been trafficked 3, victims of trafficking expose the arbitrary boundary between regular and 
irregular migrants. Victims of trafficking are allowed to stay temporarily and to the extent 
that they can become a category clearly differentiated from illegal migrants. 
The classification as victims simultaneously closes down and opens up specific 
possibilities of action. Women can act as victims of trafficking, press charges against 
traffickers, put the legal system to good use and be reintegrated into society. What is 
closed down in the shift of subjectivity from the category of illegal migrants to that of 
victims of trafficking (or vice versa) is the realisation that the two categories are artificially 
delimited. It is in the process of irregular migration (whether understood as illegal crossing 
of frontiers or as a lapse into a situation of illegality from a temporary situation of legal 
residence) that women can be abused and exploited. The category of trafficked women is 
not the negation of illegal migrants who make rational choices and appear as dangerous 
to Western states, but emerges through the very practices of security that states deploy 
towards migrants. 
Renamed as victims of trafficking, women are forbidden forms of action deemed 
inappropriate to their victim status, such as sex work or renewed migratory projects. The 
relation between the forms of subjectivity that security practices assume and thus foster 
on the one hand and the subjectivity they exclude on the other has been another point of 
interest for this research. Victims of trafficking cannot be dangerous as they are 
differentiated from illegal migrants and criminals. Therefore, they cannot undertake 
actions that would be deemed as dangerous or risky by Western states. Migration, 
prostitution, and irregular work have been external forceful impositions upon them. 
Despite the continual attempt to differentiate victims of trafficking from other illegal 
migrants, this distinction is unstable. Trafficked women are eventually voluntarily returned 
3 The woman Interviewed in the Radio 4 broadcast declined having been trafficked. She presented 
herself as a rational migrant, attempting to change her situation and the condition of poverty. 
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home after having testified against their traffickers and having undergone more or less 
extended periods of rehabilitation. Instead of deportation, voluntary return. Instead of 
detention centres, rehabilitation shelters. Instead of illegal migrants, victims. 
Although deployed upon supposedly different categories of subjects, the measures 
employed appear as hardly different. In the shift from the indiscriminate securitisation of 
all illegal migrants to an emphasis on the human rights of victims of trafficking -a shift 
made possible by the mobilisation of NGOs in the anti-trafficking struggle - what appears 
to change is rather the form of incarceration or the mode of normalisation. The logic of 
their removal from the space of the political community they attempted to enter irregularly 
remains the same. The contradiction between claiming the difference of victims of 
trafficking from other categories of migrants only to treat them in similar ways does not 
appear as a contradiction any more than other contradictions I have exposed. 
Contradictions appear as non-contradictory through the structuring that practices 
of security entail upon the phenomenon of human trafficking. Human trafficking is 
problematised in relation to other social problems that are already constituted as security 
problems. Challenging the distinctions between human trafficking and other 
problematisations such as illegal migration does not disrupt the meta-structuring logic of 
security. 
This research can be seen as having a bipartite structure. The first part entails 
asking questions about the meta-structuring of security and its relation to human 
trafficking, while the second part focuses on questioning and disrupting practices of 
security and their effects. Unmaking security practices only makes sense once the a priori 
question of what security does has been answered. The (in)security of trafficked women 
and their vulnerability appear to create a context in which women can be different from 
illegal migrants or prostitutes. They can become part of a new category, supposedly 
enjoying increased security. To understand what security entails, it is important not to 
conceptualise it as a social or psychological state, but to understand it as a series of 
mechanisms, of technologies that attempt to establish such an order (whether social or 
psychological). Security is a question of power and its instantiation upon the social. Such 
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an approach would allow us to see not what security means, but what security does. 
Practices of security bring back victims of trafficking upon the category of illegal migrants 
from which human rights activists incessantly try to dis-identify them. The political role of 
security practices can be understood by exploring their effects upon the constitution of 
political communities, the functioning of social and economic processes and the governing 
of populations. 
The focus on effects, on how security discourses and practices work have led me 
to employ what I would call, following Paul Veyne's formulation, a 'methodology of the 
surface' (Veyne 1997). Effects are apparent on the surface; they are neither 
hermeneutically hidden nor simply an offshoot of structural causes. When asked to 
explain Foucault's method, Gilles Deleuze used a metaphor from Paul Val6ry* 'le plus 
profond, c'est la peau [the most profound is the skin]' (Deleuze 1990/translation mine). 4 
This dermatological metaphor does not oppose surface to depth, but indicates that 
everything is on the surface, at the level of appearances. 5 I have therefore re-read texts, 
reports, guidelines for actions, manifestos, affidavits, and legal files with the purpose of 
locating effects at the level of appearances. The interviews conducted with NGO 
representatives and police officials have not attempted to reach to a deeper meaning or 
interest that they would have in their representation of human trafficking. I have also not 
tried to do a minute analysis of technical details that would allow this research to discover 
contradictions between what is said and what is done. My interest has been in things that 
are always there, are reported, inscribed in documents and yet rarefied, made invisible 
through the very encounter with power. I have only tried to provide supplementary 
'surfaces' where written texts have been scarce, such as the details of NGO work with 
victims of trafficking. The 'archive', as the 'system of formation and transformation of 
statements' (Foucault 2002: 127) contains both that which can be said and that which can 
be rarefied or made invisible. It is at this point that I have diverged from much of the 
feminist methodology. In the encounter with power relations, the 'truth' of trafficking is 
41 owe some of these methodological clarifications to Mariana Valverde (Valverde 2003). 
5 In Chapter 5, the critique of Foucault's positivity of the social does not refute the importance of 
'surfaces', but indicates the need to conceptualise negativity and excess in a social system. 
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there and it only becomes obliterated through the exercise of power. This 'truth' does not 
wait to be discovered through personal encounters that would be somehow placed 
beyond power relations, but are already there. These 'appearances' might be invisible 
because they are located so much on the surface. 
Having unravelled the effects of security understood as a governmental practice 
that orders populations and constitutes forms of subjectivity through specific 
problematisations, I shall try to think what form of politics can emerge 'out of security. 
Politics out of security starts from the conditions of possibility of security and it disrupts 
them, reconfiguring the way power functions in a specific situation. Can human trafficking 
be taken 'out of security? This thesis will revisit different modes of thinking how 'politics 
out of security can come to be and will propose a form of politics that is inspired by a 
hybrid reading of Alain Badiou's and Lienne Balibars conceptualisation of a politics of 
emancipation and transformation. The thesis can also be read as a travelogue, 
formulating answers and revising them in light of their limits. 
The intersection of human trafficking and security 
The first chapter looks at how human trafficking has been 'problematised' by academics 
and practitioners alike. I use 'problematisation' to understand the various representations 
of trafficking: trafficking as a problem of migration, of organised crime, prostitution, or 
human rights abuse. Specific problematisations of trafficking enable certain interventions 
while limiting other representations and interventions. There is one representation that the 
literature on trafficking is wary of engaging with, i. e. the 'problematisation' of labour. In the 
context of the problematisation of migration, issues of labour are already framed in a 
discourse of 'legality/illegality'. Therefore, the problematisation of exploited labour as over- 
arching does not resonate with this literature. Where there is a consensus on how to move 
forward on the problem of trafficking is the question of human rights. A human rights 
approach is seen to provide a politically effective representation of trafficking. This chapter 
will argue that there is one limitation that does not allow for this political representation, 
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namely the meta-structuring of human trafficking by security. Yet, in the relevant literature, 
there is no account of what it means to problematise trafficking in security terms. 
Given this non-attention to the problem of security, Chapter 2 engages in a 
'problematisation of the problematisation' of security. It looks at how security has been 
problematised, at what questions have been asked about what security is. It argues that 
the problematique of security needs to be shifted to 'how' questions, questions of effects 
and how security works. The limitation or the expansion of the realm of security is a 
historical and empirical question. How security works can be unravelled by looking at the 
discourses and practices of various actors who are tackling the problem of human 
trafficking. Their practices have constitutive effects in terms of subjectivity and political 
effects in terms of the constitution of political community. The 'subjects' of these practices 
become 'abjects', excluded, dangerous, or risky others. The constitutive effects that 
practices of security entail, their structuring of the social fabric in exclusionary terms raises 
the question of how to unmake these effects of security. Can security be thought 
differently, reconceptualised so as to entail other forms of subjectivity? Can a form of 
$politics out of security be thought and what would such a politics entail? 
For much of critical security studies, security discourses and/or practices also 
appear as undesirable interventions upon the social. Some authors understand security in 
terms of urgency and exceptional practices that go beyond democratic practices (Waever, 
Huysmans, Behnke). Others see security practices as unjustly converging upon the figure 
of the enemy, more specifically the migrant (Bigo). Others still criticise the imaginary of 
certainty and identity that security built into the modem political subject (Bauman, 
Campbell, Dillon). My critical engagement with practices of security and the attempt to 
think a form of 'politics out of security' stem from an understanding of the necessary 
constitution and representation of a space of abjection inhabited by non-subjects or not- 
yet-subjects. The effects of security or what security does lead to a concern with how to 
suspend its logic of exclusion and tear down the closures it instantiates. 
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Unmaking security, a political task 
Chapter 3 opens up the question of how to unmake the effects of security by discussing 
three different strategies proposed in security studies and International Relations (IR): 
desecuritisation, emancipation, and ethics. While desecuritisation focuses on un-speaking 
security and replacing it by alternative discourses, emancipation and ethics attempt to 
reformulate the relation to the other. Emancipation endorses security as a relation that can 
be formulated towards the 'abject' rather than simply the 'subjects' who are to be made 
secure, while ethics deconstructs the very relationality between subject and abject by 
introducing unconditional principles in politics! 
These theoretical attempts are formulated in relation to a specific understanding of 
how security works: security as discourse, security as a promise, and security as the 
problematique of identity/difference. Chapter 4 brings an account of practice and power 
relations to bear upon these strategies of unmaking security. Alternative discourses are 
mobilised for governmental purposes. The expansion of security only shifts the spaces of 
abjection towards other categories of people. Various attempts at reconstituting the 
relation to trafficked women as dangerous illegal migrants into a relation to victims as 
objects of pity are re-appropriated and re-formulated within security practices. Rather than 
objects of pity, women continue to be risky bodies, abject carriers of an un-materialised 
threat. Medicalised and psychologised, 'victims of trafficking' are also depoliticised, their 
resistance to the constitutive effects of security is rendered meaningless, read only as a 
pathological reaction rather than a political statement. Is there a way out of this impasse? 
Drawing inspiration from Badiou's conceptualisation of a politics of excess, 
Chapter 5 will propose to think 'politics out of security' as an 'event'. Political events create 
new forms of subjectivity for the excessive elements of a situation and disrupt practices of 
security by enacting the principles of equality and universality. Unlike the ethical principles 
of infinite responsibility and pity, equality addresses everybody in a situation and is not 
liable to closure. 
6 The abject has been defined by Judith Butler as the domain of those who are not yet subjects, but 
who form the constitutive outside of the domain of the subject (Butler 1993). 
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This conceptualisation of politics will entail a shift from the representation of 
trafficked women or victims of trafficking as the 'abjects' of security to the presentation of 
illegal migrant prostitutes as excessive subjects. Illegal migrant prostitutes are neither 
included in the category of trafficked women nor in that of prostitutes. As illegal migrants, 
these women do not exist within the situation of trafficking. Trafficked women are not 
illegal migrant prostitutes, but are included in the situation by two moves: they are either 
unwilling, forced prostitutes or unwilling, forced migrants. Rather than integrated in the 
situation of prostitution/migration, trafficked women are to a certain extent divorced from it, 
differentiated from both prostitutes and migrants. A politics that would unmake the effects 
of security would therefore start from the standpoint of illegal migrant prostitutes rather 
than that of 'victims of trafficking'. Politics out of security disrupts the logic of security on 
the basis a claim to equality and universality. The profoundly inegalitarian claim of 
security, which separates those who are dangerous or risky from those who are not, is 
challenged by the enactment of equality. 
Yet, as Chapter 6 will show, a politics of equality cannot be restricted to the forms 
of collective subjectification and organisation of (legal and illegal) sex workers as a politics 
of event and excess contends. Equality and universality exist as already inscribed in 
institutions - be it as a result of previous struggles against oppression or as historical 
contingencies. Challenging inscriptions in institutional locations can sustain or even 
precede events that create the political subject of the (sex) worker. 
Chapter 7 will engage with the principles of politics and their limitation to the 
universal of equality as opposed to the famous opposition that political theory has 
discussed, namely between liberty and security. Trafficking in women has been 
remarkable through the absence of any claims to freedom. What are the limits of liberty 
that make it an impossible counterpart to security, despite a long tradition of political 
theory that has counterposed them? Combining insights from the debates on liberty with 
Balibar's conceptualisation of politics as equaliberty, this chapter will formulate a 'politics 
out of security' as a politics of equal liberty. Equal liberty implies that liberty cannot exist 
without equality, as inegalitarian claims to liberty only re-enact the logic of security. 
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The final chapter will think the conditions of a theory that can both support and 
judge praxis. Can theory make similar promises to the politics of equality and liberty? An 
interest in change is part of all critical theories and human trafficking is most 
conspicuously a phenomenon where 'change' has been hailed from all sides and by all 
those involved in one form or another with the phenomenon. The change that happens 
politically is not equivalent, however, to theoretical change. One will need to define the 
parameters and status of a theory that is harnessed to unmaking security. As this 
research attempts to formulate a critique against the effects of security, the conclusion will 
consider the implications of this critique for the concept of security. What does 'politics out 
of security' mean for the relation between politics and security? 
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1. In the absence of security? The problematisation of 
human trafficking 
Introduction 
[T]he Union's objective shall be to provide citizens with a high level of 
safety within an area of freedom, security and justice... That objective 
shall be achieved by preventing and combating crime, organised or 
otherwise, in particular terrorism, trafficking in persons and offences 
against children, illicit drug trafficking and illicit arm trafficking, corruption 
and fraud ... (European Union 1992/Title 6 Art. 
29). 
Human trafficking has been a recent addition to the European political agenda. After the 
1949 United Nations (UN) Protocol prohibiting human trade, trafficking became politically 
invisible until the end of the Cold War. In the nineties, Europe seemed to be confronted all 
of a sudden with a novel variant of trafficking, originating in the ex-communist countries in 
the now liberated East. Although concerns with human trafficking had surfaced before in 
other regions of the world and feminist international relations literature has drawn attention 
to practices of sex tourism and trafficking in South-East Asia (Enloe 1989; Moon 1997; 
Pettman 1996), in Europe the issue of trafficking had been quasi-invisible until the last 
decade. Suddenly raised to high political visibility, trafficking has become the topic of an 
ever-expanding literature. 
In the midst of a context defined by the 'war on terror', where the security of the 
EU and its Member States has acquired a new urgency (Council of the European Union 
2004), human trafficking is never far from the overarching concern with terrorism. The EU 
Hague Programme on the area of freedom, security and justice spells out the need for a 
more effective approach in 'cross-border problems such as illegal migration, trafficking in 
and smuggling of human beings, terrorism and organised crime, as well as the prevention 
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thereof (Council of the European Union 2004: 3). The UK also made human trafficking 
one of its major concerns alongside terrorism for the 2005 Presidency of the European 
Council (UK Government 2005). 
The visibility of the phenomenon, its novelty and protean nature, verging between 
concerns with immigration, organised crime, prostitution and human rights abuses have 
contributed to a literature boom across disciplines. The descriptive terms include human 
trafficking, human trade, trafficking in human beings, trafficking in persons, trafficking in 
women, alien smuggling, trafficking of aliens, illegal immigrant smuggling, trade of human 
beings, human commodity trafficking, and the list could continue. To accommodate the 
protean nature of trafficking, the literature has called for a comprehensive analysis from 
various vantage points. The perspectives on trafficking have been therefore diverse: 
moral, criminal, migration, human rights, public order, labour or gender (Kelly and Regan 
2000: 4). 
Although acknowledging these multiple perspectives, the literature on human 
trafficking has kept them largely separate, on the assumption that insights from various 
fields would lead to differentiated knowledge about trafficking. The 'holistic' or integrated 
approach that the OSCE has promoted since the late nineties could be described as an 
attempted felicitous addition of these perspectives (OSCE 1999). Much of the research 
done on human trafficking either has privileged one of the perspectives Kelly and Regan 
enumerate or has used a method of perspective addition. The recent attempt by the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) to introduce 'forced labour as an overarching 
perspective that would incorporate human trafficking as one of its manifestations has not 
fared very well, as it rejects the very idea of perspective addition (ILO 2005). It is not 
difficult to imagine that the question of labour as an over-arching perspective is a very 
sensitive one for the other perspectives involved and would problematise the easy 
addition of the various facets of trafficking (especially migration, human rights, and 
prostitution). 
Whether done under the auspices of the EU or other international organisations 
such as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), by non-governmental 
19 
organisations or independently by academics, research has 'vectored' human trafficking in 
the direction of migration, organised crime, prostitution or human rights. [an Hacking has 
coined the term 'vector' in an analysis of how 'mad travellers' have been historically 
constructed (Ian Hacking 1998). The word is used both in mechanics and epidemiology 
and Hacking uses it as a metaphor for a force acting in a certain direction. For me, 'vector 
is also important in its epidemiological sense of 'transmitter' (Homby 2000). Some of the 
elements of migration, organised crime, and prostitution are 'transmitted' to human 
trafficking. Human trafficking has been integrated in various taxonomies and much of the 
research has focused on drawing boundaries and pointing out differences between 
problems. Human trafficking has been in turn divided, contrasted, and assimilated to 
migration, organised crime, prostitution, and human rights abuses in what I call a literature 
of vectoral transformation. This chapter will explore the implications of 'vectoral 
transformation' and will consider what limits that literature- sets itself and what limits are 
set by the context from which concepts are borrowed and 'naturalised'. 
The texts I shall consider in this chapter are not restricted either to the discipline of 
IR or more largely to academic literature. Research on trafficking cuts across academic 
work and the practitioners' interest in understanding the phenomenon they deal with. Most 
of the literature on trafficking is underpinned by the assumption that human trafficking is a 
phenomenon to be discovered, that its definition can capture and express its'real nature'. 
While mobilising various theories in this search for the nature of trafficking, the literature 
on human trafficking also tries to grasp the 'real nature' of trafficked women. What kind of 
migrants, what kind of criminals or exactly what type of prostitutes are they? What 
category of human rights bearers could they be? Trafficked women need only a 
refinement of existing categories to be made sense of. Although the category of 'trafficked 
women' has undergone an explicit process of social construction, the same process is not 
acknowledged in relation to the other categories that it evokes and rests upon. There is no 
recognition that these are socially constructed categories and therefore debates about 
who is trafficked, what type of migrant, prostitute etc. they are, are not just technical, but 
deeply political. 
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The approach undertaken in this chapter starts from a different epistemological 
position than the one generally endorsed by the trafficking literature. Paraphrasing Laclau 
and Mouffe (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: A), one could say that this literature partakes of the 
illusion of a non-discursively mediated access to things. Although I consider trafficking to 
be a discursive construction, it is neither an object of infinite representations nor solely a 
linguistic object. Following Michel Foucault, I understand discourse as including 
institutional practices. Discourse goes beyond the 'linguistic turn' and the emphasis on 
language as constitutive of reality. Language plays an important role in labelling people 
and creating categories of subjects; this role is only made possible under certain 
conditions. In Hacking's formulation, discourse is to be analysed not in terms of what it 
says but in terms of the conditions under which those sentences will have a definite truth 
value (2002: 79). Among the material conditions of discourses, Foucault lists institutions, 
economic and social processes, systems of norms, techniques, types of classification, 
modes of characterisation (2002: 49). Various representations of trafficking have been 
made thinkable by being embedded in specific institutional configurations, economic, 
social and political processes. 
The literature on trafficking can be read as a nexus of specific problematisations, 
in Michel Foucault's terminology. Paul Rabinow has put in a nutshell Foucault's 
understanding of problematisations: 
(A] problematization ... does not mean representation of a preexistent 
object nor the creation through discourse of an object that did not exist. It 
is the ensemble of discursive and nondiscursive practices that make 
something enter into the play of true and false and constitute it as an 
object of knowledge... (Rabinow 2003: 18). 
Through problematisation, the literature on human trafficking attempts to present the truth 
about human trafficking and solve the uncertainty of what trafficking is. While discourses 
on trafficking are made possible by existing institutional configurations and political 
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practices in relation to migration, organised crime, or prostitution, this chapter explores the 
role of discourses as representations. The various representations of the problem of 
trafficking will in turn be shaping the interventions to manage this problem. As discourses 
allow certain things to be said, thought and done and impede other things from being said, 
thought and done (Hunt 1994: 8), certain representations of trafficking enable particular 
tools and measures while impeding other understandings and projects. The 
representations of trafficking allow the enactment of a particular politics while excluding 
the prospects of different political actions. 
'Problematisation' is what makes possible the governmentality of trafficking. 
Something can be done about trafficking only if we know what trafficking is. The 
problematisation of trafficking, through the various representations of the phenomenon, 
creates an object of knowledge that can be subsequently governed. For the purposes of 
this chapter, I have also used problem atisation as a methodological tool that allows a 
mixture of texts that have various institutional sources but share a common concern with 
what trafficking is. 
In the various literatures that discuss the phenomenon, human trafficking appears 
embedded in a discursive structure of migration, organised crime and prostitution and 
where debates on human trafficking surface, they are still limited and framed in terms of 
the former terms. Migration, organised crime and prostitution are taken as the starting 
points in the analysis of trafficking. Problematisation is therefore intrinsically related to 
vectoral transformation. By means of problematising trafficking in these terms - this 
chapter argues - the trafficking literature vectors its object in directions already traced by 
knowledge accumulated in the fields of migration, organised crime or prostitution. 
As my excerpt from the EU Treaty indicates, representations are not 'natural' 
constituents of trafficking, but are already framed in a discourse on security. Concerns 
with human trafficking are inseparable from the establishment of an area of security, 
freedom and justice and various EU documents, most recently the Hague Programme, 
have not failed to point out the connections (Council of the European Union 2004). 
Despite the conspicuous presence of security as an assumption in these documents, 
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security is mostly absent from the frameworks envisaged in the research on human 
trafficking. Its fleeting appearance in an OSCE document in 1999 has not led to any 
substantial engagement with the relation between security and human trafficking (OSCE 
1999). The few texts that consider security and human trafficking have been restricted to 
security studies. Human rights activists and other state or non-state practitioners in the 
field of trafficking have eschewed the question of security. PhD theses or journal articles 
on trafficking often do not even mention 'security' as a concern. 
This research starts therefore from the absence of security or what would rather be 
an absence in presence. It starts there not simply due to this author's positioning in the 
field of IR rather than other fields, but due to an assumption that, as absence in presence, 
security does unacknowledged work. Security assumptions are present in relation to the 
problem of trafficking, yet absent from most of the literature on trafficking. I am interested 
not in why there is an absence of security considerations, but in how this absence 
influences and limits what can be said and done about human trafficking. Security itself 
becomes one of the factors of vectoral transformation, despite its absence from the visible 
problematisations of trafficking. Migration, organised crime and prostitution are already 
vectored in a discourse of threats and/or risks and the representation of trafficking as a 
subcategory reproduces practices of security. The problematisation of trafficking is 
already shaped by previous strategies concerning migration, organised crime and 
prostitution. Although the question of how security works and what its effects are requires 
an answer which will be developed over two chapters (2 and 3), this chapter will consider 
the implications of a problematisation of trafficking in the absence of security. 
The work of the absence is most interesting where an alternative discourse on 
trafficking is set in place. As the representation of trafficking as a human rights abuse 
attempts to impose an alternative discourse to that of migration, organised crime and 
prostitution and challenge the interventions that these linkages entail, the approach is 
seen to be invariably failing. While challenging the way migration or prostitution are dealt 
with and the effects that these interventions have upon victims of trafficking and other 
categories of people, this form of critical engagement does not tackle the meta-structuring 
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logic of security. The meta-structuring effects that security inscribes upon trafficking and 
the limitations it entails for a politics that attempts to challenge the dominant ways in which 
human trafficking is represented will be explored later on, particularly in Chapters 3 and 4. 
For the purposes of this chapter, however, I shall glean intimations of the problem from 
the proponents of the approach themselves. The human rights approach enters a field in 
which there are already 'legitimate' representations of what trafficking is. I shall argue that, 
despite its opposition to the visible representations of migration or prostitution, the 
humanitarian approach fails to conceptualise its relation to security. 
Governmentality and the problematisation of human trafficking 
The problematisation of human trafficking is part of a concern with governing and ordering 
society. 'Governmentality', the term coined by Foucault to express this concern with the 
ordering, administration and regulation of society is not a new term in IR. It has been used 
to understand different practices of security (Bigo 1996; Dillon 1995b; Huysmans 1998a), 
of regionalisation (Walters and Larner 2002), migration regimes (Huysmans 2004a; 
Lippert 1999), global liberal governance (Dillon 2004; Dillon and Reid 2001) or terrorism 
(Aradau and van Munster 2007 forthcoming). IR has been able to draw on a vast literature 
which has undertaken sociological analyses of governmental practices, from 
unemployment to the government of pregnancy, and which has employed and refined the 
categories and conceptual tools devised by Foucault. According to him, 
[t]his word [government] must be allowed the very broad meaning which 
it had in the sixteenth century. 'Government' did not refer only to political 
structures or the management of states; rather it designates the way in 
which the conduct of individuals or states might be directed: the 
government of children, of souls, of communities, of families, of the sick. 
It did not cover only the legitimately constituted forms of political or 
economic subjection, but also modes of action, more or less considered, 
which were designed to act upon the possibilities of action of other 
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people. To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action 
of others (Foucault 1982: 221). 
If government is concerned with shaping and directing the actions or the conduct of 
others, 'governmentality' refers to the political rationality or'mentality' that has made this 
concern its own. To shape the field of action of others, it is important first to understand 
the problem that confronts them. It is in this sense that one can speak of the 
problematisation of trafficking as part of a larger governmental concern. Mitchell Dean and 
Barry Hindess have located four domains for a governmental analysis: the study of 
problematisations, of modes of reasoning, of technical aspects and the formation and 
shaping of identities (Dean and Hindess 1998a). Problematisations appear in definite 
institutional and social locales, at a specific time and place and reflect upon a task that is 
at hand. They imply contestation between various actors and competing speculative 
interpretations about what the task at hand is. 
In this sense, problematisation can be thought as a form of representation. 
Representations form the object they depict and purport to tell the 'truth' about what is 
represented. They create a 'managed space in which some statements and depictions 
come to have greater value than others' (Campbell 1992: 6). While representation has 
become a cherished term in cultural studies to refer to mediatic and all sorts of spaces 
where personal experiences and other narratives can enter, problematisations function 
7 around the element of 'knowledge'. Problematisations create a managed space where 
knowledge plays an important role for the representation of trafficking. They are, 
therefore, more than a simple serniotic system of representation. Problematisations both 
foster and rely upon forms of knowledge and expertise. The problematisation of trafficking 
relies upon knowledge and expertise in various fields (migration, gender, organised crime, 
etc. ), while simultaneously fostering a new field of knowledge, human trafficking. 
Problematisation is close to Hacking's specific understanding of representation. 
Hacking has discussed representation in the context of natural sciences, thus making 
7 On this largely accepted understanding of representation see Shapiro (Shapiro 1988). 
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knowledge one of the elements of representation. By representation, he means theories 
rather than specific everyday instances of representation. In an almost circular definition, 
representations are complicated speculations which attempt to represent our world (Ian 
Hacking 1983: 133). Problem atisations involve speculation and theory, they depend upon 
expert knowledge. The problematisation of human trafficking involves theoretical 
representations which attempt to ground the truth about trafficking in knowledge. 
Problematising trafficking in terms of migration, organised crime or prostitution activates a 
theoretical apparatus and expertise already present in the academic fields which have 
tackled these issues. We shall see that human rights approaches to trafficking are 
underpinned by the knowledge of psychology rather than theories of human rights. 
The knowledgeable discourses I consider here represent, and in this sense 
constitute human trafficking as an object of knowledge. They confer particular identities 
and agencies on different actors (the trafficked victim, the migrant, NGOs, police etc. ) and 
make identifiable problems to be solved (the prevention of trafficking, of illegal migration) 
(cf. Dean and Hindess 1998b: 9). The problematisation of human trafficking creates a 
language and a regime of intelligibility (Rose 1999), which make trafficking amenable to 
intervention. A governmental approach makes explicit the emergence of human trafficking 
from various sources of knowledge and its dependence upon particular forms of 
knowledge and expertise. 
As Miller and Rose have put it, '[g]overning a sphere requires that it can be 
represented, depicted in a way that both grasps its truth and re-presents it in a form in 
which it can enter the sphere of conscious political calculation' (Miller and Rose 1990: 82). 
Governing trafficking requires first the conceptualisation of the situation and the set of 
relations at work, as governing is only possible under a certain description. The 
problematisation of human trafficking involves competing attempts to depict the domain of 
trafficking in a way that grasps its real nature and thus represents it as a field for 
governmental intervention. Governmentality involves the representation of objects from 
reality as problematic, thereby attempting to re-order reality in terms of solvable problems. 
The goal of much of the literature on trafficking is to understand the 'real' nature of 
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trafficking, thereby being able to propose adequate solutions for dealing with this problem. 
The 'real' nature of trafficking entails the creation of a regime of truth about an object of 
knowledge. 
The knowledge of the problem of trafficking is, however, not restricted to the 
knowledge of an object. It also needs to provide adequate knowledge about the subjects 
of governmental interventions: traffickers and trafficked people, migrants or the poor more 
generally as vulnerable categories, as well as all other categories which potential 
trafficked persons can encounter (clients, police, etc. ). Knowledge about the people who 
are part of the phenomenon and their relations can contribute to a better overall 
knowledge about trafficking as well as to better ways of shaping their conduct. 
Human trafficking is thus formulated as a problem for the authorities who need to 
devise ways to deal with it. Trafficking will be approached differently depending on 
whether it is considered a problem of illegal migration, of prostitution or organised crime. 
Different policies will be developed and trafficked women will be dealt with differently, 
depending on whether they are considered illegal migrants, prostitutes, victims of trickery, 
of ignorance or bearers of human rights. Representation is simultaneously a form of 
intervention, both by conferring specific identities to categories of people and by limiting 
and steering what can be done about these people. Interventions are inseparable from 
representations of the problem to be governed. 
The specificity of governmentality, according to Hacking, lies in this complex inter- 
weaving of procedures for representing and intervening (1983). The complexity of the 
relation between representation and intervention makes impossible the distinction 
between knowledge that would provide insights into a phenomenon and practice-oriented 
knowledge that is conceptualised in relation to a goal of intervention. Inasmuch as the 
literature on human trafficking engages in a contestation of what trafficking is and 
attempts to stabilise the 'truth' about its meaning, it is governmental, a combination of 
representation and intervention. The concept of government in relation to the trafficking 
literature erases the difference between academic and policy-making literature as in this 
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case all authors are concerned with strategically influencing actions or the 'conduct of 
conduct' (Foucault 1991). 
If 'acts of governing actually constitute and make up the zones on which they act 
and the entities upon which they act' (Rose 2001a: 145), the concept of governing raises 
the issue of the responsibility of writing. As governmentality does away with the idea of 
pre-existing objects that can be adequately described and known, the knowledge that is 
formed under the imperative of the problem of trafficking is complicit in the power relations 
that govern trafficking. The last chapter shall return to this problem of the responsibility of 
writing and the possibilities of a non-governmental theory. Human trafficking therefore 
emerges as an object of discourse and knowledge out of these attempts to establish a 
veridical discourse about its nature. 
Nevertheless, I do not want to imply that the literature considered here is unaware 
of the political game it is involved in or brings it to a common denominator of deliberate 
ignorance of the political stakes. Some of the texts explicitly acknowledge their attempt to 
enter the political arena and change things. Most of the literature, whether academic or 
practice-oriented, is written with the purpose of intervention and transformation of existing 
regimes to govern human trafficking. 
My incursion into the trafficking literature will be 'steered' by two questions. The 
first question is: how is human trafficking formulated as a problem? I shall look at how 
trafficking is represented as an object to be known, analysed, and evaluated. In 
representing human trafficking, this literature claims to depict and tell the truth about what 
is represented. Trafficking needs to be conceptualised in a particular way and it is by 
means of this representation that who and what is trafficked are shaped in a manageable 
form. As problematisation is inseparable from intervention, the follow-up question is: how 
do these representations also intervene? The literature on trafficking is explicitly 
interventionist and could bear the motto of 'a plea for action' (von Struensee 2000). 
However, this plea is addressed to somebody else, mainly the various authorities and 
much of the literature does not perceive itself as intervening by means of the 
representations it puts forth. The literature on human trafficking needs to reflect on the 
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'governmental' work it does and on the 'governmental' space upon which it inscribes 
human trafficking, a space already structured and categorised in security terms. By 
inserting human trafficking in a space already shaped by discourses and institutional 
practices, the literature on trafficking is already subjected to the closure that this very 
space has already enacted. 
Human trafficking as a problem of migration 
The European Council is determined to tackle at its source illegal 
immigration, especially by combating those who engage in trafficking in 
human beings and economic exploitation of migrants' (European Council 
1999). 
Human trafficking and migration are seen here as inseparable realities. Van Impe has 
defined human trafficking as an 'epiphenomenon within the continuum of the migration 
cycle' (Van Impe 2000: 115). According to him, trafficking in women 'has to be seen in the 
larger context of illegal migration flows and analysed against the backdrop of worldwide 
economic and political change' (Van Impe 2000: 123). For many other authors as for Van 
Impe, trafficking is a subcategory of migration or rather illegal migration. Similarly, for the 
IOM, trafficking constitutes the antithesis of 'humane and orderly migration' that the 
organisation upholds (e. g. Anderson and O'Connell Davidson 2003). 
The commitment to advancing the understanding of migration has driven the IOM 
research in relation to trafficking. Very early on, the IOM was involved in defining 
trafficking. In its initial definitions, it did not differentiate trafficking from smuggling, which 
involved the crossing of borders with the help of an intermediary. Trafficking was defined 
as occurring when 'a migrant is illicitly engaged (recruited, kidnapped, sold, etc. ) and/or 
moved, either within national or across international borders; (or when] intermediaries 
(traffickers) during any part of this process obtain economic or other profit by means of 
deception, coercion and/or other forms of exploitation under conditions that violate the 
fundamental human rights of migrants' (IOM 1999). The addition of trafficking 'within 
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national borders' to cross-border forms of trafficking has not become politically relevant; 
the IOM projects on counter-trafficking/smuggling have been subsumed under the fight of 
illegal migration. Trafficking, just like other forms of migration, is part of an overall concern 
with reducing illegal migration. 
The link between trafficking and migration has mostly gone unchallenged. Certain 
authors make explicit this connection by keeping the signifier 'migrant' or 'migration' in the 
denomination of trafficking. Phil Williams has argued that 
illegal migrant trafficking is a large and growing industry, facilitated by the 
ease of travel, corruption or laxity of immigration officials in a significant 
number of countries, and driven by the asymmetry between the number 
of people wanting to migrate (for whatever reason) and the restrictions 
imposed by governments on the number of immigrants legally allowed to 
enter their countries (P. Williams 1999: 2). 
Almost all definitions of trafficking include the element of 'movement across borders'. 
Even when authors note the existence of intra-border trafficking, it is considered a rather 
sporadic form of trafficking, which has not challenged the dominant understanding of 
trafficking as an international problem of managing migration (Jordan 2002). 
Although some scholars believe that the conceptual and definitional uncertainties 
concerning the issue of trafficking in human beings challenge rather than strengthen the 
traditional migration theories by blurring the boundaries between legality and illegality and 
between forced and voluntary movements (Apap et al. 2002: 23), these processes of 
subcategorisation require just a refinement of migration theories to accommodate the 
novel variant of trafficking. Most of the literature is rather optimistic about integrating 
trafficking in categories of migration and focuses on the refinement or further specification 
of categories. 
When illegal migration is considered, Salt and Stein, for example, prefer to 
describe trafficked migrants as irregular/undocumented rather than illegal because at 
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various stages they might drift in and out of a legal status (Salt and Stein 1997). Victims of 
trafficking do not always enter illegally the territory of another country as they might have 
obtained tourist visas, temporary work permits or legal status through marriage. Or they 
might enter illegally and obtain legal status at a later stage. Koser has noted that the term 
'illegal', when applied to migration, has been used to cover a variety of situations normally 
concerning conditions of entry, residence and employment (Koser 1998: 186). Other 
authors have also noted that the very notion of illegal migration covers a wide spectrum 
on which every sovereign state decides (Apap et al. 2002). The task of the literature is to 
note, monitor these various usages and integrate them within existing theories. 
This task is more difficult when it comes to forms of forced or voluntary 
movements. Is trafficking forced or voluntary migration? The methods of recruitment can 
occasionally involve kidnapping, yet research has pointed out the wilful undertaking of 
migration projects by trafficked women. The difference between forced and voluntary 
migration becomes even more complicated when one considers structural causes. Do 
women who choose to migrate to escape poverty make a voluntary choice? Moreover, if 
women start their journey by choice, elements of force and coercion can appear at other 
stages in the process of trafficking. As Koser has pointed out in the case of illegal 
migration, coercion covers conditions of entry, residence and employment. Even if women 
are not forced to leave their country of origin, they are often forced to do sex work instead 
of the jobs that had been advertised. The solution has been to loosen the meaning of 
force to cover various forms of coercion, from physical coercion to the use of deceit. 
Within the migration framework, the understanding of human trafficking is driven 
by a process of categorisation. Categories of illegal, irregular, undocumented or simply 
deceived migrants overlap and are refined to adequately express the reality of trafficking. 
There is no awareness of the fact that these categories are socially constructed, artefacts 
of legislation. The debate concerning the conceptual distinction between smuggling and 
trafficking is based on such attempts at categorisation. Apap et al. (2002: 18) suggest that 
trafficking and smuggling should be seen as part of a continuum. Smuggling is clearly 
concerned with the manner in which a person enters the country and with the involvement 
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of a 'facilitator' of illegal entry. Trafficking is supplemented by a concern with the migrants' 
working conditions and treatment after they enter the country (Apap et al. 2000). Unlike 
Apap et al., Salt is in favour of clearly differentiating trafficking from smuggling by 
emphasising the exploitative element of trafficking (Salt 2000). 
The concept of exploitation can represent an awkward intruder in the debate on 
the distinction between trafficking and smuggling. Migrant labourers, and especially illegal 
migrant labourers, frequently find themselves forced into exploitative working conditions. 
In this sense, they are just like the victims of trafficking. Yet, migrant labourers have not 
necessarily been tricked or deceived during the migration process. Trafficking, on the 
contrary, is taken to refer to the transportation of people within countries or across 
international borders using force, trickery or the abuse of power. 
The conceptual distinction between smuggling and trafficking leads Wijers and van 
Doornick to conclude that while smuggling constitutes an offence against the state, in the 
case of trafficking, human rights violations give rise to certain obligations on the part of the 
state under international human rights law to protect victims (2002: 7). In such an 
approach, any movement across borders which is not sanctioned by the receiving state is 
problematic. 'Exploitation' could thus subvert the clear distinctions that definitions of illegal 
or irregular migration reproduce between state-sanctioned cross-border movement and 
other forms of movement. Hence, considerations of exploitation are to be limited to the 
framework of trafficking, once movement and other forms of deceit have been made 
explicit. 
Some scholars have challenged the understanding of trafficking as a specific form 
of migration which combines different forms of constraint and have put forward the idea 
that trafficking is an 'unintended consequence' of restrictive migration policies and of the 
efforts to curb illegal entry and illegal employment of migrants. Koser has pointed out that 
the activities of smugglers and traffickers have flourished in the context of tightening 
political restrictions (Koser 1998). Given that legal channels of migration are more and 
more reduced or restricted to specific categories such as highly skilled migrants, other 
types of migrants have recourse to mediating parties. Andrijasevic has also remarked that 
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EU visa regimes and restrictive immigration regulation work in favour of the third party 
organisers of trafficking as a supplementary migration system or an alternative to the EU 
system (Andrijasevic 2003). 
This rendering of the phenomenon of trafficking blurs the image of the trafficker as 
the evil foreigner who takes advantage of the liberal policies of the EU Member States. 
Trafficking becomes more similar to assisted migration and research has shown that the 
business of trafficking is often dependent on the reputation that traffickers establish as 
well as their success rates (Koser 1998). While recruitment by a trafficker has been a 
definitional characteristic of trafficking, this research likens the trafficker to a service 
provider. By challenging both the description of trafficking and of traffickers, these 
approaches equally question migration policies. Yet, in formulating 'accusations' against 
restrictive migration policies, they do not engage with the very limitations that do not allow 
such normative claims. Without engaging with the security construction of migration, it is 
impossible to understand how such claims are limited in their effects. 
The literature on trafficking which has taken the migration lens has problematised 
trafficking without being able to engage in the 'problematisation of the problem atisation' 
(Campbell 1998b). While debating categories of legality/illegality, forced/voluntary 
migration, this literature has not questioned what the category of illegal migration allows to 
be done about trafficking and what it excludes. It has assumed that illegal migration is a 
problem that needs to be fought against, thus indirectly fighting trafficking. The 
problematisation of trafficking concurs largely with the existent ways of dealing with illegal 
migration. 
Moreover, this approach takes as given the security concerns that inform the 
representations of illegal migration and the interventions to manage the phenomenon. 
Anti-trafficking policies are just a subcategory of those targeting illegal migrants. Van Impe 
could therefore argue in favour of preventive measures for human trafficking in order to 
obstruct'the considerable misuse of various channels of migration' (2000: 121). Vectoring 
human trafficking through migration leads to the interpretation of trafficking as illegal 
migration with a surplus, i. e. the exploitative trafficker. While this representation of the 
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trafficker as the evil foreigner makes possible repressive policies targeted at him/her, 
'vectoring' has effects on trafficked and non-trafficked migrants that are ignored in this 
literature. 
The categorisation of the object of trafficking constitutes categorlsed identities for 
the subjects of trafficking. The literature on trafficking intervenes at two levels: at one level 
by explicitly promoting policies to tackle the phenomenon of trafficking and at another 
level by fostering the category of trafficked women. These two types of interventions are 
intimately linked, as the categorisation of women limits the policies that are devised to 
deal with them. Whether women are perceived as rational illegal migrants, powerless 
deceived victims, illegal prostitutes, irregular workers or, most recently, trafficking 
survivors influences the policies adopted by authorities. Specific categorisations are 
governed by specific policies. 
This literature does not reflect on how it takes up and embodies assumptions 
about illegal migration or how it reinforces these assumptions by the problematisation of 
trafficking in terms of illegal migration. Even when this literature reaches the conclusion 
that categories of migration, trafficking and smuggling are actually blurred in practice 
(Apap et al. 2002: 17), it does not consider that these are theoretical constructs and not 
natural givens. Likewise, when migration policies are seen as a cause of trafficking, these 
policies are presented as a case of misguided or cynical calculations by politicians. 
Interestingly, despite the lack of attention to how other categories have been created and 
how challenging those can be subject to limitation, the very category of 'trafficked 
persons/women' appears as an intervention and artificial creation. 
Human trafficking as a problem of organised crime 
The major threat of organised crime for society is that criminal networks 
develop a strong economic and 'political' structure in society through 
legitimate ways. The underlying motive for such criminal penetration is 
the opportunity to make a profit quickly with little risk, unhindered by rules 
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or just making use of weak rules, circumstances and 'cover techniques' 
(European Commission 2001 a). 
The organised crime framework is parallel to the migration one in terms of the arguments 
it puts forth and similar strategies to create a niche for human trafficking as a specific form 
of organised crime. As with migration, the link between trafficking and organised crime 
raises definitional problems and identification problems. What is organised crime and who 
are the criminal organisations which have established themselves as 'travel agents' for 
illegal migrants? Defining what organised crime is has proved an extremely difficult task 
because of the multi-faceted nature of criminal organisations (Apap et al. 2002). In relation 
to trafficking, it is necessary 'to identify the new forms of criminal organisations that seem 
to be active in this sector... We should determine whether the subjects in question are 
recycled from other criminal experiences or whether we are dealing with new 
organisations'(Pomodoro 2001: 241). 
The answers provided in the literature on the proliferation and categories of 
criminal organisations are as varied as they are contradictory. In Phil Williams' 
interpretation, some organisations are target-specific, while other well-established criminal 
groups have simply diversified their activities into one more profitable area of activity (P. 
Williams 1999). Trafficking is either the unique profit-making activity of an organisation or 
an addition to other criminal activities such as drug- or arms-trafficking. For Shannon 
(1999), criminal organisations frequently conduct trafficking in conjunction with other illicit 
ventures (Shannon 1999). Other authors such as Bertone see sex trafficking as a 'large 
scale, highly organised and profitable international business venture transcending state 
borders and nationalities of women who supply the commodity of sex and of men who 
demand it' (Bertone 2000: 7). Organised crime is represented as an insidious type of 
threat, penetrating the state and destabilising its functions, while at the same time 
surpassing it. Unlike migration, which is a threat that the state can manage by appropriate 
strategies that promote legal migration and deter illegal forms, organised crime is 
experienced as a very serious challenge. 
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The literature on organised crime and trafficking warns against some of the 
conclusions which have been reached in the migration literature. One should beware of 
the portrayal of organised crime as 'relatively harmless, a form of borderline 
entrepreneurship that feeds on opportunities provided by various forms of prohibition' (P. 
Williams 1999: 1). Human trafficking cannot be a benign form of business venture when it 
is linked with organised crime. Organised crime is most often perceived as external, 
involving 'alien' actors who subvert otherwise orderly, law-abiding, subjects whether these 
be bureaucracies, corporations, markets or the internal security of the polis itself (Edwards 
and Gill 2002: 253). 
Despite this disagreement, the debate in the literature on trafficking and organised 
crime focuses, just like with migration, on creating categories and drawing boundaries. Is 
human trafficking (partly) synonymous with large-scale organised crime? Research often 
contests the hypothesis of large-scale organised crime which is supposedly at the heart of 
the trafficking phenomenon. Vocks and Nijboer see trafficking as 'small networks of 
recruiters and exploiters, who knew each other' (Vocks and Nijboer 2000: 385). The 
consequence they point out is that, through such connections, exploiters can make very 
real threats to victims and their families. By expanding the conceptualisation of organised 
crime, these authors expand simultaneously the scope of what human trafficking is and 
entrench the link between trafficking and organised crime. In a trial at the Galati Court of 
Justice, Romania, the judge decided that the eight persons involved in transporting and 
exploiting women for prostitution in Spain did not constitute an organised group because 
there was no hierarchy and no precise tasks for each of the members. 8 Such a decision 
would most likely be considered inappropriate by Vocks and Nijboer. 
Some authors have tried to replace the 'bureaucratic' model of organised criminal 
activity implicit in Mafia-type analyses with a more complex understanding of organised 
criminality as being developed and sustained... through networks rather than omnipotent 
criminal families or imperatively-coordinated cartels (Taylor and Jamieson 1999: 259). If 
the 'Mafia shorthand' is thought to be no longer adequate for the description of 
a Legal archive for case R/1418/05, consulted in January 2006. 
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transnational organised crime, the concept as such is not questioned. Just like migration, 
organised crime is considered a natural given whose nature needs to be adequately 
grasped. According to Finkenauer, human trafficking seems to fall more into the 'crime 
that is organised' category than it does into 'true' organised crime (Finkenauer 2001: 172). 
The IOM has also described a mostly often direct relationship between the women being 
trafficked and their traffickers. Interviews suggested that traffickers are often young 
criminals, attracted by the possibility of earning easy money even at the cost of profiting 
from girls/women that were friends, school mates or neighbours in their home town or 
village' (quoted in Finkenauer 2001: 174). The literature can, however, accommodate 
them by creating new categories of organised crime such as middlemen networks. 
Kyle and Koslowski have pointed out that some migrant smugglers are more akin 
to the historical 'free traders' of an earlier era (Kyle and Koslowski 2001: 48). They 
denounce existing studies of human smuggling for using a particularly a-historical concept 
of organised crime that allows no conceptual space for analysing the organisational 
sources of transnational human smuggling. What they call for is actually an enriched and 
expanded concept of 'organised crime' able to accommodate the strategies of human 
smuggling/trafficking. Rather than the Mafia-type organisation which has been 
stereotypically linked with organised crime, these authors claim a flexible concept which 
will accommodate various types of structures. Such a concept can also ultimately 
accommodate individual traffickers. As in the case of migration, these approaches do not 
question how organised crime has become a threat of such proportions for the EU. Just 
like illegal migration, organised crime is taken for granted as a reality among many where 
specific policies are at work. The main concern of these authors is to distinguish trafficking 
as another 'reality, to show how it is simultaneously different and related to organised 
crime. 
More than simply a variation of organised crime, the essence of human trafficking 
is often seen as that of crime. As Donna Hughes has put it, without recruiters, traffickers 
and pimps, trafficking in women would not exist (Hughes 2000: 10). Human trafficking can 
only exist and be explained in relation to crime. In this approach, organised crime is no 
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more of a theoretical construct than illegal migration was for the migration literature. What 
remains unquestioned is the intervening power of its categorisations and the effects these 
entail upon those who are categorised. By considering organised crime as a natural given 
to be adequately grasped and problematising human trafficking in terms of organised 
crime, this literature implicitly takes up the construction of these problems as threats and 
the modes of intervention associated with it. 
This does not mean that critical engagement with the description of organised 
crime is lacking. Wijers and van Doorninck have noted that a criminal approach focuses 
on individual victims and perpetrators, leaving aside structural causes (Wijers and van 
Doorninck 2002). Moreover, they wam that a criminal approach can expose women to 
secondary victimisation, risks of retaliation from the perpetrators, harassment by the 
authorities in the home country or stigmatising exposure to the home community. 
However, these critiques are unable to replace a general construction of organised crime 
as a threat to society by individual concerns of clearly limited groups. Organised crime is 
already located in a securitised discourse which vectors human trafficking and establishes 
a logic of suspicion for trafficked women. Trafficked women are continually suspected of 
not being genuine victims, of taking advantage of the system or, even worse, of being 
involved themselves in these networks. The cases of victims of trafficking who later on 
become recruiters themselves are used as examples of the ubiquity of networks and their 
power of infiltration. 
Human trafficking as a problem of prostitution 
The nightmare of human trafficking is upon us ... it is a stain on our 
culture. [... ] We see it in the plate glass windows of Antwerp and 
Hamburg; it inundates the centres and pavements of Amsterdam, Paris, 
Athens, and Rome; it is the product for sale in the markets of London and 
Madrid (Diamantopoulos 2001)... 
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Human trafficking has also provided a new locale for debates on prostitution. The 
categorisation of trafficking as prostitution is a historical inheritance, which has not been 
displaced by concerns with other forms of forced labour such as domestic work. The 1949 
LIN Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of the 
Prostitution of Others states that 'prostitution and the accompanying evil of the traffic in 
persons for the purpose of prostitution are incompatible with the dignity and worth of 
human persons and endanger the welfare of the individual, the family and the community' 
(LIN 1949). The resurgence of trafficking in the 1990s has entailed a fierce debate around 
the Protocol and its abolitionist approach to prostitution as a social evil. 
The 2001 UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol, some feminist activists have argued, has not 
significantly departed from the idea of prostitution as a social evil (Doezema 2002). Yet, 
feminists themselves have been split on the issue of prostitution and the question of 
agency: can prostitution be freely chosen? Feminist lobbying on what trafficking is has 
been quite fierce, with different groups promoting opposite definitions of trafficking. 
Trafficking has found a niche within the category of prostitution, leading to the subsequent 
task of deciding what subcategory of prostitution trafficking is and what distinguishes the 
latter from the former. The debates have mirrored the debates on prostitution led by the 
Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW) and the Global Alliance Against 
Trafficking in Women (GAATW). Put in a nutshell, the two positions are prostitution as 
sexual slavery versus prostitution as labour. 
One side, represented by the CATW, has argued that 'trafficking' should include all 
forms of recruitment and transportation for prostitution, regardless of whether any force or 
deception took place. This approach is driven by a belief that all prostitution is abusive of 
women. In the words of its founder, Kathleen Barry, prostitution cannot be 'a right 
because, as a violation, it usurps and negates prostitute women's already established 
right to human dignity, bodily integrity and physical and mental well-being and it 
constitutes a severe condition of sex discrimination' (Barry 1995). 
As prostitution is deemed to be a degradation that no normal woman would 
consider, the question of voluntary or forced prostitution becomes irrelevant. Prostitution 
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can only be the result of some sort of coercion and violence, with violence understood 
along a continuum from direct physical violence to violence inscribed in the social and 
economic structures. This position has been mostly criticised for denying any agency and 
self-determination to those women who voluntarily engage in prostitution. According to 
Doezema, it was based on the assumption that a woman's consent to undertake sex work 
is meaningless, that prostitution can never be a matter of personal choice and a form of 
work (Doezema 2002: 21). 
The other position, held by GAATW, makes the distinction between 'trafficking in 
women' as 'forced prostitution' on the one hand and 'voluntary prostitution' on the other. 
GAATW has taken up a distinction developed in the mid eighties by the prostitutes' rights 
movement (Doezema 1998: 37). Trafficking is reprehensible only inasmuch as it is linked 
with forced prostitution and abuse of human rights. Since the re-emergence of trafficking 
in women on the political agenda and the increase in measures targeting all sex workers, 
this position has met with renewed criticism by sex activists. Anti-trafficking measures, it 
was argued, did little for the protection of women's rights and could have negative effects 
for the rights of sex workers. In their comment on the UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol, the 
Network of Sex Work Projects (NSWP) has argued that 
[h]istorically, anti-trafficking measures have been more concerned with 
protecting women's 'purity' than with ensuring the human rights of those 
in the sex industry. This approach limits the protection afforded by these 
instruments to those who can prove that they did not consent to work in 
the sex industry. It also ignores the abusive conditions within the sex 
industry, often facilitated by national law that place (migrant) sex workers 
outside of the range of rights granted to others as citizens and workers 
(NSWP 1999). 
NSWP and other organisations for sex workers' rights (e. g. the English Collective of 
Prostitutes and Legal Action for Women UK) have been at the forefront of this critique of 
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equating 'trafficking in women' with 'forced prostitution' and have argued that the fight 
against forced prostitution is a fight against prostitution tout court as long as the rights of 
prostitutes are not protected. The condemnation of forced prostitution has led to a lack of 
interest in the rights of 'voluntary' prostitutes. Doezema and Wijers warn against the 
definition of trafficking as forced prostitution, as it supports the distinction between 'native' 
and immigrant prostitutes as 'voluntary' and respectively 'forced'. This dichotomy also 
implies a further one between guilty and innocent prostitutes (Doezema 1998: 42). 
Doezema has argued that the innocence of the victim determines on which side of the 
dichotomy she will fall, perpetuating an understanding of prostitution as evil and abnormal. 
Reports on trafficking as 'forced prostitution' emphasise either the deceit, the fact 
that women did not choose to be prostitutes, or'poverty as force' (Doezema 1998). These 
are strategies of making innocent victims eligible for human rights protection. Turned into 
innocent passive victims, trafficked women are to be protected at the expense of 'dirty 
whores' who are to be policed and punished. Doezema's discontent regards the denial of 
the prostitutes' human rights and the false divisions representations of trafficking create 
among sex workers. Alison Murray (1998) has noted that the 'voluntary' prostitute is 
generally associated with the Western sex worker endowed with agency, while the sex 
worker from a developing country is considered incapable of making this choice, being 
either easily deceived or deterministically influenced by poverty. 
This image of the passive victim incapable of self-determination has been 
reinforced by reactivating the myth of white slavery. Doezema has shown how the 
prostitution approach to present day trafficking has inherited many of the presuppositions 
of white slavery (Doezema 2000). At the turn of the twentieth century, 'white slavery' 
caused a veritable moral panic about the sexual enslavement of young virgins (Irwin 
1996). Doezema has argued that, while the myth of 'trafficking in womenTwhite slavery' is 
about protecting women, it has not displaced the underlying moral concern with the 
control of 'loose women'. The 'loose women' that Doezema has in mind differ very little 
from Judith Walkowitz's Victorian prostitute (Walkowitz 1980). 'An object of fascination 
and disgust, the prostitute was ingrained in public consciousness as a highly visible 
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symbol of the social dislocation attendant upon a new industrial era' (Walkowitz 1980: 32). 
Other feminists and sex activists have tried to divorce trafficking from prostitution. 
Andrijasevic has put forth the hypothesis that prostitution is considered by trafficked 
women simply as a migratory project. For her interviewees, prostitution was simply a 
means to an end, a temporary solution they favoured (Andrijasevic 2003). She attempts to 
loosen both the necessary link between the trafficking subcategory and prostitution as well 
as that between trafficking and migration. Although the second choice is normative rather 
than empirical, based on the belief that disentangling trafficking from migration would lead 
to better protection of the trafficked women's human rights, such choices take for granted 
the presuppositions concerning migration and prostitution. As identifying victims of 
trafficking with any of these categories has harmful effects, it appears important to 
disentangle trafficking from these other categories. Yet, such a critique is unlikely to have 
much effect as there are no other alternative categories which these researchers put forth 
to replace the empirical ones of prostitution and migration. 
The sex activists' position has shifted the discourse of rights from the category of 
trafficked women to that of prostitutes. While the credo of anti-trafficking NGOs has been 
that trafficked women must not be subjected to the same treatment as undocumented 
migrants (Jordan 2002: 2002), sex activists argue that prostitutes should not be submitted 
to any human rights abuses. Faced with the continual threat of deportation of (illegal) 
foreign prostitutes, sex activists have argued that trafficking is not prostitution, but forced 
or bonded labour, in the domestic, sex or any other industry (Adams 2003: 138). 
Moreover, human rights abuses should be considered independently of whether those 
who suffer them have been trafficked or not. 
The writings of Doezema, Wijers; and other feminists associated with this position 
try to engage in the 'problematisation of problematisation'. They analyse trafficking in 
terms of the influences it entails on sex workers, migrants, asylum seekers, etc. and do 
not measure it against some standard of 'reality'. For sex activists, anti-trafficking 
measures have so far incurred more harm than good to sex workers. Repeated raidings 
by the police have lead to detention of all foreign prostitutes under the suspicion of having 
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been trafficked. For instance, sex activists have condemned the police and immigration 
raids in Soho that had held 60 migrant women under the suspicion of having been 
trafficked (International Prostitutes Collective 2001). The question 'what is human 
trafficking? ' has been mobilised by sex workers' movements for critical purposes. If 
answering this question can make possible the deployment of technologies of government 
to govern trafficking, it can also activate a critique of 'how not to be governed thus' 
(Foucault 1997). The 'problematisation of the problematisation' of anti-trafficking 
measures through the effects that certain descriptions of trafficking have upon sex 
workers encounters the limitation of different subjective positions. Sex workers on the one 
hand, victims of trafficking on the other. Sex workers mobilise specific lived experiences to 
buttress their own narrative. NGOs and the police use other lived experiences for their 
narrative. Subjective positions and lived experiences are mobilised to make apparent the 
dangerous effects of anti-trafficking measures either for sex workers or for victims of 
trafficking. 
The subjective positions of sex workers and victims of trafficking become 
incompatible in a discourse of security. The police are dangerous for sex workers, anti- 
trafficking measures have dangerous effects. What is important at this point is to see that 
the problematisation of the problematisation of trafficking is done in terms of threat or 
danger. My critique here is not simply that these authors overlook threat construction and 
the representations which structure the field in which they consider trafficking, as they 
invoke a certain configuration of threat. What is overlooked is how threat construction 
meta-structures the problem atisation of trafficking, how it mobilises certain institutions and 
specific expertise. The displacement of categories that activists favour remains ineffective, 
as they are not able to mobilise similar expertise and they do not question the 'regime of 
truth' in which these categories function. Moreover, without the possibility of making sense 
of how the lived experience of victims of trafficking is mobilised in anti-trafficking 
discourses, their own problematisation is unable to sustain a project of 'how not to be 
governed thus' (Foucault 1997). The question of multiple lived experiences, different or 
competing subjective positions and incompatibility of claims will be tackled in more detail 
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in Chapter 5. 
Human trafficking as a problem of human rights abuse 
Imagine if victims of rape or torture could only get medical attention if 
they agreed to cooperate with the police in persecuting their abusers 
(Pearson 2002: 56)? 
Although the humanitarian approach to trafficking overlaps considerably with much of the 
feminist literature on prostitution and trafficking, as the most consensual of the strategies 
of re-describing trafficking, it both evinces the political stakes involved in representation 
and the limits that attempts at redefinition encounter. Despite the consensus that would 
seem to speak of the success of a human rights approach, this approach is seen by its 
own proponents as invariably failing. What appears as a failure here is the impossibility of 
human rights to dispense with the boundary, with the limit. While other representations of 
trafficking attempt to shift limits, displace categories and re-configure them differently (e. g. 
women as migrants, exploited prostitutes, etc. ), human rights nourish an imaginary of 
representation without limits. This limitless representation is 'humanity', which is 
universalised through suffering. The strategies for suspending limits and their failure will 
be discussed in-depth in Chapter 4. For the moment, I am interested in how human rights 
activists and academics think rights as a strategy and how they assess the failures of the 
approach. 
Vectoring trafficking through representations of human rights violations is a 
politically explicit strategy. Alternative representations of trafficking as human rights 
violations are not based on theoretical refinements but on what can be called an 
emotional pedagogy. While all the approaches aim to naturalise the right definition of 
trafficking, the humanitarian approach is concerned with instilling the 'right' way to feel 
about the group of trafficking women. To promote understanding and sympathy for their 
situation, these advocates have focused on personal stories and psychological 
explanations of the pain and suffering trafficking causes. The main purpose of these 
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accounts is to promote the identification with victims of trafficking in a way that crosses 
divisions preserved by other approaches. This literature is no longer concerned with the 
specificity of trafficking as a form of migration, organised crime or prostitution, but with the 
commonality of potential suffering. 
The commonality of suffering as the commonality of humanity suspends the need 
for an engagement with other categories. As a symbol of their humanitarian approach, the 
OSCE has used the image of a fingerprint inscribed with the Declaration of Human Rights 
(Pallwein-Prettner 2004): 
Ironically, zooming out the image does not make the Declaration of Rights more readable. 
Rights remain mere scribbles on the body of the suffering humanity. As a subject of rights, 
humanity already appears as an impossible subject. Chapters 3 and 4 will explore this 
impossibility of constituting trafficking women as the concrete embodiment of suffering 
humanity. 
The human rights approach tries to use the mobilising potential of sentimentality 
and emotions to efface divisions by presenting a one-dimensional image of the trafficking 
victim as a suffering individual. While being aware that categorisations entail effects on 
trafficked women, the humanitarian approach does not challenge the existing categories 
of illegal migrants, criminals and prostitutes, but creates a different category of human 
rights bearers or trafficking survivors. This new category is supposed to transcend all 
previous categories. 
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The humanitarian approach is therefore harnessed to re-structuring social relations 
in the sphere of trafficking. It envisages specific interventions, different from the repressive 
and preventive strategies embraced especially by those concerned with migration and 
organised crime. It has a broad critical span, targeting at the same time constructions of 
human trafficking as a form of illegal migration, organised crime or prostitution. Despite 
the emphasis on the one-dimensional victim of trafficking, the human rights approach is 
multi-faceted in terms of both representations and interventions. There is no consensus 
on what human rights mean for victims of trafficking, as there is no consensus on what 
protection means either. 
For von Struensee, when women are trafficked and sexually exploited, they are 
denied the 'most basic human rights, and in the worst case,... their right to life, as 
prostitution and sexual exploitation have devastating health and quality-of-life effects on 
its victims' (von Struensee 2000: 389). Another representation of human rights violations 
rests upon the rights of women to control their body, life, work, and especially to migrate, 
to decide for themselves whether they want or not to work in prostitution, to be free from 
coercion and violence (Wijers 1999: 246). Whichever position is embraced, there is an 
overwhelming feeling in the literature that the humanitarian approach invariably fails. 
In order to account for this failure, Deimleiter finds startling 'the apparent overall 
lack of political will... to protect victimised women' (Deimleiter 2001: 269). At times, the 
literature on trafficking points out tensions between different representations. 'Though 
purporting to combat trafficking, such measures rather aim at protecting the state against 
(illegal) migrants than at protecting women against violence and abuse, thus serving the 
interests of the state rather than those of the women' (Wijers and van Doorninck 2002: 
200). The strategy favoured is one of responsibilisation of political elites: instead of being 
concerned about stopping illegal migrants, Western states should be rather disturbed by 
the victimisation and sacrifices such policies cause (Deimleiter 2001: 265). Authorities 
need to be educated on the rights and needs of trafficked persons (Jordan 2002: 29). The 
work that human rights advocates are supposed to undertake is that of gathering stories 
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about the fate of victims of trafficking due to governmental policies, i. e. stories about 
returnees who are harmed or re-trafficked as a result of summary deportations. 
The solution that human rights advocates privilege is to shift the focus from seeing 
trafficked persons as a category of migrants or prostitutes to 'understanding them as 
people bearing human rights' (Jordan 2002: 30). The humanitarian mode of intervention 
acts as a strategy of identification/dis-identification. Trafficked women are dis-identified 
from categories of migrants, criminals or prostitutes by the emphasis on suffering. 
Therefore, women who are trafficked into prostitution should not be deprived of their rights 
on grounds that they are undocumented migrants. Yet, these rights are only the right of 
the victim, an identification achieved through a mode of suffering and a feeling of pain. 
The problem with the dis-identification strategy is that it rests on an illusory 
critique. It rests on a process of re-identification that displaces the universality of 
humanity. Trafficked women are not embodiments of common humanity, but particular 
victims. By insisting that trafficked women should not be likened to illegal migrants or 
prostitutes, the critique does not displace all the other categories and their social 
construction. The category of human rights bearers does not dispute the previous 
categories, it only qualifies them. Trafficked women as illegal migrants or prostitutes who 
have been victimised are entitled to human rights protection. An argument has been put 
forth that special benefits for women in forced prostitution can act as an incentive to other 
women to illegitimately claim this status (Home Office 2006). The logic of suspicion that 
hovers over migrants that they would illegitimately take advantage of any benefits 
designed for victims of trafficking can only be accounted for in the specific construction of 
migrants as conniving and dangerous others. 
The failure of the human rights approach to displace existing categories raises 
questions about the possibilities of an alternative discourse. The conundrum of 'half- 
hearted protection' (Pearson 2002) that activists and scholars have found disquieting can 
be understood by contextualising trafficking, placing it in a field in which its existence is 
shaped by a representations of threat and specific modes of intervention. 
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Human trafficking and the absent problematisation of security 
Trafficking in human beings is not only an episodic phenomenon, 
affecting a few individuals, but of structural nature with extensive 
implications on the social, economic and organisational fabric of our 
societies. [ ... I The Member States of the European 
Union and the 
candidate countries are much affected by these scourges to society 
(European Commission 2002b/emphasis mine). 
This chapter has shown that human trafficking comes into existence as a social concept 
by being derived from migration, organised crime, prostitution and forms of human rights 
abuses. Paraphrasing Foucault, one could say that human trafficking exists inasmuch as it 
establishes relations of resemblance, proximity, distance, difference, transformation and 
relation to other objects (Foucault 2002). Human trafficking is constructed as a series of 
variations on illegal migration, organised crime, prostitution, and human rights abuses. 
Concerned with providing a better representation of the reality of trafficking, this 
literature often engages in a 'politics of representation/intervention' without paying 
sufficient attention to the political effects of social construction, to how categorisations and 
vectored categorisations of trafficking do governmental work. Human trafficking as a 
problem and trafficked women as a specific category can be made governable through 
vectored categorisation. This literature enters the field of relations of power/knowledge 
and engages in the politics of representation of human trafficking, without being 
sufficiently reflexive about how descriptions work within an already structured context. 
Edwards and Gill have suggested that any alternative strategy with respect to 
transnational organised crime needs to look at how 'the problem' is narrated and 'how this 
in turn selects certain strategies of control and their concomitant operational instruments, 
whilst deselecting others, and then how it organises the interpretation and appraisal of 
their effects... ' (Edwards and Gill 2002: 247). 
Their suggestion is especially interesting as human trafficking does not emerge in 
a void, but in a political field where migration, organised crime and prostitution are already 
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'narrated' and modes of intervention selected. The vectoring has been already vectored in 
the field in which trafficking emerges and which is characterised by the securitisation of 
illegal migration, organised crime as well as certain aspects of prostitution. The literature 
on trafficking which analyses it at the intersection with migration, organised crime and 
prostitution has been inattentive to the representation of threat that structures the field in 
which their discourse is located. Research on trafficking rarely mentions security. 
Protection appears as a puzzle of who deserves to be protected: individuals or the state. 
I am interested in this absence, this absent encounter because I start from the 
assumption that security is the limit that these representations take up. Security influences 
what can be said and done about human trafficking. While this assumption is rooted in an 
understanding of security that I will explore in detail in the following chapter, most of the 
literature on trafficking does not engage with the construction of illegal migration and 
organised crime as threats. In a speech to the European Parliament before the Seville 
European Council, Romano Prodi regarded migration as the 'most burning issue' to be 
dealt with by the EU (Prodi 2002). While a model for managing migration should not be 
incompatible with the fundamental values of the Union, he emphasised, it should also 
attend to 'our citizens' legitimate demand for security'. 
Similarly to the literature on migration, the literature on organised crime embodies 
an explicit construction of threat. For Apap et al., transnational organised crime is the dark 
side of globalisation, threatening and damaging democracy and the economic basis of 
societies, weakening institutions and confidence in the rule of law (Apap et al. 2002: 6). A 
report on organised criminality commissioned by the EU starts by defining crime as a 
threat to the well-being of our societies (Fondazione Rosselli 1999). Moreover, the paper 
argues, 'the internationalisation of criminal activities means that no country can feel 
completely secure within its borders at the same time when the danger of all-out military 
confrontation has receded with the end of the Cold War' (Fondazione Rosselli 1999: 5). 
The 'made in Sicily' model is thought to have been universalised in a proliferation of threat 
that has taken on more and more adjectives besides 'Italian': Russian, Turkish, Albanian, 
etc. 
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While prostitution is no longer explicitly constructed as a social evil, the underlying 
imaginary of threat to public order, public health and community morality has led countries 
like Sweden to criminalise it. Equally, debates on criminalising prostitution have recently 
gained impetus in France. The feminist literature has also never failed to mention the 
threat construction of prostitution, although it has not specifically tackled this construction 
of threat. 
Despite an awareness of various threat constructions in relation to illegal 
migration, organised crime and prostitution that traverses the literature, there is no 
analysis of the 'vectors' considered in the description of trafficking. When the literature 
mentions threat representations in connection with trafficking, it does so only in passing, 
without engaging with this specific problematisation. For Bertone, trafficking is a threat to 
orderly, legal migration (Bertone 2000). 'Socially', she goes on to argue, 'trafficking can 
feed popular fear of uncontrolled borders and xenophobic sentiments. Security is put at 
risk by the growth in criminality that trafficking in women involves' (Bertone 2000: 10). 
Doezema has also noted various fears and anxieties linked with human trafficking: fears 
about women's security and independence, of foreigners and migrants, moral fears as 
well as fears of disease such as AIDS (Doezema 1998: 39). When activists have 
attempted to formulate the dangerous effects of anti-trafficking, this discourse of threat 
has appeared as incompatible with another discourse of threat, the threat to trafficked 
women. The problematisation of problematisation is suspended, as the relation between 
the two remains unexplored. 
The lenses of migration, organised crime and prostitution both form and limit the 
possibilities of discussion on human trafficking. They do so mainly because of the security 
structure in which they are all embedded. Illegal migration, organised crime and 
prostitution are all constructed as security issues and human rights approaches are not 
autonomous from the legitimate representation of threat at the EU level. The concept of 
security cannot be divorced from its conceptual baggage, the forms of representation and 
modes of interventions which have been naturalised in relation to security. I shall consider 
the aporias of this other type of alternative discourse in more detail in the next chapter. 
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The humanitarian approach is driven by a wishful replacement of current 
representations of human trafficking. Human rights advocates argue in favour of an 
approach protecting the fundamental human rights of victims to balance measures of 
increased border control and punitive measures against carriers and traffickers. It is 
interesting to note that the only way these two different claims have been reconciled has 
been in preventive policies concerning human trafficking. One of the important think-tanks 
on issues of migration and trafficking, the International Centre for Migration Policy 
Development (ICMPD), has argued that trafficked women should be granted rights either 
because it is in the interest of justice to punish traffickers or because it can help the police 
prevent other cases of trafficking: 
Law enforcement officers should always adhere to this method [human 
rights], not only because it is the correct and caring thing to do so, but 
also because it is ultimately in the best interests of the investigation to do 
so because the cooperating victim will always make a more resilient 
witness if given time and support to come to terms with her experiences 
(lCMPD 2002). 
This argument is not particular to the ICMPD, but has been taken up by many NGOs in 
order to set up cooperative arrangements with law enforcement. 
However, two recent discussions of human trafficking in IR have pointed out the 
connections between trafficking and security. Jacqueline Berman has argued that 
trafficked Eastern European women are both an external (as an illegal immigrant) and an 
internal threat (as white women not easily locatable) to the cohesiveness of the political 
community (Berman 2003: 60). In her analysis, women present a joint threat of illegal 
migrants who violate borders and prostitutes who transgress the European moral order. 
This construction of security appears as entirely artificial and Berman's article is 
underpinned by a doubt: is this really security? 
Earlier, in the context of the Danish construction of the trafficking of Baltic women, 
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Karen Lund Petersen found too many ambiguities in the criminalisation of trafficking to 
decide whether it is a security issue (Petersen 2001: 231-232). While the criminalisation of 
trafficking is linked with a societal threat and as an individual threat to the prostituted 
women, she claims it can also be read as a strategy of individualisation which avoids the 
securitisation of the Baltic. Although the equation of Baltic trafficked women with the Baltic 
more generally is in itself a problematic statement, Peterson's analysis of what 
securitisation or the construction of security means is an interesting attempt to understand 
the 'stakes' of security around human trafficking. 
What these two analyses trying to bring together trafficking and security have in 
common is a doubt about what security is. Is trafficking problematised as a security issue 
and if so, is it really a security issue, as Berman has put it? The answer to this question is 
underpinned by ontological and epistemological assumptions that the next chapter will 
unpack in order to be able to tackle the effects that security has and the limitations that 
security imposes on the politics of human trafficking. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has read the literature on human trafficking as a literature of 
'problematisations'. Human trafficking is represented as a problem of migration, organised 
crime, prostitution, or human rights abuses. I have argued that the representation of 
trafficking is already vectored by other representations. Representations are important 
inasmuch as they legitimise or delegitimise, enable or disable certain interventions. What 
can be done or said about human trafficking can be limited by what can be said or done 
about migration, organised crime, prostitution or human rights. 
While some of the literature, especially on prostitution and human rights is aware 
of a limit or a limitation to the representational politics that they formulate, this limit is not 
defined as 'security'. Despite the presence of security in discourses around the 
categorisations of trafficking and of trafficking itself, 'security' is absent as one of the 
vectors of trafficking. Even when dangerous effects are acknowledged, the subjective 
positions affected, i. e. those of sex workers, are exclusive of the positions of trafficked 
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women. The problem atisation of danger for sex workers leaves unquestioned the 
problematisation of danger for human trafficking. The problematisation of the 
problematisation is partial as it is formulated in the absence of security. My premise is, 
however, that the absence of security from reflection allows for the unhindered presence 
of its effects. This chapter has therefore started from the 'is' of security. There is security. 
The following chapter will inquire into the ontological and epistemological status of 'there 
being security. In what sense can one say that there is security? What does it mean for 
trafficking to say that it is a security issue and what are the effects of it being security? 
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11. The presence of an absence: theories of security and 
human trafficking 
Introduction 
'Central to the problem of policing THB [trafficking in human beings] is the difficulty in 
clearly identifying the threat that THB poses to a State'. Thus starts a Europol Report on 
human trafficking (Europol 2003). Another Report, this time by the IOM, is more explicit in 
identifying trafficking as 'the most menacing form of irregular migration due to its ever- 
increasing scale and complexity involving, as it does arms, drugs, prostitution and so on' 
(Laczk6 and Thompson 2000: 19). Or, once more, in a different definition of threat, 
'[t]rafficking... strips victims of their rights to liberty, dignity, security of person, the right not 
to be held in slavery, the right to be free from cruel and inhumane treatment' (OSCE 
1999). These reports raise the issue of trafficking as a threat and concern themselves with 
establishing what is threatened and by whom/what. Definitions of what makes human 
trafficking a threat, whether to the state or trafficked women, are considered important by 
those involved in governing the phenomenon. The first chapter has argued that definitions 
of trafficking as a specific form of illegal migration, organised crime and/or prostitution 
were important for the same reasons of governing it. 
This chapter will explore the assumptions with which the previous chapter has 
worked and explicate them from within security theories. What is security vectoring for 
human trafficking? What effects does securitisation entail or, to put it simply, what does 
security do? What limits does securitisation entail? In the previous chapter I claimed that 
security meta-structures what can be said or done about human trafficking. Moreover, 
articulating human trafficking with other types of dangers/risks or qualifying it as a threat 
places it in a security field which entails various effects on how trafficked women are 
'managed' as well as on the strategies that re-configure human trafficking as a violation of 
human rights. I have shown that the alternative approach that represents trafficking as a 
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violation of human rights fails due to the way in which it is framed in an already securitised 
discourse. I assumed that security has effects and sets limits to what can be said and 
done. 
The effects of security can only be understood in the context of describing security. 
What security is has an impact on interventions, on what security does and what it allows 
to be done. This chapter will unpack the 'there is' of security. Ascertaining whether human 
trafficking is a security issue has been important for practitioners and analysts alike. At the 
beginning of her article on sex trafficking in the EU, Berman asks whether human 
trafficking is a 'grave threat' to international security or really a law enforcement issue 
(Berman 2003/emphasis mine). Berman's question (Is human trafficking 'really' a grave 
security threat? ) takes us in the midst of the security debates in IR on the nature of 
threats. 
Really can be read in different ways. It can be read as opposed to constructed, 
which has entailed a debate about what is rightly and what is wrongly defined as a 
security issue. 'Real' as what pertains to the objective materiality of the world de- 
legitimises construction as false. Really can also be read as opposed to symbolically and 
imaginarily. Symbolically and imaginarily open up different readings of what 'constructed' 
can mean. Different security schools have argued about the meaning of the symbolic in 
relation to discourse and practice. 'Imaginary' is a term I introduce here to make explicit 
the relation that the concept of security creates between the subject and the world. 
Security has a fictional element, something one can imagine as a state to be achieved. 
How can this imaginary enter the other debates? Really can also be read from a 
subjective perspective: real for whom? 
Unpacking the question of the real of security shows a different relation that the 
debates on security have towards problematisation. While the first discussion of whether 
security is real or not, whether one representation is false and another not is also a 
literature of problematisation, the other debates formulate problematisations of the 
problematisation of security. All forms of construction, symbolic or imaginary, have effects 
which are differentiated depending on subjective positions. While this chapter introduces 
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different ways of approaching security and argues for an approach that focuses on the 
'problematisation of problematisation', the next chapter will explore how critical 
approaches have devised strategies that would unmake the effects of security. 
This chapter will proceed in four stages. The first section will consider the debate 
between strategic studies and constructivism on what a security issue is. This 
problematisation will allow us to see the departures by other debates and the attempt at a 
problematisation of problematisation. I have already indicated that the problematisation of 
problematisation entails an inquiry into the effects of security. To be able to answer the 
question of 'what security does', in the second section I shall look at 'how security works'. 
If securitisation is a matter of discourse, practice or rather of ontological (in)security, then 
its effects are likely to differ. The final two sections will consider the effects of security, 
what security'does' in the tension between its explicit goals and implicit effects. Explicitly, 
security purports to secure somebody/something, while implicitly, securitisation is set to 
eliminate dangerous others and triggers other sets of pernicious effects that need to be 
explored. 
The two articles by Berman and Petersen briefly considered at the end of the first 
chapter ask some of these questions in relation to human trafficking. In the context of this 
chapter, I shall use them for illustrative purposes, both empirical and theoretical. Both 
Petersen and Berman are faced with some of the dilemmas in security studies and their 
standpoints will be useful as a background for my own discussion of these debates. 
Questioning security: is it real or not? 
This section will focus on the debates about whether security issues are socially 
constructed or not. In security studies, the question of the social construction of security 
has inflamed spirits, created new antagonisms and re-shaped sub-disciplines. I embark 
upon this discussion bearing in mind Hacking's point that richer tools are needed to think 
than those of reality or social construction (Ian Hacking 1998: 1) and I shall subsequently 
look at what tools exist in the field to understand how security works. 
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Many of the debates in security studies are concerned with what security means 
nowadays, which problems are actually threats and therefore legitimate objects of study in 
the field and, for those in the social constructivist camp, which issues should be dealt with 
as security threats and which not. The opposition of real vs. constructed has characterised 
the debate starting in the 1980s on the proper sphere of security. For 'strategic 
studies7classical security studies, the offspring of American and Western defence policy 
(Buzan 1991: 6), threats are objectively given and military in nature. For those who 
concern themselves with the 'study of threat, use, and control of military force' (Walt 1991: 
212), human trafficking is 'wrongly' conceived of as a threat. Human trafficking is largely 
indifferent to the state, it is not military in nature and does not threaten 'national security; 
one could say that human trafficking bypasses the state. 
Threats to a state are objectively given inasmuch as they can be read from the 
behaviour of other states. States cum individuals are intentional beings whose actions are 
expressive of their goals. The main question that concerns the strategists would be of 
measures to be taken to pre-empt or neutralise such threatening behaviour by other 
states. The arms race and theories of deterrence dominated the discourse on security 
(Buzan 1997: 6). Established in the conditions of the Cold War, strategic studies were 
understandably concerned with the territorial survival of the state and attacks to state 
sovereignty. While 'national security' was strictly defined and limited given the 'military and 
nuclear obsessions of the Cold War' (Buzan 1997: 9), state sovereignty could provide 
some leeway, bearing in mind that much of the Cold War was 'fought', directly or 
indirectly, on the territories of third states considered to be essential 'zones of influence' 
for the two big powers. Military actions outside the national territory could thus count as 
infringements of sovereignty. 
From the possible widening of state sovereignty, the next step for an enlarged 
concept of 'national security' was the economic dimension. On the one hand, economic 
power could be transformed into military power as money could buy arms and new military 
technology. On the other, economics was thought to be a viable substitute for military 
power (e. g. Gilpin (1981). Economic sanctions are a tool of US foreign policy as much 
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favoured as investment in military technology. In a gatekeeper article on the meaning of 
security, Stephen Walt allows for economics only if it relates to military issues. Widening 
security is limited by two axes: that of the state and that of military appurtenance. Any 
larger expansion, Walt (1991) has argued, would destroy the intellectual coherence of the 
field and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems 
(Walt 1991). Buzan has read in this unwillingness to widen security a 'generally unspoken 
political concern that allowing non-military issues to achieve security status would have 
undesirable and/or counter-productive effects on the whole fabric of social and 
international relations' (Buzan 1997: 9). 
Later on, the concept underwent successive extensions given that other threats, 
non-military in nature were seen as endangering the state. Organised crime, to take an 
example closely related to trafficking, has been considered by strategists. By weakening 
state institutions, organised crime is analysed as an objective threat to sovereignty. 
Organised crime infiltrates the legitimate business and political elites and reaches a 
'symbiotic' phase in which it becomes fully integrated into the political structure, as in the 
example of Italy where the Mafia became closely connected with the Christian Democratic 
Party (Lupsha 1996: 24). As the example of organised crime shows, the concept of 
'national security' and threats to the state can be expanded. 
Even if human trafficking does not satisfy the conditions of possibility for a threat, 
namely it is not of a military nature and it does not threaten the survival of the state, it can 
be integrated in a loose definition of 'national security. Myron Weiner for example has 
provided an account of migration as a threat to the state. Weiner has undertaken an 
analysis of 'how, why and when states may regard immigrants and refugees as potential 
threats', of the conditions under which migration is legitimately dealt with as a security 
threat (Weiner 1992/1993: 104). He has identified five ways in which migrants can 
become a security threat to the state: when refugees and migrants are working against 
the regime of their home country; when they pose a risk to their host country; when 
immigrants are seen as a cultural threat; when they are perceived as a social or economic 
threat; when the host country uses immigrants as instruments to threaten the country of 
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origin. In the same vein, refugee crises can spill over and cause destabilisation of states 
(W. Zimmerman 1995: 107). 
Weiner's analysis would be the appropriate response to a demand to qualify the 
type of threat that human trafficking represents, as required by the Europol Report quoted 
at the beginning of this Chapter. Post-9/1 1, one of the main concerns with the threat of 
human trafficking was that, similarly to arms- and drug-trafficking, it Yields huge sums 
which can be used by terrorist groups. In his discourse justifying the war on Iraq, George 
Bush has included trafficking as one of the most important threats we are facing today 
(Bush 2003). 9 Therefore, trafficking could potentially become a crucial security issue for 
the state, even given a commitment to security threats as objective givens. In this 
approach, human trafficking is linked with other direct threats such as money laundering, 
drug dealing and arms trade. 
However much strategists have tried to hold on to restricted definitions of security, 
claiming a widened concept appeared to be more in tune with political developments. 
Security encompassed more and more issues that the post-Cold War World was 
confronted with: environmental problems, ethnic problems, migration problems, etc. The 
widening debate has endorsed an expanded concept of security and has shifted the 
boundaries of the security realm to include all sorts of threats to the state and other forms 
of political communities. It has however resulted in simply adding adjectives, as 
Huysmans has put it (Huysmans 1998c: 227). Environmental, political, economic, societal 
security... For Krause and Williams too, broadening has turned security into a 'grab bag of 
different issue areas'(Krause and Williams 1997: 35). 
'Wideners' have discovered a proliferation of threats that need to be analysed and 
dealt with. Human trafficking as connected with organised crime would be analysed as a 
cluster of threats: political, economic and societal. Wyn Rees has looked at organised 
crime and the security construction from a conventional widening perspective (Rees 
1999). Organised crime is an 'Indirect' political threat inasmuch as it is linked with political 
9 This is not however the only element that makes human trafficking a security issue. Bush adds 
the humanitarian element, the global concern with the plight of trafficked people. 
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corruption which may exercise a pernicious effect even within relatively stable countries. 
Economically, organised crime groups may establish micro-economies within the 
boundaries of the state. On the societal dimension, organised crime can contribute to the 
breakdown of the cohesion of a society by promoting high levels of violence and 
intimidation. " A 'Widening' approach would limit itself to telling us 'how things are', again 
replicating a construction of security. 
Some wideners would say that human trafficking is 'really' a security threat and 
should be analysed as such. Others would add a constructivist proviso to the analysis of 
issue areas. The construction of issues into security problems has sparked acrimonious 
debates between traditional security analysts and social constructivists. Despite their 
rejection of constructivism in favour of an objective assessment of threats, one could say 
that there is a 'performative constructivism' at the heart of their approach. Even when 
denying that human trafficking is a security threat, strategists would still imply that at some 
level (most likely the political/societal arena) human trafficking is considered to be a 
threat. If trafficking is 'wrongly made to appear as a threat, it means that things are not 
predisposed by nature to become security threats. 
Therefore, the opposition between 'really' and 'falsely/wrongly' means that, in 
certain locales, things are made into security threats and/or un-made. There are certain 
processes that make issues into security. In the end, this process of construction does not 
appear as artificial at all, but becomes naturalised. Constructivists would agree that 
threats and dangers do not meet us out there, as positivists would have it, but gain 
'ontological hardness' in a process of construction. Lene Hansen's formulation about the 
poststructuralist approach to securitisation could apply with slight modifications to most 
constructivists: '[a]ll poststructuralists; work with the notion that security should be seen as 
a discursive practice rather than as a direct representation of an objectively threatening 
reality' (Hansen 1997: 376). This formulation takes us away from the debates on the truth 
or falsity of security issues. Construction becomes the real. What is interesting is no 
10 The literature on organised crime and security has flourished since the 1990s, typical widening 
analyses being present in the journal Transnational Organised Crime. Similar approaches in P. 
Williams (1994). 
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longer the debate about whether security issues are rightly or wrongly so, truly or falsely, 
but understanding the processes which make security real. 
Nevertheless, there are differences among constructivists, especially between 
wideners-turned-constructivists and those who avow a poststructuralist sensibility. David 
Campbell has discussed these differences between a constructivism focused on adding 
variables (such as ideas) to the poststructuralist interest in discourses and their effects. 
He has rejected both a constructivism of the 'volitional agent reigning supreme' and of 
language as an 'omnipotent force' that expunges accounts of human agency (Campbell 
1998a: 218-219). More than the distinction between construction and reality - we have 
seen that to a certain extent the two overlap, with strategists allowing for 'wrong' 
constructions and constructivists admitting to naturalised, thus real security issues - are 
the tools with which to tackle the process of construction. How do security issues gain 
their 'ontological hardness', what is the role of structures and agents in this construction? 
Constructing security., the real of symbolic practices 
This section will consider two modes of opening up processes of security construction. 
The first one - though not necessarily chronologically the first - has been offered by the 
Copenhagen School of security studies (CoS). Ole Waever has labelled the process by 
means of which issues gain 'ontological hardness' and appear as real security issues 
'securitisation'. The second approach, linked with the Paris School of security studies, 
focuses on the symbolic power of discourse. " It emphasises the role of the speakers and 
of their positions of authority for the success of discourses. 
The CoS have expanded the concept of security to provide better tools to 
understand the 'proliferation of threats' on the political agenda. Their theory combines a 
taxonomy of sectors in which issues can be securitised with an understanding of the 
process by which issues are raised above the 'haggling of normal politics' (Buzan et al. 
11 'Schools'are arbitrary delimitations of how security is analysed. Yet, Waever's 'school' 
terminology has stuck, as it captures some of the main disagreements in security studies (Waever 
2004). Nevertheless, not all the approaches discussed here can be labelled as schools. 
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1998). In the 1998 Security Framework, the CoS identified five sectors of security: military, 
political, societal, economic, and environmental. Later on, Lautsen & Waever argued for 
another possible sector of security, religion (Lautsen and Waever 2000). Sectoral 
differentiation serves to distinguish between referent structures of securitisation (societal 
securitisation will tackle identity, while military security is concerned with state survival). 
However, it is with the notion of 'securitisation' that the CoS becomes truly 
innovative (Huysmans 1998b). Their constructivism is inspired by Austin's theory of 
speech acts. What makes securitisation coherent across sectors is a rhetorical structure; 
for Buzan and Waever security could be 'homogenised across sectors only by being 
linked with practices of challenge-resistance (defence)-escalation-recognition/defeat... the 
structure of the game is derived from the most classical of classical cases: war' (Buzan et 
al. 1998). Issues are securitised by virtue of discursive construction or, as Buzan and 
Waever have put it, '[s]ecurity is a quality actors inject into issues by securitizing them, 
which means to stage them on the political arena... and then to have them accepted by a 
sufficient audience to sanction extraordinary defensive moves' (Buzan et al. 1998: 204). 
Human trafficking would be discursively constructed as a threat rather than as a 
labour issue. Three main elements characterise the construction of human trafficking as a 
threat: the speech act, political actors (with the state as the ultimate securitising actor, as 
it is the state that needs to take up the security claims) and the sanctioning of 
extraordinary measures. Unlike strategists who could decide a priori on the securityness 
of an issue, for the CoS the security analyst can only decide a posteriori if an issue has 
been securitised or not. The security analyst is little more than an observer geared with 
the necessary conceptual tools to understand the moves taking place in the realm of 
extraordinary politics. 
Didier Bigo has criticised the CoS for reducing symbolic practices to linguistics, at 
the expense of analysing institutional practices and actors. One tradition of analysing 
securitisation has been to look at discursive representations of dangerous others in the 
media. Many articles on human trafficking look extensively at media representations of 
what human trafficking is and how others are depicted. Another research strategy has 
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been to look at securitisation discourses in the media as constitutive of moral panics. 
When other discourses are considered, it is generally of major political actors, like the EU 
commissioners, government officials, and party leaders. Often these discourses are 
selected depending on their previous selection by the media. There is little critical 
assessment of how these discourses have attained the prominence that makes them 
relevant for desecuritisation. 
Pierre Bourdieu's analyses of the positions from which discourses are uttered have 
provided valuable tools for the so-called Paris School in this debate on the role of speech 
acts. Not everybody has the power to turn human trafficking into a threat or even 
represent the issue of human trafficking. For Bourdieu, the efficacy of speech acts cannot 
be separated from the existence of institutions that confer authority upon the 
speaker/utterances (Bourdieu 1991). Successful speech acts are uttered from positions of 
authority. As Mike Williams has concisely put it, 'Performing the discursive speech-act of 
security... is a social accomplishment which can only be effective in the context of a 
corresponding constellation of social forces' (M. C. Williams 1997: 299). The question that 
hovers is how to discriminate between various actors, which actors and whose discourses 
to privilege. 
Drawing on Bourdieu's theory of symbolic power, Bigo has considered the 
constitution of authority to speak security. The 'constitution of authority' (for example, the 
authority the police gains in dealing with security matters normally reserved for the 
military) is to be understood in terms of Bourdieu's convertibility of capital, with the proviso 
that Bourdieu's types of capital (economic, social, cultural) are replaced by types of 
knowledge (Bigo 2000: 87). Practices of security exist in a specific field, formed by actors 
with particular know-how and technologies, namely the 'security professionals' (Bigo 
1996,2000,2002). As not any speech act is felicitous and depends on conditions both 
internal and external to discourse, practices of securitisation can only be undertaken by 
those endowed with the knowledge to do so. Those who speak security must have the 
capacity to produce a discourse on the figure of the enemy and impose their own 
definition on what constitutes a threat (Bigo 1996: 51,2002: 75-76). The success of voices 
63 
which speak security depends on the positions actors hold and on the symbolic capital 
these are endowed with, as well as on the capacity to produce a discourse which supports 
and reinforces a particular reading of reality. 
In response to Bigo, Waever has reiterated the importance of the performative 
speech act at the expense of what he calls, following Austin, the 'conditions' of a felicitous 
speech act. The three main conditions that Waever lists are: (i) the internal construction of 
the security speech act as a plot with an existential threat, a point of no return and a 
possible way out; (ii) the position of authority of the securitizing actor, and (iii) conditions 
historically associated with the threat (Waever 2000: 252-253). Although Waever, 
following Butler's insight that it is possible to speak with authority without being authorised 
to speak (Butler 1997a: 157), claims that authority is not essential for the success of a 
securitising act, he does no theorise how un-authorised agents can disrupt the normal 
practices of democratic politics. 
Waever's example of environmental movements having performed un-authorised 
speech acts leaves open the question of practices which are able to account for the 
success/failure of a speech act (Waever 2000: 286/ft. 7). On which arguments do 
environmental movements base their discourse? They often employ alternative 
knowledge to counter already 'authorised' knowledge; yet, the CoS lacks the tools to allow 
for this possibility as securitisation is limited to the act of uttering. Williams has formulated 
this issue of authorisation in a Bourdieuean voice against the CoS approach: 
A key element in understanding the politics of security is thus not simply 
the linguistic and conceptual structures involved, but their position within 
a specific institutional setting. The ability to 'speak security' effectively 
involves the ability to mobilise specific forms of symbolic power within the 
specific institutional fields in which it operates (M. C. Williams 1997: 298). 
The savoir faire of the police can be made applicable to other issues. NGOs, for example, 
can be incorporated in the regime to govern human trafficking inasmuch as they have 
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made their expertise indispensable by 'liaising with the authorities on... behalf [of victims] 
and intervening to protect the rights of trafficked persons' (Anti-Slavery International 2002: 
32). 
The securitisation of human trafficking is articulated from various institutional 
positions and institutional interests are at work in the constitution of a 'regime of truth'. As 
at the European level human trafficking was initially thought to fall under the aegis of the 
Europol, to be dealt with together with drugs- and arms- trafficking (den Boer 1998), other 
institutions are now involved in the management of human trafficking: border police, 
internal police, customs, migration services, international NGOs, human rights NGOs, etc. 
These institutional actors do not only mobilise resources, but create particular forms of 
knowledge to 'fabricate the threat migration represents (for example, a statistical 
representation of asylum seekers or of illegal migrants in a discourse on social instability, 
or, categorizing migration together with drugs trafficking, international criminality, and 
terrorism)' (Huysmans 1998a: 572). 
These analyses work with a Foucauldian understanding of discourse. The objects 
of discourse can only be analysed in a complex group of relations between institutions, 
economic and social processes, behavioural patterns, systems of norms, techniques 
(Foucault 2002: 49). This emphasis on the 'exteriority' of discourse or rather on relations 
situated at the limit between exteriority and interiority as Foucault has defined them in The 
Archeology of Knowledge is close to Bourdieu's study of the social positions. 
The difference between Butler and Bourdieu is, however, manifest in another 
respect. Butler's indebtedness to Foucault makes her account of performative speech acts 
interested in the power effects of discourses in constituting subjects and abjects. A 
Bourdieuean approach to speech acts focuses rather on the emergence and reproduction 
of discourses and practices, on the constitution of subjects who are authorised to speak 
rather than abjects to whom legitimate speech is denied and whose words come to count 
as less than words. 
The CoS have not denied a Bourdieuean actor-oriented approach to language; 
they do not analyse 'floating' discourses and agree that securitisation is spoken from 
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positions of authority. In a sense, they are closer to Bigo in their understanding of security 
than to Butler's emphasis on the effects of power relations. Waever has seen 
securitisation as 'articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites' 
(Waever 1995: 57). Where, for example, Waever and Bigo part ways is in their respective 
delimitation of the 'security field'. For Waever securitisation is a political spectacle where 
the main actors are the political elites. For Bigo it is bureaucracies that are important in 
the securitisation process. The CoS, like many constructivists, have not taken on board 
Foucault's insights on power/knowledge and the role that knowledge can play in 
establishing authority (or relations of domination in Foucault's terminology). Although 
Foucault differentiates relations of power and relations of domination, I shall use the two 
interchangeably as analysis of power relations are the taken-for-granted terminology. Yet, 
security practices can be better understood as relations of domination. According to 
Foucault, 
facts or states of domination [occur when] the relations of power, instead 
of being variable and allowing different partners a strategy which alters 
them, find themselves firmly set and congealed. When an individual or a 
social group manages to block a field of relations of power, to render 
them impassive and invariable and to prevent all reversibility of 
movement - by means of instruments which can be economic as well as 
political or military - we are facing what can be called a state domination. 
(Foucault 2000c). 
Security practices do not function as reversible relations of power, but reify and congeal 
spaces of abjection. 
The CoS have focused on political actors as speakers of security, given their 
understanding of what politics is. As liberal democratic politics has electoral responsibility 
at its core, the dynamics that the CoS have in mind is that between political actors and 
their electoral 'audience', those who need to be convinced of the legitimacy of a security 
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threat. Such an approach equally sanctions an analysis of securitisation in the media, if 
media is seen as the intermediary, the medium through which representations are 
circulated between political elites and the audience. 
Media representations have been extensively used by sociologists to explain the 
creation of 'moral panics'. Securitisation, although mediated, reinforced or even spurred 
by media representations, remains very much the premise of institutions. Bigo has 
remarked that 'U]oumalists often repeat and summarise what they hear from their 
information sources: security bureaucracies' (Bigo 2001a: 126). The media discourse on 
trafficking tends to mirror two types of discourses, one endorsed by NGOs and anti- 
trafficking campaigners who see trafficking as a human rights violation and the other one 
upheld by law enforcement. An article from The Spectator quotes Andy Felton, who has 
worked on Project Reflex, a unique British/Romanian initiative to stem illegal migration to 
the UK, who argues that victims of trafficking, far from being gullible peasant girls, as 
portrayed by the IOM, were seasoned prostitutes before they left (The Spectator 25 April 
2003). 'Happy hookers of Eastern Europe' as the journalist calls them, they are the 
opposite of the victim image promoted by other media reports and the NGOs. 
Sociological analysis would shift the centre of gravity of securitisation behind the 
bureaucratic closed doors rather than relegate it to political actors and the media. The 
dichotomy that the CoS preserve between political elites and the audience tends to 
reproduce either an image of cynical politicians or of unawareness on the part of elites 
and ignores the role that knowledge plays in creating a 'regime of truth' about threats, 
whose veridicity is taken-for-granted by politicians and electorates alike. 
The analyses of security which have turned a sociological eye upon practices have 
been mainly concerned with the emergence of practices in specific institutional loci. In 
such an analysis, human trafficking would be the result of a contingent combination of 
practices that links it with other threats such as illegal migration, drug-trafficking, 
organised crime and even terrorism. An understanding of this security continuum would 
require extensive interviewing and monitoring of police officials entrusted with the 
management of human trafficking. 
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As the first chapter has suggested, the securitisation of trafficking is not necessarily 
a discourse that utters security in relation to trafficking. It is by being represented as a 
form of organised crime, illegal migration and prostitution that human trafficking acquires 
the threat connotations of the former. The CoS do not emphasise the inter-relatedness of 
issues, but look at the separate processes of construction. I have shown, however, that 
representations that take up other categorisations are subject to vectoral transformations. 
These representations are directed and modified by the initial categorisations. What 
Bigo's analyses add to this insight is a non-discursive element. Vectorisation' does not 
happen through linguistic cohabitation of terms, but takes place in a field where 
professionals place these issues together, inter-link them and devise interventions to 
manage them. At the same time, what the first chapter has added to an analysis of 
policing and of 'security professionals' is the element of knowledge and representation 
that does not necessarily belong to the 'security professionals'. Other categories of 
professionals enter this field of practices which is simultaneously a field of knowledge. 
The CoS approach to threat construction raises problems in deciding whether 
human trafficking is a security issue. Petersen's article is interesting especially because 
she confronts head-on this problem from within the CoS camp. Buzan and Waever have 
been aware of Walt's warning that constructivism can lead to relativism (if issues are 
constructed into security, then everything can arbitrarily become a threat, making the 
concept of security irrelevant) and have attempted what I would call a 'controlled 
expansion'. While expanding security to sectors through the performative speech act 
definition of securitisation, they control and limit it by the 'logic of war and, one could 
legitimately add, by that of friend and enemy. 
Acting as criteria for judging successful securitisation, these limitations are 
apparent in Petersen's analysis. Since the Baltics are no longer perceived in a relationship 
of enmity in the Danish society and old stereotypes of friend/enemy are no longer at work, 
she has problems deciding whether trafficking has been securitised or not. Moreover she 
wonders whether 'the criminalisation of trafficking in women mean[s] that trafficking in 
women has become securitised' (Petersen 2001: 231) and looks for the equivalent of the 
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'logic of war' and survival in practices of criminalisation. Human trafficking fails to satisfy 
both criteria: it does not threaten state survival anymore than the survival of society, there 
is no logic of war or of survival at play, and friends and enemies can only be found if a 
priori given in certain circumstances. 
According to this argument, Russian women trafficked to Germany would be 
perceived along the friend/enemy lines, while Baltic women trafficked to the Scandinavian 
countries not. As none of these elements are present in the Baltic-Danish case, she 
decides that 'the criminalisation of trafficking works to prevent a securitisation of trafficking 
in women by individualifing the issue of trafficking' (Petersen 2001: 232). If securitisation 
concerns collective survival, criminalising human trafficking can only be a move to 
suspend securitisation. The CoS securitisation does not leave space for the individual, 
whose concerns for survival would not have the mobilising potential that those of larger 
societal groups (e. g. ethnic groups) can have. 
The CoS restrict the logic of security by means of discursive rules. As the 
securitisation scenario was played on the stage of 'panic politics' - as opposed to 'normal 
politics' (Buzan et al. 1998: 34), the distinguishing feature is internal to discourse, the 
specific rhetorical structure of survival and urgency. Huysmans has warned against this 
limitation of the ambit of security (Huysmans 1998b). Bigo has also argued against this 
restriction of securitisation to the logic of war. According to him, securitisation is a matter 
of everyday technologies that the 'professionals of security' employ. Biometrics, 
databases or surveillance do not immediately entail questions of survival. Yet, these are 
the technologies used in specific security constructions. One would therefore need to 
consider the possibility that the securitisation of human trafficking takes place in a specific 
articulation with criminalisation, that certain practices applied to traffickers and even 
trafficked women are criminal practices. Having recourse to these practices would appear 
commonsensical if one were to consider the institutions and the actors involved in this 
field. 
As the police are one of the actors involved in securitisation (cf. Bigo 1996), 'policing' 
human trafficking is different from practices of the military, for example. Moreover, the 
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securitisation of trafficked women does not necessarily entail a type of regional 
securitisation. Securitising trafficked women from the Baltics is not equivalent to 
securitising the Baltics, though old stereotypes about regions and nationality do play an 
important role. Bigo has claimed that security practices and technologies are more 
important than public policies and political discourse if one is to understand what is at 
stake (Bigo 2001a: 121 ). 12 It is an analysis of practices that disentangles securitisation 
from emergency and exception to find practices of security that work 'through everyday 
technologies, through the effects of power that are continuous rather than exceptional, 
through political struggles, and especially through institutional competition within the 
professional security field' (Bigo 2002: 73). Human trafficking will also appear as de-linked 
from war and the friend/enemy construction, governed through technologies of risk 
management and profiling. 
In his analyses of policing, Bigo has made explicit the heterogeneity of practices 
which do not fit the militarised logic of friend/enemy making, but are 'policing' practices in 
the Foucauldian understanding of the word (Bigo 1996). 13 He has argued that the link 
between the migrant and the criminal is the result of the techniques that the police have 
used against migrants, techniques previously used against criminals (Bigo 2001a: 134). 
Bigo's analyses would turn upside down an interpretation of discourses which would point 
to the slippage from 'clandestine/illegal immigrants' to 'criminals' or from the criminalised 
movement of drugs and arms to the criminalised movement of people. While discourses 
remain important for ensuring the continuity of practices and providing rationales for 
certain practices, Bigo sees practices as ontologically prior to discourses. 
However, it is less important to decide whether it was first that border officials 
transferred practices from dealing with illegal migrants to trafficking, whether the police 
first considered trafficked women as illegal prostitutes, having thus committed an offence 
or whether it was a discursive construction that entailed certain practices. The relationship 
12 M. C. Williams (1997) and Ceyhan (1998) make similar arguments. 
13 There is an ambiguous use of 'police' in Bigo's work, one directly connected with the analysis of 
police work and a more comprehensive one derived from Foucault. In the latter sense, 'police ... is 
the ensemble of mechanisms through which order is ensured' (Foucault 2001: 17/translation mine). 
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between discourse and practice is more complex, a relationship of co-dependence rather 
than 'implementation' (Rose and Miller 1992; Valverde 1996). It entails an analysis of 
heterogeneous practices that place certain issues in a field defined by security 
professionals. The questions that emerge from a Bourdieuean approach to the field of 
security and the professionals who have 'stakes' in the field concern the structuration of 
the field itself and the relation between professionals and the logic of practice. Is there a 
logic of security practices that goes beyond the 'stakes' of professionals? Chapter 4 will 
suggest that the logic of security practices can subvert forms of contestation between 
professionals, e. g. between NGO professionals and security professionals. How is the 
field constituted, how is it held together? The next section will suggest that there is an 
imaginary of security that holds together practices and allows for movements between 
fields. 
Discovering security., the real of imaginary (in)security 
Is security all about institutional practices and discourses? Zygmunt Bauman, Anthony 
Giddens, and Ulrich Beck link security with subjective experience. This section is devoted 
to ontological security to explore how an imaginary of security functions beyond real and 
symbolic practices or rather consonant with those. Even if not much theorised, the 
imaginary of security is invoked or often assumed in security studies. Ontological security 
gives us an idea of what makes security so powerful, beyond institutional and discursive 
construction. Ontological security has not sparked much debate and has not entailed any 
school creation in IR, mostly given its contradictory position towards the discursive and 
practice-oriented approaches already discussed. 14 On the one hand, ontological 
(in)security provides an explanation for the quasi-pervasive securitising practices and on 
the other, it challenges an analysis of practices inasmuch as it functions like an invariant 
of post-modernity. Ontological security can be read as posing a challenge to the analysis 
14 The articles that make use of the concept of ontological security are rather sparse. See, for 
example, (Steele 2005), (Mitzen 2006 forthcoming), (Zaretsky 2002). 
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of practices; if we know the underlying reason for securitisation, it is no longer necessary 
to study practices, but to come to terms with our ontological (in)security. 15 
The phrase 'ontological security' was coined by Giddens in the early 1990s. 'To be 
ontologically secure' is, according to him, 'to posses... uanswers" to fundamental 
existential questions which all human life in some way addresses' (Giddens 1991: 47). 
There are four existential types of questions: questions about being, finitude and human 
life, questions concerning the existence of otherpersons, self-identity (Giddens 1991: 50- 
55). This general philosophical argument becomes a sociological argument of 'ontological 
insecurity' in modernity, characterised by the intrusion of abstract systems and the de- 
skilling of day-to-day life, an 'alienating and fragmenting phenomenon so far as the self is 
concerned' (Giddens 1991: 137). Anxiety about self-identity is one of the characteristics 
linked with modernity. What Giddens has called 'ontological security could more aptly be 
called 'epistemological security' as it is closely bound with the limits of knowing, with 
asking questions about the nature of being, of self and others and the impossibility to 
provide answers. Huysmans has looked at the 'double fear' in security stories as both the 
'fear of death' and an 'epistemological fear -a fear of not knowing' (Huysmans 1998c: 
234-235). 
Bauman has also located three ingredients of Unsicherseit (security, certainty and 
safety) as 'conditions of self-confidence and self-reliance on which the ability to think and 
act rationally depends' (Bauman 2001: 17). As a writer of postmodemity, Bauman argues 
that the conditions of globalisation produce continuous uncertainty, they do not allow any 
risk-free, secure spaces and in the process encourage fear about threats to personal 
safety. As institutions are no longer capable of offering security and certainty, all they can 
do is shift anxieties to one ingredient of Unsicherheit, i. e. individual safety. Yet Bauman 
understands safety as a necessary strategy to deal with mortality, which is therefore a- 
historical. He combines a metanarrative of human civilisation and its 'essential' propensity 
towards security with a large-scale narrative of globalisation. Bauman was not a singular 
15 In this form of argumentation, ontological insecurity has fared better in security studies. If at the 
heart of the modem subject is insecurity, one needs to come to terms with this insecurity. 
72 
figure to point out that the unresolvability of large scale uncertainty/insecurity brings about 
an exclusive focus on personal safety. Such a strategy is seen as politically appealing, 
given that 'the roots of insecurity are thrust in anonymous, remote or inaccessible places' 
and 'it is not immediately clear what the local, visible powers could do to rectify the 
present afflictions' (Bauman 2001: 50-51). 
Connolly has also emphasised how the state, confronted with the globalisation of 
economic life and its inability to control or provide a secure space for its citizens, takes up 
a 'compensatory expression of state efficacy and accountability' (Connolly 1999b: 129). 
'Under these circumstances', Connolly goes on, 'signs of state inadequacy in other 
domains become transfigured in the realm of criminal punishment' (Connolly 1999b: 129). 
Berman's argument about human trafficking is similar to Connolly's. The problem with 
such narratives of (post)modernity and globalisation is that they can explain virtually 
everything, any of the issues that become securitised are a Freudian replacement and 
negation of one type of Unsicherheit by another. 
For Beck, a division between first and second modernity introduces risk to 
parameters unknown before. Beck's risks are attributable to the inability of social 
institutions to control the risks they have themselves created. Unlike the theorists of post- 
modernity, Beck replaces the 'post-' accounts by a positive account of modernity. Beck's 
theory rests on the 'totafising assumption that risk should be approached in a narrative of 
the modernisation process that brings about a "risk society"' (Dean 1999a: 181). The 
pervading sociology of risk in modernity is directly linked to a failure of knowledge. The 
industrial society of the first modernity is no longer able to control the risks to which it has 
given rise (environmental, technical) and the risk society of the second modernity 
becomes the era of incalculable, unaccountable and unlimited risks (Beck 1992). 
Beck's risk society, Giddens' late modernity or Bauman's postmodernity are 
characterised by changes in the forms of lives, types of connections, ties, communities 
that exist and which have anxiety and insecurity built at their heart. Despite the limited 
resonance of Giddens' ontological security, the idea of an insecurity that is explainable in 
the context of the larger process of modernisation has appealed to security studies. By 
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integrating 'ontological insecurity' in such a meta-narrative of modernisation, all security 
constructions are shown to be equally flawed. 
Different constructions of security have Girardian undertones, in which all 'others' 
become arbitrary objects of (in)security, scapegoats of modernity (Girard 1986). The 
problem with such an approach is that it is not linked with micro-practices of security 
construction. At most, it can conceptualise macro-practices, as Beck does. Illegal migrants 
can be swapped with refugees, asylum-seekers, terrorists, drug-dealers or even more 
generally the 'East', 'the Baltics'. In her explanation about the state's 'ontological 
insecurity' under conditions of post-modernity and globalisation, Berman does away with 
the specificity of human trafficking. She quotes officials for whom the problem of trafficking 
is not just individual violence but equally involves the threat of cross-border activity. In this 
instance, the announced concern over the exploitation of women is haunted by a more 
visceral concern about border violations (Berman 2003: 42). As the fluidity, fast pace and 
blurring of boundaries that globalisation is thought to entail are dangerous for all forms of 
identity, one danger could be easily substitutable for another, all leading to the same 
effect, namely exposing state insecurity. 
Every form of insecurity is therefore amenable to a grand insecurity, the insecurity 
of post-modernity, late modernity or globalisation. In contrast to ontological (in)security, 
practices of security emphasise concrete analyses of rationalities and technologies. 
Rather than assuming a form of risk or disorientation characteristic of (post-)modernity, 
these accounts focus on the heterogeneity of these rationalities and show how practices 
are made up and assembled of various elements. In such an account, human trafficking 
would not be expressive of a malaise of the state under the conditions of globalisation, but 
would be constituted as a particular assemblage of rationalities and technologies. 
Technologies for managing illegal migration, organised crime, prostitution, technologies 
for assisting victims of crime, judicial technologies for dealing with criminals are brought 
together in a specific formation. As Bigo has formulated a research strategy of security 
practices, '... it is in their [the actors'] ordinary work, which they do every day... that we 
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note tangible marks of crucial transformations which are affecting "governality" within the 
European boundaries' (Bigo 2000: 72). 
Opposing the grand narrative of 'risk society, the governmentality literature has 
advocated a concrete and empirical analysis of specific types of risk rationalities and 
practice. Dean has pointed out that '[r]isk and its techniques are plural and heterogeneous 
and its significance cannot be exhausted by a narrative of a shift from a quantitative 
calculation of risk to the globalisation of incalculable risk' (Dean 1999a: 191). In the case 
of human trafficking, risk functions mainly as a strategy for assigning people into 
categories of risk. Typical risk profiles of victims of trafficking would read along these 
lines: 
Most (Central and Eastern European) victims of women trafficking are 
between 18 and 25 years of age, unmarried and without children. 
Relatively often, victims of women trafficking, especially Central 
European victims, come from problem families - single parent families, 
alcohol abusing parents, incest, mistreatment, financial and housing 
problems, psychological problems (Vocks and Nijboer 2000: 383). 
A study by the IOM office in Romania office has found that 38 percent of girls between 15 
and 18 years of age in orphanages were ready to 'emigrate to a foreign job', putting them 
at risk of being trafficked. The same study has found that 38 percent of single women and 
girls aged 15 to 25 and 20 percent of women and girls who lived with their parents were 
ready to emigrate to a foreign job (US State Department 2002). These practices of 
profiling are part of the strategies and techniques of pro-active policing and prevention 
and they are important inasmuch as they create specific exclusions which cannot be 
understood from an invariant account of 'ontological security'. 
The ontologisation of insecurity has also informed analyses of the constitution of the 
modern subject that security practices invoke. Practices of security are grafted upon the 
constitution of the modern subject in need of security. Bauman has defined 'the typical 
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modern practice, the substance of modern politics, of modem intellect, of modern life, is 
the effort to exterminate ambivalence' (Bauman 1991: 7). Dillon has shown that 
(in)security is tightly bound with metaphysics, inasmuch as the 'metaphysically determined 
being has a foundational requirement to secure security (Dillon 1996: 27). The 
metaphysical being is the Enlightenment being, driven by a desire to security and secure 
identity, but doomed to eternal ontological insecurity. Ontological insecurity bears the 
name of the other, the difference that cannot be eliminated but is constitutive of the 
modern being. It is not the conditions of (post-)modernity that create insecurity, but the 
metaphysical definition of identity. Identity can only be constituted and re-enacted as 
identity/difference. As Connolly has famously put it in his groundbreaking 
IdentitylDifference, 
Identity is... a slippery, insecure experience, dependent on its ability to 
define difference and vulnerable to the tendency of entities it would so 
define to counter, resist, overturn, or subvert definitions applied to them. 
Identity stands in a complex political relation to the differences it seeks to 
fix (Connolly 1991: 64). 
This is the predicament of the modem subject. Campbell and Dillon have argued in 
the introduction to their co-edited book that 'the political subject of violence, rapaciously 
invoking security, comes in a variety of guises, however, depending upon where its 
particular idiomatic expression happens to locate the centre' (Campbell and Dillon 1993: 
28). The imaginary of security is consonant with the variety of security practices through 
which the modem subject attempts to make herself secure. Given the metaphysical 
necessity to secure the identity of the modern subject, they conclude, alongside Der 
Derian, that'the enemy of the politics of security is the very heterogeneity, difference and 
otherness' (Campbell and Dillon 1993: 28). 16 Taking up Connolly's analyses of 
16 Both Campbell and Dillon have also offered influential analyses of security practices inspired by 
Foucault's work (Campbell 1992; Dillon 1995b). 
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Identity/difference, poststructuralists claim that an identity Is made insecure or threatened 
#not merely by actions that the other might take to injure or defeat the true identity but by 
the very Identity of its mode of being as other' (Connolly 1991: 66). Securitisation 
therefore conceals 'the inherent insecurity In any referent object... the impossibility of 
security (Edkins 2002: 75). 
Berman's account of human trafficking displays both aspects of the ontologisation 
of (in)security. Human trafficking Is a threat to the state's symbolic powers of sovereignty, 
already eroded by globalisation. 'At this historical moment', she writes, 'forces associated 
with globalisation - regional Integration, Immigration, new forms of capital circulation - 
forge the appearance of a loss of Individual and national control over the parameters of 
everyday life... sex-trafficking discourses rise In this environment and function, in part, as 
a site at which to assuage this sense of crisis and loss of control' (Berman 2003: 49). The 
other form of ontological Insecurity is sparked by the presence of the Eastern European 
other In the midst of the European moral order. As Berman's discussion shows, the two 
takes on 'ontological (in)security' are not Incompatible. How does an emphasis on 
metaphysical fears or anxieties triggered by the conditions of (post-)modemity relate to 
concrete (micro-)practices? 
These approaches rely on an Imaginary of the modem subject and an imaginary of 
what security Is. Their Importance for analysing discourses and practices of security is that 
of providing an Imaginary framework within which symbolic practices can be deployed. it 
Is an Imaginary of ontological and epistemological security that confers consistency upon 
heterogeneous practices. The Imaginary of ontological security holds these (micro- 
)practices together. The Institutional positions of security professionals and discourses of 
elites are embedded In a shared Imaginary of security that can create a consensus about 
and acceptance of security practices. 
Experiencing (In)security. - the real of the subjectlabject 
If security constructions Invoke - Implicitly or explicitly - an Imaginary of ontological 
security, an Imaginary of expectation that security can deliver, they do so by a long 
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historical process that has constituted the modem subject. This macro-constitution of the 
subject needs to be duplicated by a subject constituted by micro-practices. The subject of 
security has not however surfaced In many of the security debates. In the CoS definifion, 
securitisation Is a topological move from the realm of normal politics to extraordinary 
politics, made possible by the construction of an existential threat to a referent object. 
Referent objects are 'things that are seen to be essentially threatened and that have a 
legitimate claim to survival'(Buzan et al. 1998: 36). 
This limitation of constructivism as reifying (one of the reifications being the state) 
has attracted a lot of criticism (e. g. McSweeney 1999). Athough the CoS have rather 
convincingly argued that bracketing some processes of social construction in order to 
analyse others Is a legitimate move, the answer to Campbell's charge against a 
constructivism of 'volitional actors' would be more difficult. Securitising actors behave 
rather like rational actors and cannot but do so, in the absence of a theorisation of the split 
subject, such as Althusser's theory of Ideology, Foucault's theory of power or Bourdleu's 
theory of habitus. The state Itself Is both an actor and an object of security. Yet, 
poststructuralists have shown that the state is continuously reproduced through 
performative constructions of danger (Campbell 1992). 
The predominance of the state In security stories Is due to how the meaning of 
security has been tied to a historically specific form of political community (Walker 1990: 
5). As states are still very much with us and quite visible actors on the political scene, it is 
therefore hardly surprising that they dominate our understandings of security. The state 
has thus been the referent object par excellence of security. Whether one explains it 
historically or simply by the weight that states still have nowadays, state security crosscuts 
various schools and approaches to security as a major concern. Other referent objects 
(societies, nations, ethnic groups, and the environment) have been simple additions to the 
state rather than a challenge to its primacy. Their survival could be meaningful only if the 
survival of the state was taken for granted. 17 
17 Ethnic conflicts or security concerns around Identity, religion. cultural differences are treated In 
the literature within the framework of the given state, under the Imperative of state security. 
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The Individual has been relegated to the background of security studies given the 
same assumpOon of the primacy of state security. States have been considered the 
guarantors of Individual security too, but where Individuals could only count as a 
collective, as an aggregate rather than as specific Individuals. Even in this account, the 
state can become problematic as a referent object when we are dealing with competing 
securitisations, when the state Itself becomes a threat to its citizens. The problem of the 
primacy of state or of the Individual cannot, however, be given In such general terms. The 
differentiation between the state and the individual as legitimate objects of security is not 
pertinent as 'the state Is not only expected to ensure the Institutional survival of the 
community but also the personal survival of each of Its members' (131go 2001 a: 134). 
Foucault has analysed the advent of the biopolitical state and the change in the 
development of the modem state from what he called the 'city-cifizen' game to those of 
pastoral care of life and the living (Foucault 2000b). The state not only assigns 
membership In the political community and ensures the survival of the community, but is 
also In charge of the well-being of Individuals (or of categories of the population). The 
governmental practices of the state are to reach citizen In their Individuality and totality, 
omnes and singulatim (Foucault 2000b). Yet, as part of this process of securing the 
Individual, the state permanently draws boundaries, creating categories of individuals who 
are to be protected at the expense of the exclusion and elimination of others. In Dillon's 
formulation, the 'continuous blopolitical assaying of life proceeds through the episternically 
driven and continuously changing Interrogation of the worth and eligibility of the living 
across a terrain of value that Is constantly changing' (Dillon 2005: 41). National Socialism 
was an extreme example of how the protection of the population, its good and fit life entail 
the disqualification of other forms of life and the elimination of other Individuals. 
Trafficked women would appear as this form of disqualified life. Critical scholars 
have challenged the disqualification and abjectification of life that security entails and 
have counterposed the human being to the state, asking the question of primacy. who Is 
the primary referent object of security, 'is It states, or Is it people? Whose security comes 
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first? ' (Booth 1991: 319). Critical Security Studies" and feminist security studies have 
promoted the individual as the legitimate referent object of security and tackled the issue 
of inclusion/exclusion and concurring vs. competing securitisations. These schools 
emphasise a normative concern with the individual driven by the concern that state 
security is not synonymous with the security of everybody living within the state. CSS 
introduces the question of 'whose security, promoting the individual as the legitimate 
referent object of security. 
The Welsh School take seriously the injunction that security should be about 'real 
people in real places' (Booth 1995: 123) and add that one cannot separate individual 
security from the wider social context (Wyn Jones 1999: 117). As Wyn Jones has pointed 
out, Booth is not concerned with an abstract liberal individual, but understands the 
individual in her corporeal, material existence and experiences (Wyn Jones 1999: 115). 
Here Critical security scholars are closer to feminists than to the fashionable supporters of 
human security because it is on the basis of these experiences of exclusion that a certain 
individual can be turned into a legitimate subject of security. 
The previous chapter has shown that accounts of human trafficking as 'human 
rights violations' attempt to bring to the fore women's suffering and portray real-life victims 
who would be able to support a different representation of human trafficking. Women's 
experiences of violence and exploitation are supposed to buttress an alternative account 
of security, promoting them as legitimate referent objects. 
If Tony Blair took a short stroll from Downing Street to Soho, the heart of 
London's sex trade, he'd find human rights abuses right under his nose 
every bit as terrible as those in Iraq. Increasingly, coercion, human 
trafficking and violence dominate the UK's sex industry. Yet strangely, 
this domestic human rights issue fails to arouse crusading zeal. 
'a Critical Security Studies with capital 'C' has also been named the Welsh School given the 
location of Ken Booth and Wyn Jones at the University of Aberystwyth (Smith 2000). 
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Stories surfacing from these women are barely credible in 20th-century 
Britain. Last year 'Natasha' gave evidence against a pimp. Aged 15, she 
had been forced to have sex with customers for 20 hours a day, earning 
her 'owner' pounds 500 a day. She'd come from a broken and 
impoverished home in Romania, been tempted by offers of a better life, 
and ended up trafficked via the Balkans to sex slavery in London. A 
similar recent prosecution of two Albanians for trafficking, rape, indecent 
assault and drug possession revealed another Romanian girl, 16-year-old 
Anna, who had been sold at 12 and trafficked via Macedonia to London 
(The Guardian 26 March 2003). 
Faced with stories of victimisation and human rights violations, the answer to 'whose 
security? ' seems straightforward: trafficked women. This question only makes sense if it is 
fully formulated, 'against whom are women to be secured? ' Formulated as a security 
issue, human trafficking sets competing referent subjects against each other. Women are 
to be secured against the 'evil' trafficker but cannot be secured against the state which 
chooses to deport them. Berman, for example, analyses discourses of trafficking as a 
threat to the state. For her, [i]t is the particular combination of the movement, 'race', and 
gender of migrant East European sex workers that in part disrupts the ability of the state 
to adjudicate membership in the political community -a combination that makes them an 
external and internal threat to the nation and the state' (Berman 2003: 59). While human 
trafficking seems to be more of a threat in the symbolic order, Berman acknowledges that 
trafficking in women also represents the threat of the other in the midst of the European 
social, political and moral order. State and identity are the referent objects that these 
authors consider. Berman equally tries to turn the tables on the arbitrary construction of 
the dangerous other by advocating 'human security', the individual as a referent object. 
Other CSS scholars are less sensitive to the problem of 'which individual' is to be 
considered in relation to security. Krause advocates human security as the security to be 
analysed, given that the 'new security threats' are actually threats to the material well- 
81 
being of individuals rather than to states or large human collectivities as the CoS has 
claimed (Krause 1998: 310). However in the edited book on Critical security, Krause and 
Williams refine the understanding of the individual and consider three possibilities (Krause 
and Williams 1997: 43). The first one takes 'individuals as persons' as the object of 
security and to focus on the promotion of human rights, protecting persons from each 
other and from state institutions. The second concerns 'individuals as citizens' and sees 
threats to individuals coming from the institutions of their own state. The third analyses 
human security in terms of membership in a 'transcendent human community with 
common global concerns'. In the face of threats such as environmental ones, the 
individual can be secured only by securing humankind as such (Krause and Williams 
1997: 44-45). 
Feminist security studies have been mostly concerned with those who cannot 
voice their security concerns, those 'whose experiences of danger and violence are 
written out of the account' (Pettman 1996: 98). They have either set out to make such 
concerns audible from specific loci or have advocated, more generally, the diminution of 
all forms of violence (Tickner 2001: 143). They have tirelessly interpellated those whom 
Cynthia Enloe metaphorically calls the 'margins, silences, and bottom rungs' (Enloe 1993: 
186). Christine Sylvester has argued for privileging the 'profoundly mundane' and 
women's experiences of insecurity (Sylvester 1994,1996). The little mermaids with silent 
security dilemmas, to paraphrase Lene Hansen's famous critique (Hansen 2000) of the 
CoS , is the phrase that sums up those who been ignored, those who cannot utter their 
security concerns, They are the ones that need to be brought into the limelight of security. 
Unlike feminists and CSS, the proponents of the very fashionable concept of 
'human security' stick with an abstract individual who is granted minimum standards of 
human rights, at the expense of an analysis of practices of violence and exclusion. They 
place common humanity rather than raison d"Etat at the core of normative concerns, 
implying that security of the state is not necessarily synonymous with the security of 
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everybody living within the state (Poku and Graham 2000: 13). 19 In a human security 
approach, trafficked women would be granted rights to shelter, justice, food, medical 
assistance. The human security paradigm attempts to take security beyond the limits of 
the state. Unlike the feminist analyses of the limited remit of security and locations of 
numerous sites of insecurity, human security applies to a generally abstract subject. A 
concept of human security would restrict, for example, the possibilities of understanding 
the insecure and insecuring status of trafficked women in relation to the state. While all 
women would be granted shelter, food and medical assistance if they contact the police, it 
would be for a limited period until deportation. Other rights would only be granted if 
women are supportive and give evidence against their traffickers. These contradictory 
techniques are dependent upon the contradictory status that trafficked women hold within 
the state. 
Berman has captured an interesting dichotomy, the split condition of the trafficked 
women between 'as if citizens and not-citizens. As 'white women', East European sex 
workers are at once identical to the 'white' women that the state is supposed to protect. As 
illegal immigrants and workers, they are 'different' from citizens and therefore to be 
deported (Berman 2003: 54). She also provides the other facet of the relation between 
state and individual as referent objects of security when she argues that the discourses on 
human trafficking result in an attempt to 'reinvigorate the state as the defender of the 
"white" women, punisher of illegal immigrants and criminals and protector of the political 
community' (Berman 2003: 64). 
The poststructuralist proviso to the analysis of referent objects as undertaken by 
CSS and some feminists would be that '[referent objects] do not exist independently of 
discursive articulation, it is through discourse that security is defined, and where actors 
successfully manifest their position and capacity' (Hansen 2000: 288). In what was 
supposed to be a summary of the CoS position, Hansen has taken them further down 
along the poststructuralist path than they have gone themselves. Although in the debate 
19 For the purposes of this chapter, I do not engage with the debates about the concept of human 
security, but simply rely on a contradiction that the concept cannot capture. 
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on the reification of objects of security, the CoS would endorse the constitution of these 
objects in discourse, they have not taken this assumption to its logical end. On the 
contrary, they have decided that given that identity construction is a long process, at a 
certain moment in time, states, nations, ethnic groups can be taken as given. The 
argument offered basically acknowledges the 'constructed' nature of the referent entities, 
yet continues by defending their reification into 'sedimented' and 'petrified', or 'thingish' 
objects (Behnke 1999: 6) 
They have ignored here the temporal dimension of performative speech acts. 
Campbell's seminal book, Writing Security, has made explicit the iterative character of 
performativity. 'For the state, stasis equals death', he argues (Campbell 1992: 8). Security 
practices will thus reproduce an unstable identity at the level of the state, and the 
containment of challenges to that identity (Campbell 1992: 78f'. As identities are 
performatively constructed in the securitising process and posts, poststructuralism moves 
away from the traditional concern with the a priori assumptions of agency and pre-given 
subjects to the problematic of subjectivity and its political constitution (Campbell 1998a: 
222). Security and subjectivity are intrinsically linked, given that securing something 
requires its differentiation, classification and definition (Campbell 1992: 253). 
Poststructuralists, however, remain evasive on the subject that they consider. 
Many emphasise, in the wake of Connolly and Campbell, the constitution of identity/self 
through the exclusion of difference/other and the reproduction of identity. However, the 
'othee they envisage is mostly a derivative of the constitution of 'us'. Even assaying the 
worthiness of life by biopolitical practices appears as a consequence of the 'political 
rationality' of the state. In Campbell's analysis of how American identity is reproduced 
through re-writings of dangers, the others who are written out as dangerous, abnormal, 
risky are 'faceless faces', substitutable to one another. Different others succeed one 
another, subjected to the need of identity reproduction. The long march of others is not 
without effect on the constitution of identity. The others who are excluded and made 
abject create - by means of negation -a specific imaginary of identity. Others are not 
20 Cynthia Weber sets out a feminist interpretation of performative identity in IR (Weber 1998). 
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random others, but those who, in certain historical configurations, negate the imaginary of 
the self. The identification of the self takes place 'through a repudiation which produces a 
domain of abjection' (Butler 1993: 3). It is this imaginary of the self, of the modern subject 
that poststructuralists have challenged. For Rob Walker, it is only in the context of the 
subject of security that 
it is possible to envisage a critical discourse about security, a discourse 
which engages with contemporary transformations of political life, with 
emerging accounts of who we might become, and the conditions under 
which we might become other than we are now without destroying other, 
ourselves, or the planet on which we all live' (Walker 1997: 78). 
Subjects of security would therefore need to take up the challenge of difference and re- 
evaluate their discourses and imaginary of security. 
Such an account is vulnerable to the critique that it cannot discriminate between 
dangerous others and non-threatening others. The other is arbitrarily constituted as 
dangerous by the identitary requirements of the self, it is made abject, relegated to the 
"unlivable" and "uninhabitable" zones of social life which are nevertheless populated by 
those who do not enjoy the status of the subject' (Butler 1993: 3). The abject only exists 
as a constitutive outside (Butler 1993: 3), as the limit to the domain of subjectivity. And if 
the other voices her own security concerns as feminist security studies have suggested, 
this only serves to perpetuate a dynamics of insecurity. Security functions by explicitly 
securing the self/us (with the ambiguity implied in the impossibility of achieving a secure 
identity) and implicitly insecuring others. The relation to the other has been at the heart of 
critical engagements with the effects of security. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has engaged Wth an extensive field of approaches to security to gauge their 
complexity, their problems and impasses. The problematisation of security has been 
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formulated in IR as reality vs. construction. Some theorists have considered security as an 
objective problem, similarly to how other literatures have read migration or organised 
crime. The only question that remains is how to deal with threats. For those who have 
problematised security as a matter of construction, security can be read as a problem 
constructed through discourses and specific practices. The CoS have emphasised 
discourses and the importance of 'speaking' security, while the Bourdieuean-inspired 
Paris School has embedded discourses in institutional positions. Security is a matter of 
symbolic struggles and not just performative discourses. Security has also been seen as a 
problem of how individuals relate to the world, how they imagine their position in the world 
and how the world can fall short of this imaginary. Ontological security has appeared as a 
useful explanation for the inflationary problematisations of security. Although an imaginary 
of security makes possible certain practices and discourses to be formulated and to thrive 
in the present context, it cannot be divorced from specific discourses and institutional 
struggles. These approaches remind us, however, of the 'promise of security, the 
imaginary of certainty beyond survival upon which political communities are built. The 
promise of security activates a certain understanding of order and of ordering things and 
people. This imaginary of ordering appears most explicitly in relation to the subject of 
security. The subject of security has often been seen as (s)he who is to be secured, made 
part of such an ordering. 
Yet, this promise of security is made possible to the extent that other subjects are 
excluded from this ordering. Security practices create abject bodies, shadowy others are 
already prepared for elimination or neutralisation. Butler has summarised this contentless 
image of the other: 
I have seen it [the abjection of bodies] in the German press when Turkish 
refugees are either killed or maimed. Very often we can get the names of 
the German perpetrators and their complex family and psychological 
histories, but no Turk has a complex family or psychological history that 
Die Zeit ever writes about ... So, we get a differential production of the 
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human and a differential materialization of the human (Meijer and Prins 
1998: 281). 
The ordering of security based on a dynamics of abjection and of exclusion exposes the 
very promise of security as an impossible promise. The abjectification that security does 
depends on the very imaginary of ontological security instantiated in symbolic practices, 
both institutional and non-institutional. The limit of security is the limit of the order that it 
defines, it is the limit of otherness. The conceptualisation of security with which analyses 
will work depends on the immanent relation between symbolic and imaginary practices 
which make possible the creation of spaces of abjection, of the indeterminate and 
shadowy limit of order and of all ordering processes. Can these spaces of abjection be 
undone? In different ways, critical security studies (I include here the CoS, the Welsh 
School, certain feminists and poststructuralists) have tried to replace and reformulate this 
promise of security. The next chapter will go on to explore how desecuritisation, 
emancipation, and ethics have reformulated (explicitly or implicitly) the relation to the other 
and how they have exposed the fallacies of the promise of security. The conceptualisation 
that I have proposed will also be transformed through the encounter with these attempts 
at unmaking it. 
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Ill. Unmaking security: desecuritisation, emancipation, 
and ethiCS21 
Introduction 
The previous chapter has shown that security functions as an institutionally embedded 
discourse that relies upon a promise and an imaginary of ontological and epistemological 
certainty. The argument of Chapter 2 was not, however, an attempt to propose a theory of 
security as theory assumes a prior objectification, but rather a conceptualisation with 
which analytical work can proceed (cf. Foucault 2000c: 327). This promise rests upon the 
exclusion and abjectification of another, who is repudiated as dangerous or risky, turned 
into life which is not life and 'materiality' which does not matter (Meijer and Prins 1998: 
281). The question that has emerged out of this conceptualisation of security - given the 
exclusionary effects of security in the ordering of subjects and abjects - was how to 
unmake these practices. Spaces of abjection are created through symbolic practices 
(institutional and non-institutional, mobilising technologies, knowledge and language) and 
of an imaginary of security. The strategies that have emerged in the literature that can be 
seen as critically engaging with the effects of security do not share a conceptualisation of 
security or of its effects in creating spaces of abjection. Yet, in grappling with the effects of 
security, they transform the very understanding of security and make us aware of the 
impasses and insights that a politics that unmakes security practices, a politics out of 
security needs to consider. 
The discontent with security can be understood in terms of its symbolic effects (as 
with the CoS) or its partiality, its limited and arbitrarily exclusive remit (CSS). For the CoS, 
securitisation entails a dynamics out of the normality of politics, a dynamics of urgency 
and immediacy. Therefore, the symbolic practices of security cannot be simply analysed 
in their emergence, but especially in the effects they entail for the political community. For 
21 Earlier versions of parts of this chapter have been published in (Aradau 2004a, 2004b). 
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CSS, security is unequally allocated to just some. Against the constructions of security 
that privilege the state, Booth and his students argue for a focus on the individual as the 
subject of security. The security of the individual spans a large array of issues which affect 
prospects of a free life. Ethics has come to the attention of security studies as a radical 
way of reconceptualising the relation to the other. Its discontent with security is that 
formulated in the previous chapter, the relationality to the other that security entails. The 
ethical approach has not created a school, but has rallied different poststructuralist writers 
at different times - ethics is not a constant in their research, but a theoretical engagement 
with the question of subjectivity. Campbell for example has been mostly concerned with 
analysing security discourses. His encounter with the work of Jacques Derrida and 
Emmanuel Levinas has led to a couple of books and articles which have embraced the 
ethical turn. Similar encounters can be found in the work of Dillon, Connolly, or Jenny 
Edkins. 
The ethical turn reconfigures the relation between self and other in terms of 
responsibility. Ethics becomes integral to subjectivity (Campbell 1998b). The ethics that I 
focus on in this account is of Levinasian and Derridian inspiration. In his book on ethics, 
Alain Badiou has distinguished two types of ethical approaches: the first one of Kantian 
inspiration, with a conception of the subject of moral law as universal and context-free and 
the second promoting an ethos of the other (Badiou 2002a). While human security 
approaches can be seen as partaking of a Kantian 'ethics of the same', sameness is 
problematic for security. As security creates and repudiates spaces of abjection, 
sameness is a priori ousted from its practices. An ethical approach able to unmake 
security practices can only be an 'ethos of the other', an ethics that radically reshapes the 
self/other relationality. 
This chapter will link some of these theoretical insights to the practical formation of 
the humanitarian approach to trafficking. While the three strategies located in this chapter 
are not the only forms of thinking politics out of security, I am discussing them together as 
they all speak to the human rights approach. This critical travelogue needs to also discuss 
strategies of critique and resistance inspired by Foucault. Yet, these strategies do not 
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speak directly to what the proponents of a human rights approach attempt to do, they 
point to other modalities of critically engaging with practices of security that will be tackled 
in Chapter 4. The human rights approach was imagined as an alternative representation 
grounding different political interventions from the dominant ones - illegal migration, 
prostitution, and organised crime. I am interested in whether this approach can be seen as 
an alternative intervention to the dominant security practices. In order to explore the 
implications of these strategies for unmaking securitisation, I shall consider the human 
rights approach as interweaving a strategy of desecuritisation, of emancipation and an 
'ethics of the other. 
Although a classical human rights approach would appear at first sight to partake 
more of an ethics of sameness, the humanitarian approach to trafficking can be seen to 
partake of these three strategies. The subjects of trafficking are not abstract subjects of 
rights. Human rights approaches have put forth a strategy that can only make them equal 
through dis-identification from categories of dangerous abjects. This strategy of dis- 
identification requires an alternative discourse that represents trafficked women as a 
different category. In formulating an alternative discourse to the discourse of illegal 
migration, this strategy can be read as an attempt at desecuritisation. Similarly, the focus 
on the plight of trafficked women shifts interest from the state - at least potentially. 
Trafficked women become part of a process of emancipation as defined by CSS. With the 
help of NGOs and other specialised organisations, women can build another future, a 
future of security away from exploitation and vulnerability. The new identification of 
trafficked women with bodies in pain reconfigures the self/other relationality. How does 
one relate to the suffering other? One can pose this question in terms of an ethos of the 
other. 
If the first three sections of the chapter are dedicated to a theoretical exploration of 
these three strategies (desecuritisation, emancipation, and ethics), the last section will try 
to understand in what sense the failure of the humanitarian approach can mean a failure 
of these strategies too. In the CoS framework, desecuritisation remains the prerogative of 
political elites and it is unclear how moving issues from one agenda to another would 
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affect the 'everydayness' of subjects (Huysmans 1998a). Emancipation, as used by CSS, 
tries to claim a different concept of security (emancipation is security in Booth's 
formulation) from state-led security practices, but it is unable to account for this very 
conceptual difference except by choosing other subjects as referents of 
emancipation/security (e. g. migrants). The ethical approach raises the issue of devising 
alternative concepts that could be mobilised politically. The theoretical problematique will 
be brought to speak to a particular situation. How can these theoretical strategies orient 
themselves to practice? 
Desecuritisation and alternative discourses 
The CoS represent the most immediate and direct engagement with a strategy as the one 
employed by NGOs and human rights activists. They attempt to contest and replace the 
security speech act by other speech acts that emphasise the suffering of victims of 
trafficking and their particularity. Although one could also open up the strategies through 
which these speakers of human rights enter the field of security professionals, the speech 
act, the consistent discourse they produce is most important for understanding their 
strategy. The veracity and poignancy of a discourse of suffering has led to increased 
attention to the well-being and life of victims of trafficking. 
The CoS have, however, had an ambiguous theoretical position about 
whether/when desecuritisation should replace securitisation, despite some of their 
concerns with the effects of securitisation. For Waever the choice between the 'dubious 
instrument of securitisation' and desecuritisation is not altogether clear (Waever 2000: 
285). Securitisation appeared at times as a very effective tool to make sense of several 
developments in the field of migration, refugee and asylum policy and even environmental 
policy. More often however, the CoS have expressed a preference for desecuritisation as 
being 'more effective than securitising problems' (Waever 1995: 57/emphasis in original). 
Although Waever has not specified the grounds which motivate the choice of 
desecuritisation over securitisation, Huysmans has read 'effective' in instrumental or 
utilitarian terms (Huysmans 1998a: 572-573). Yet, it remains unclear in exactly which 
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sense desecuritisation is more effective, especially given the attention-catching potential 
of securitisation that they emphasise. Arguments of effectiveness have also been made in 
favour of securitisation. In a recent discussion of the ethical issues raised by the 
securitisation vs. the desecuritisation of AIDS, Stefan Elbe has listed as the first 
advantage of a security approach the mobilisation of more political support and economic 
resources for addressing the AIDS pandemic (Elbe 2005). 
The ambiguity about the need for desecuritisation appears to me to reside in the 
analytical duality of the concept of securitisation. Firstly, in line with the 'linguistic turn' in 
social sciences, securitisation is a performative speech act. Moreover, successful 
securitisation is a felicitous speech act such as the felicitous naming of ship or performing 
of a marriage. As a speech act, it is defined by a specific structure internal to discourse 
(survival, priority of action 'because if not handled now it will be too late, and we will not 
exist to remedy our failure') (Buzan 1997: 14). Secondly, securitisation is also defined by 
the 'extraordinary defensive moves', the emergency actions undertaken by institutions and 
various security actors. Successful securitisation implies extraordinary measures, a 
breaking of 'normal political rules of the game (e. g., in the form of secrecy, levying taxes 
or conscription, placing limitations on otherwise inviolable rights, or focusing societys 
energy and resources on a specific task)' (Buzan et aL 1998: 24). 
For those who link security with the military, expanding the concept can lead to a 
'militarisation' of social relations. Discussing the expansion of threats to the environment, 
Simon Dalby has voiced this misapprehension that one would only militarise society 
further rather than dealing directly with political difficulties (Dalby 1997: 5). In the CoS 
assessment, securitisation is at best, 'a kind of mobilization of conflictual or threatening 
relations, often through emergency mobilization of the state' (Buzan et al. 1998: 8). The 
other misapprehension regarding the expansion of security refers to the social relations 
that securitisation brings about in a political community. It is the spectre of violence that 
the definition of securitisation invokes. Violence becomes a permanent possibility in a 
society that defines itself in terms of conflictual relations, reminding us of the 
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contradictions of the promise of security. The imaginary of security does not sustain the 
identity of the community, but necessarily places it in a dynamics of violence. 
The concrete and specific measures that are involved in successful securitisation 
raise the issue of normal vs. exceptional or extraordinary politics. It is in relation to the 
procedural 'normalcy' of democracy that the 'exceptionalism' of securitisation can be 
theorised. 22 The element of urgency takes securitisation out of the realm of normal 
politics. Securitisation re-inscribes issues in a different logic, a logic of urgency and of 
extraordinary measures, a sibling of the logic of 'political realism' (Huysmans 1998a). This 
approach takes securitisation on a different path than the more benign one to which the 
CoS were attracted, namely the 'tactical attractions' of securitisation. Security does not 
simply function as a way to obtain sufficient attention (Buzan et al. 1998: 29). It is 
rhetorically modelled upon war. 
As securitisation means 'that an issue is presented as an existential threat 
requiring emergency measures, and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of 
political procedure' (Buzan 1997: 14), desecuritisation becomes an ethical-political choice 
which upholds the values of a democratic regime. Andreas Behnke has read the CoS's 
preference for desecuritisation in similar terms: 'Given that this move suspends the usual 
democratic process, securitisation constitutes a highly problematic strategy which should 
be avoided' (Behnke 2000: 91). The 'anything goes' for a higher common good can only 
be dangerous for a political tradition of freedom and democracy. Waever has however 
rejected this location of securitisation in a democratic context, claiming securitisation as a 
more general tool. 23 Contra Waever, I would argue that without a normative assumption 
about 'normal politics', the effects of securitisation cannot be assessed as good or bad. 
Moreover, without keeping this normative distinction, the CoS would lose the very 
specificity of 'securitisation', which they have proposed as a sharper analytical tool. Why 
securitisation and not just a normal practice of an authoritarian regime? Or illiberal 
22 On the exceptionalism of security according to a Schmittian logic, see especially Huysmans 
(1 998a, 2004) and Williams (2003). 
23 Personal communication with Ole Waever, Paris, June 2005. 
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practices of liberal regimes? The specificity of securitisation they want to preserve cannot 
be disentangled from a specific understanding of normal politics as democratic. 
Mike Saward has identified political equality, inclusion, expressive freedom and 
transparency among the contested principles that make up a democracy (Saward 2003). 
He has also emphasised the proceduralism of these principles, the fact that they need to 
be embedded in practical institutions and processes (Saward 2003). In an incidental 
definition of politics, Buzan and Waever also remark that '[i]deally, politics should be able 
to unfold according to routine procedures' (Buzan et al. 1998: 29). Huysmans has 
commented that security institutionalises speed against the slowness of procedures and 
thus questions the viability of deliberation, contest of opinion and dissent (Huysmans 
2004b). While the securitising speech act has to be accepted by a relevant audience and 
remains within the framework of the democratic politics of contestation, the exceptionality 
of procedures is its opposite. The speed required by the exceptional suspends the 
possibilities of judicial review or other modalities of public influence upon bureaucratic or 
executive decisions. Securitisation re-inscribes issues in a different logic, a logic of 
urgency and exceptionalism. 
As securitisation is not simply a speech act that stages a narrative of survival in 
order to attract attention, but an enactment of exceptionalism in political life, questions 
about what type of politics we want need to be asked. The exceptionalism and 
decisionism of securitisation activate a Schmittian politics. The specificity of security as a 
'particular kind of speech-act in the work of the Copenhagen School is underpinned by an 
understanding of the politics of enmity, decision, and emergency which has deep roots in 
Schmitt's understanding of political order' (M. C. Williams 2003: 515). Huysmans has also 
forcefully argued that securitisation leads to a re-ordering of social relations according to 
the logic of 'political realism' and has defined it as a 'technique of government which 
retrieves the ordering force of fear of violent death by a mythical replay of variations of the 
Hobbesian state of nature' (Huysmans 1998a: 571). 
The duality of securitisation as a speech act and extraordinary measures creates 
tension at the core of the concept of securitisation, to be replicated in desecuritisation. 
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Williams has located the political potential of the CoS in the discursive construction of 
security. an ethics of argumentation would be the antidote to securitisation (M. C. Williams 
2003). Speech acts, whatever their structure, are in a certain sense ordinary in their 
functioning: they need to be reiterated, are open to contestation and can be replaced. 
Desecuritisation becomes a matter of different speech acts, which one could privilege 
depending on external, pragmatic criteria, for example 'how much attention we want to 
capture for an issue. ' Such contestation of a securitising speech act would be consonant 
with the democratic politics of transparency and public scrutiny. However, when one takes 
into account the extraordinary measures and exceptional politics that securitisation is 
steeped in, desecuritisation can only be regarded as a political choice restoring 
democracy. The question of desecuritisation becomes one about the kind of politics we 
want. Do we want politics of exceptional measures or do we want democratic politics of 
slow procedures which can be contested? 
Although the CoS envisage securitisation as part of a critical project to shift the 
understanding of security from the traditional state-centric, military definition to a 
constructivist broader concept, they have been reproached exactly for the lack of a critical 
edge, for not engaging with the political implications of the concept. 24 This lack of a critical 
edge is especially manifest in the unwillingness to decide between the 'dubious instrument 
of securitisation' and desecuritisation (Waever 2000: 285). Despite misgivings about the 
effects of securitisation, Waever has formulated desecuritisation in the atheoretical terms 
of 'preference' (1999). This preference seems justifiable given that securitisation is often 
perceived as an innocuous tool which moves issues up the political agenda. In Buzan and 
Waever's benign formulation, '[s]ecuritisation has tactical attractions: as a way to obtain 
sufficient attention' (Buzan, Waever, and Wilde 1998: 26). Rhetorical strategisation takes 
over concerns with democratic politics: 
24 See the debate in Cooperation and Conflict, especially Eriksson (1999) and Waever's reply 
(1999). 
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In some democratic perspective, 'de-securitisation' is probably the ideal, 
since it restores the possibility of exposing the issue to the normal 
haggling and questioning of politicisation, but if one is actually concerned 
about something, securitisation is an attractive tool that one might end up 
using - as a political actor (Waever 2000: 251). 
As language functions similarly in all contexts, securitisation could be extended to all 
forms of political regime and community. Yet, there is more to security than just attracting 
attention and mobilising funds and the CoS seems wary of its 'ensuing effects' (Buzan et 
al. 1998: 32). 
Emancipation and the democratisation of security 
Emancipation is the concept that promises to enact a radical 'democratisation' of security. 
As we have seen from Saward's principles of democracy, political equality and inclusion 
are related manifestations of democratic practices. Emancipation radically tackles the 
concept of democratic politics and the issue of institutional authority in claiming a voice for 
the silenced, the 'security have-nots' (Dunne and Wheeler 2004), those who have been 
excluded from the remit of security. Critical security studies have tried to conceptualise 
emancipation as an alternative to predominant constructions of security. Even if CSS do 
not engage with the concept of desecuritisation, the two concepts are definitely related if 
only for their potential in establishing alternatives to particular social practices. 
While for the CoS desecuritisation remains the prerogative of the political actors 
who 'speak' security and can formulate alternative discourses, emancipation is harnessed 
to those who are made insecure. Preserving the ambiguity of who is made insecure, 
feminists would be concerned with the emancipation of women, with uttering security 
concerns which have been silenced and critical security studies with those who are 
continuously being made insecure, be they women, refugees, or the poor. Although they 
do not explicitly consider the dynamics I have pointed out above, between 
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threatening/insecure other and threatened/insecure selves, I am interested in whether 
desecuritisation or emancipation could be adequate tools for tackling this dynamics. 
The concept of emancipation is associated with the intellectual tradition of the 
Frankfurt School and a critical tradition of thinking social change and resistance. Despite 
this intellectual tradition, Ken Booth claims it is impossible to say'what emancipation looks 
like, apart from its meaning to particular people at particular times' (Booth and Vale 1997: 
110; Wyn Jones 1999: 121). Normatively, emancipation is intimately linked with the idea 
of moving towards a better world (Wyn Jones 1999: 120). For CSS, it remains a very 
general notion which can only be fleshed out by considering 'real people in real places' 
(Booth 1995: 123) and their insecurity predicaments. Booth is worth quoting at length here 
as he has written the first manifesto of CSS and formulated the concept of emancipation 
to be endorsed by his fellow critical security analysts: 
Emancipation means freeing people, as individuals and groups, from the 
social, physical, economic, political, and other constraints that stop them 
from carrying out what they would freely choose to do, of which war, 
poverty, oppression, and poor education are a few. Security and 
emancipation are in fact two sides of the same coin. It is emancipation, 
not power and order, in both theory and practice, that leads to stable 
security (Booth 1997: 110). 
The 'generality' problem of emancipation is solved by CSS not through recourse to 
various theories but by making it the equivalent of security. When equated with security, 
emancipation becomes problematic, as it can no longer envisage social transformations 
outside the logic of security. The Welsh School wants a radical alternative to state-centred 
security and proposes another type of security, defined as emancipation (or emancipation 
defined as security) at the level of the individual. The struggle for security is re-styled as a 
struggle for emancipation, without any qualms about the relationship between 
emancipation and security. 
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Critical scholars like Booth and Wyn Jones endorse both a CoS-type of approach 
to security and a normative usage where security is a value to be fought for. Booth has 
acknowledged that security has enormous political significance and to obtain an issue on 
the state agenda means to give it priority (Booth 1997: 111); on the other, security is 
emancipation as an ideal to be achieved. Or, in Wyn Jones' formulation, '[s]ecurity in the 
sense of the absence of the threat of (involuntary) pain, fear, hunger, and poverty is an 
essential element in the struggle for emancipation' (Wyn Jones 1999: 126). In line with 
this second meaning of security, Booth has pointed out that 'security studies need to 
engage with the problems of those who, at this minute, are being starved, oppressed or 
shot' (Booth 1997: 114). This understanding of security has steered their critical project 
towards the 'realities of security' that have been made invisible by'the traditional mindset 
of those have dominated or disciplined International Relations' (Booth 2004: 8). 
Uncovering the realities of security (or rather insecurity) entails locating human rights 
abuses, the oppression of minorities, the powerlessness of the poor, and the violence 
against women (Booth 2004: 7). 
These uses of security forget that security itself institutes a particular kind of 
ordering political communities and that it is important to be aware of the politics one 
legitimises by endorsing security. The equivalence of security and emancipation suspends 
the project of making the effects of securitisation explicit, of analysing its political effects 
and assumes 'security' is worth being achieved. CSS thus inadvertently endorse the 
exclusionary logic of security and the politics that is instituted by doing security, 
independent of which/who is the referent object or subject. 
The dual usage of security makes the CoS partly right in arguing that CSS 'will 
often try to mobilize other security problems - environmental problems, poverty, 
unemployment - as more important and more threatening' (Buzan et al. 1998: 204), 
thereby reproducing the traditional and objectivist concept of security. The charge of 
'objectivist security' is partly wrong because it fails to acknowledge that the CSS project is 
a political project, be it a normative one. It is not a question of saying what security is, but 
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of claiming security for those who are deprived of it. In this sense, CSS share a radically 
democratic political project with feminist scholars. 
The security that is to be privileged, emancipatory security, is life-preserving. Both 
CSS and feminists often endorse a valuation of life beyond the violence of security, a 
'realism' of life that would surpass the social constructivism of practices. Ann Tickner in 
the feminist camp has argued that 'we can no longer afford to celebrate the potential 
death of hundreds of thousands of our enemies; the preservation of life, not its 
destruction, must be valued' (Tickner 1992: 138). This valorisation of life can be read as a 
discourse of survival, as a biopolitics of the state that makes live and lets die. Yet, the 
valorisation of life as 'survival' suspends questions about 'how not to be governed thus' 
and lets the subject be captured by biopolitical practices of security. The life of refugees 
and asylum-seekers can be valued as they are provided with food, shelter, even medical 
assistance, but are in principle excluded from the political community. They are to be 
saved from sinking boats only to be deported to their countries of origin. By bringing the 
conditions of politics upon the pre-condition for acting as a political subject, the discourse 
of life preservation closes down struggles about the kind of life that people can live. The 
Foucauldian question 'how not to be governed thus' is also neutralised by a biopolitics of 
survival. 
This point about the exclusion and the abjectification constitutive of security has 
not raised many concerns as it seems obvious that vulnerable women would utter their 
insecurities against existing security articulations privileging the state or patriarchal power 
relations. While it has appeared almost self-evident to activists to point out these 
insecurities of trafficked women and to try to obtain protection for them (Jordan 2002), 
such a move of 'securing' the victims of trafficking has led to spiralling insecurity for 
prostitutes (now subjected to increasing raids, interrogatories, and incarceration) as well 
as for asylum-seekers and refugees (suspected of having been trafficked or of being 
exploited). The Schmittian politics at the heart of security will reiterate the logic of enmity 
against 'other others' and feminists, just like critical theorists, would need another concept 
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to ground their normative politics. Democratic politics is incompatible with the politics of 
security as we cannot all be equal sharers of security. 
Reclaiming security as both Critical and feminist security studies do functions 
rather as 'counter-securitisation', as this move leaves intact the logic of security that 
shapes social relations. Equated with security, emancipation only shifts the remit of 
(in)security within the social realm and shuffles various categories of security have-nots. 
Individual or human security cannot be the answer of emancipatory politics, as this would 
trigger the question of whose individual security is supposed to be sacrificed. Who is to be 
made dangerous so that others be made secure, what forms of life are to be disqualified? 
On which grounds can one privilege such a construction of security, the security of 
migrants over the security of racists, the security of HIV-positive people over those at risk 
of being infected? The line of inquiry could be prolonged by many other examples. 
Huysmans has also argued that it is difficult to employ security in an emancipatory way in 
the context of societal questions, as 'the security formation in this field is a conservative 
one with strong roots in a 'vulgarised' Hobbesian version of the human condition' 
(Huysmans 2002: 60). 
This insight was present in Booth's early accounts of emancipation. Emancipation, 
he has argued, needs to take precedence over concerns with power and order exhibited 
by security research given the inherent fragile nature of formations of power which are 
always at the expense of somebody (Booth 1991: 319). Although Booth does not take his 
formulation any further, the question that arises is whether emancipation can be at 
nobody's expense. Emancipation, as Laclau has formulated its traditional meaning, 
presupposes 'the elimination of power, the abolition of the subject/object distinction, and 
the management - without any opaqueness or mediation - of communitarian affairs by 
social agents identified with the viewpoint of social totality' (Laclau 1996: 1). Would the 
security that Booth equates with emancipation not be insecuring to others? While Booth's 
insight that the problem with privileging power or order is that they are at somebody else's 
expense, willing power away from security will not do lead to emancipation. Security 
cannot be the remedy to (in)security. 
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Like CSS, feminists raise pertinent questions about security practices and 
advocate the need to re-order unjust practices, and similarly, they also give in to the 
appeal of 'security' as the organising principle of this re-ordering (e. g. Tickner 2001). 
Rather than questioning the effects of security, many feminists have tried to use security 
for an emancipatory purpose. Bringing women into the limelight of security practices 
would supposedly yield more concern and therefore the possibility of taking extraordinary 
measures to re-write the script of the world in their favour. The question is whether, in 
having 'security' as the re-ordering principle of social relations, both feminists and critical 
theorists can account for the continuous insecuring of others, for the governmental 
practices that divide and categorise subjects. 
If one considers the emancipation of trafficked women, the disruption of their 
insecurities is an admirable goal. Yet, turning trafficked women into referent objects often 
perpetuates a dynamics of 'Insecuring' another. And if the other is taken-for-granted as 
being the trafficker (morally blameable), when 'other others' made insecure in the process 
of securing trafficked women are prostitutes or asylum-seekers, the necessity of an 
ethical-political principle to contest these practices is even more evident. Shifting subjects 
of security from one category to another does not suspend the logic of security. The limit 
which desecuritising or emancipatory approaches confront is that of security as universal. 
Security would normatively be something which we can all partake of or share in. It is only 
by opening up the process and technologies of rendering secure that one can see how 
security functions and what kind of social dynamics it brings about. 
Ethics and abject others 
Against the insecuring dimension of alterity, ethics highlights difference and heterogeneity, 
it brings otherness into a relation of interdependence with the self and re-works security 
on an ethical basis. In an early work, Campbell and Dillon have formulated this 'ethical 
turn' as a response to challenges by the world we live in: 'We live in a time of doubt, 
paradox and difference' (Campbell and Dillon 1993: 161). An ethical approach would 
acknowledge that the world is other than we are ideologically induced to believe that the 
101 
world is. Their preference for difference is to be read in the same worldly terms, because 
'the modern globalisation of human existence allows no one an escape from continuous 
encounter with otherness, however much the encounter seems to have intensified 
attempts to efface difference' (Campbell and Dillon 1993: 161). In a world of pervasive 
difference, the securing of the self against the other, the drawing of boundaries needs to 
be replaced by the recognition of and opening towards difference. Later on, Campbell's 
encounter with Levinas' philosophy entailed a rooting of ethics in ontology. Together with 
Michael Shapiro, he has argued for an 'ethical relation in which our responsibility to the 
other is the basis for reflection' (Campbell and Shapiro 1999: x). Ethics as opposed to 
security would constitute the relation to the other on a different principle from fear. For 
Campbell and Dillon, for example, this principle is derived from Levinas' philosophy. 25 
The transformed relationship to the other is based on a Levinasian infinite ethics of 
responsibility: '[r]esponsibility for the Other, for the naked face of the first individual to 
come along... ' (Levinas quoted in Campbell 1999: 32). In a Levinasian world, security 
becomes an ontological impossibility given that the subject is constituted by the relation to 
the other, called into being by the prior existence of the Other (Campbell 1999: 33). Such 
an ethics is resonant with Campbell's concern with Bosnia as it implies responsibility for 
the plight of Bosnians, responsibility for the ones who are not immediately dangerous and 
who could be conceptualised as 'our neighbours' at the margins of Europe. 
How does such an ethics respond to dangerous others? Campbell himself has 
remarked that the Levinasian logic is restricted to the neighbour, to an other defined by 
'proximity'. Such proximity is defined by Levinas in terms of Gemeinschaft. 'my next of kin 
are also my neighbours' (Levinas quoted in David 2002: 85). Given the organic proximity 
of the other, the question of dangerousness is suspended. When faced with the idea of 
threat, Levinas is adamant that '[i]f self-defense is a problem, the "executioner" is the one 
who threatens my neighbour and, in this sense, calls for violence and no longer has a 
25 For a Foucault-inspired approach to ethics as 'aesthetics of the self, see Jabd (1998). The two 
approaches, an ethics of the self and an ethics of the other, cannot be, however, totally separated. 
The constitution of the individual as a moral subject of her actions is inseparable from action upon 
others. The injunction of the ethics of the other is ultimately an injunction to the self. 
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Face' (Levinas 1998: 105). The ethics of responsibility can be suspended when faced with 
dangerous others. Simon Critchley has formulated a sort of taxonomy of problems that 
Levinas' ethics entails: fraternity, monotheism, androcentrism, filiality and family (Critchley 
2004). As it is impossible in the space of this chapter to thoroughly engage with the 
problematique of Levinas' ethics, my remarks will be limited to two aspects of ethical 
engagement: its relation to the dangerous other and (non-)embeddedness in power 
relations. 
Richard Kearney has sharply formulated the theoretical impasse of the encounter 
with a dangerous other: 
[H]ow are we to address otherness at all if it becomes unrecognizable to 
us? Faced with such putative indetermination, how could we tell the 
difference between one kind of other and another - between (a) those 
aliens and strangers that need our care and responsibility, no matter how 
monstrous they might first appear, and (b) those others that really do 
seek to destroy and exterminate (Kearney 2002: 10)... 
Although one can debate Kearney' s meaning of 'really', the dilemma he voices cannot be 
tackled from within Levinasian philosophy, given that his other as the 'Altogether Other 
which transcends mere finite experience is the name for God. 26 The Levinasian ethics is 
'the ultimate name of the religious as such' (Badiou 2002a: 23) and the ethical relation to 
the neighbour is modelled upon a theological relation with God. How can one interact with 
God or what happens if God is dead? What does this limit-interaction mean for politics? 
Derrida has formulated an answer to this dilemma with the limit concepts he has 
devised for ethics. The role of such limit concepts (one could say similarly to Levinas' 
other) is to preserve the gap between politics and ethics, and make always room for a 
more generous form of politics. Radical concepts such as pure hospitality or forgiveness 
26 Kearneys answer to the question of indetermination takes him beyond Levinas and into 
hermeneutics (Kearney 2002: 10). 
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expose and challenge the limitations of a politics of migration or war for example. Any 
form of particular politics is a form of violence that distorts the 'unconditional' of politics. 
Beyond the restrictive understanding of hospitality as evinced by Kant's Perpetual Peace 
or by state practices that differentiate and divide among those who can be welcome and 
those who need to be expelled there is a concept of pure or unconditional hospitality. 
The Levinasion/Derridean ethics as it has been used in IR has ignored Derrida's 
self-avowed 'political impracticability' of his absolute concepts. Derrida would simply claim 
that 'any politics which fails to sustain some relation to the principle of unconditional 
hospitality has completely lost its relation to justice' (Derrida 1994: 35). Democracy and 
justice are always 'to come', always differed by the impossibility of the ultimate encounter 
with God and the limit. Derrida's unconditional principles for politics cannot be restricted 
by any conditions, but they can also never be inscribed in the structures of the world, they 
can never come to be. 
Such a conclusion does not directly shed light on any concrete situation. It does 
not speak to requests of a particular context and its injunctions need to be translated 
politically. Unconditional principles should not be contaminated by 'the historically 
restricted concepts of humanity, ethics, and democracy under which we presently labor' 
(Caputo 1997). Given, however, the 'unworldliness' of Derrida's concepts, such work of 
translation is arduous and has remained minimal in international politiCS. 27 Edkins' 
concluding remarks on an ethico-political decision against the technologisation of famine 
are that 
[t]he decision itself is a terrifying nontime or nonplace, where there is no 
subject and where we are facing the traumatic real... We have to make a 
move for which there are no secure grounds. This moment is, 
nevertheless, something that we must face: the fact that it is undecidable 
is not an excuse for inaction' (Edkins 2000: 157). 
27 Campbell has undertaken such a work of translation in the case of Bosnia (I 998b). 
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Undecidability avoids the closure of a situation. It avoids its ordering and thus also the 
horizon of security. What happens to change and transformation if we are caught in a 
permanent state of undecidability? While her remarks would be valid for any political 
decision, it is unclear whether there is no politics of famine, where there are no ethico- 
political decisions taken in this situation. In this sense, any political engagement in the 
situation of trafficking would always already fall short of the radical principles of politics. 
Yet, what the situation of trafficking needs is exactly decisions that reconfigure and take 
politics out of the grip of security. 
Besides the injunction to become political, politics seems to be completely absent 
and impossible. As with Derrida, all decisions are doomed to fall short of the ethico- 
political requirement. And we remain unable to gauge whether one decision is preferable 
to another. Yet politics is always a matter of decision. As my discussion of Badiou in 
Chapter 5 will show, a political decision has to be made from the point of view of the 
undecidable. In a situation of undecidability, a decision is always necessary. What counts 
is what decision is taken - it is not the form of undecidability that is constitutive of politics, 
but the substance of the political decision. 
From within a Derridean approach it is impossible to bridge the undecidable and 
the decision. Without some way of understanding how decisions can be taken 'ethically' 
when faced with the undecidable, decision becomes simply a matter of power. The 
question of decision Is folded back either upon the Schmittian question of sovereign power 
revealing itself through the decision or upon the inescapability of power - any decision 
would be just part of the system of power relations and therefore depoliticising. Dillon is 
right to note that the political is always taking place in a space of undecidability which 
allows decisions to be taken without being certain which decisions are correct, as 
$correctness' cannot be thought from within the situation (Dillon 1996: 199). There is also 
no metaphysical correctness that would bring us back to the Kantian ethics of the same. 
Yet, when exploring a political situation, it is possible to say that some decisions are 
'correct'. We know what the right decision is. 
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What does undecidability mean in a fight for national liberation, in a struggle for 
women's rights or against exploitation? What does radical hospitality mean in the fight 
against fascism or racism? Critchley has defined political action, following Derrida, as 'the 
taking of a decision without any determinate transcendental guarantees' (Critchley 2004: 
178). The impossibility of distinguishing between decisions appears even more strikingly 
when one encounters a concrete other and needs to distinguish between various others. 
As 2-i2ek has made clear, Levinas himself succumbs to 'to vulgar commonsensical 
reflections' (2-12ek 2004: 106) when asked to make this translation in relation the 
Palestinian/Israeli relations: 
My definition of the other is completely different. The other is the 
neighbour, who is not necessary kin, but who can be. And in that sense, 
if you're for the other, you're for the neighbour. But if your neighbour 
attacks another neighbour or treats him unjustly, what can you do? Then 
alterity takes on another character, in alterity we can find an enemy, or at 
least then we are faced with the problem of knowing who is right and who 
is wrong, who is just and who is unjust. There are people who are wrong. 
(Levinas quoted in 2-i2ek 2004: 106). 
The same quote appears in David Campbell's book on Bosnia. Campbell sees the 
'potential limiting of responsibility ... in the passage from ethics to politics' (Campbell 
1998b: 180). That is why Campbell needs to supplement Levinas by Derrida, to 'fold the 
ethical relation into the social effects of the ontologies of politics that harden skin and feign 
presence, so that the relationship with the Other that makes those effects possible, the 
state among them, is never elided' (Campbell 1998b: 182). 
Contra the 'too transcendent' (Kearney 2002: 11) ethics of relationality/of pure 
hospitality, William Connolly has advocated a more mundane form of ethical relation, 
based on the recognition and reaction to the others suffering. Connolly revisits an 
obligation to respond to suffering as formulated by John Caputo in Against Ethics: 
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'Obligation means the obligation to the other, to one who has been laid low, to victims and 
outcasts. Obligation means the obligation to reduce and alleviate suffering' (Caputo 
quoted In Connolly 1999a: 127). In this reformulation, unlimited responsibility becomes a 
tractable obligation for politics. 
Ethics is no longer ontologically given, but is derived from an 'encounter with the 
world' and the other's suffering. I find Connolly's turn to suffering extremely interesting as 
a possible engagement with the consequences of security practices. If security is seen as 
suffering inducing, can an ethical relation that prescribes an obligation to alleviate 
suffering unmake security? Connolly is aware of the tenuous relation between the 
obligation to diminish suffering and the dangerous other. 
Some of the most difficult cases arise when people suffer from injuries 
imposed by institutionalized identities, principles, and cultural 
understandings, when those who suffer are not entirely helpless but are 
defined as threatening, contagious, or dangerous to the self-assurance of 
these identities, and when the sufferers honor sources of ethics 
inconsonant or disturbing to these constituencies (Connolly 1999a: 129). 
It is exactly these 'limit cases', these difficult cases for his ethics that Connolly leaves 
aside. Even when he argues that a mode of suffering needs to be moved 'from below the 
reach of justice to a place within its purview... [so that] the language of injury, 
discrimination, injustice and oppression can apply more cleanly to it' (Connolly 1999a: 
143), his historical examples are carefully chosen: slaves, women, homosexuals. The 
status of slaves, women, homosexuals has not changed due to an obligation to alleviate 
suffering that became manifest at some point in time, but through their political struggles, 
through their irruption on the political scene and a claim to politics that was a formulation 
of the injustice to which they had been subjected. 
If an obligation to alleviate suffering is to inform an ethical approach, a more 
radical question could be asked: what happens to the terrorist, the sexual abuser, the 
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illegal migrant or the trafficked woman? Or to Badiou's famous 'religious-corrupted- 
terrorist-polygamous' (1999)? Although Connolly chooses 'others' who have experienced 
suffering and domination in specific relations of power, the ethical relation does not 
engage with issues of representational politics or power relations. Ethics functions as an 
avoidance of power relations rather than as a direct confrontation with them. If an ethical 
approach presupposes a radical reconstitution of the world which would reshape politics, it 
is unclear how such a move can happen without an engagement with power relations. 
Yet, Derrida's messianic future can never arrive, unconditional principles can never be 
embodied in political communities. 
Connolly's approach points to an ethics that can be processed in the world. How 
would the obligation to alleviate suffering function in a particular situation like trafficking? 
one can imagine that this obligation is mediated, fostered, processed differentlally. Pity 
can be one of the means through which the alleviation of suffering becomes necessary 
and evident. Luc Boltanski has noted that certain types of suffering have surfaced at 
various epochs, while others have passed unnoticed and translates this insight into a 
practical task of those who convey suffering: to make it recognisable, to include it in a so- 
called repertoire of recognisable suffering (Boltanski 1999). Pity for certain categories of 
oppressed people could only be experienced at particular historical moments and not at 
others. Within the realm of political struggles the conflict of beliefs supporting pity... ', 
Boltanski points out, 'corresponds to a conflict over the identification of the unfortunates 
whose cause is to be judged politically worthy' (Boltansk! 1999: 155). Here we are faced 
again with Connolly's difficult cases, those who are dangerous, those who would be 
deemed unworthy of pity. According to Boltanski, pity cannot work on those who are 
deemed responsible for the ills that have befallen them or those who are considered 
dangerous to the community. Suffering must be undeserved and pity cannot be 
experienced towards the culpable and the dangerous. Only some forms of suffering and 
its bearers can be recognised as 'the other in me'. If pity can function as an ethical 
injunction to reconfigure the abject other, it has to become political, to engage in 
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contestations over the representation of its object and promote a credible and emotional 
depiction of suffering. 
The next section will explore the humanitarian approach to trafficking as a form of 
ethical injunction (pity), an alternative discourse (desecuritisation) and a concern for the 
vulnerability and insecurity of individuals (emancipation). As the unconditional principles of 
ethics cannot engage with the world, I am interested in how a more practicable ethics that 
emphasises suffering can be processed and I shall focus on the strategies of pity as they 
have been formulated in the situation of trafficking. I shall argue that all three approaches 
are surpassed by the requirements of knowledge, by the governmental impulse that 
demands more and more knowledge about the 'abject others' than any of these strategies 
can offer. The space of abjection is not a space of shadows, a constitutive outside as 
Butler has suggested. It is actually a space of detailed knowledge about those who are 
governed as abjects. 
Three strategies, one (governmental) lack 
The humanitarian approach to human trafficking can be addressed from within the three 
normative approaches discussed (desecuritisation, emancipation, and pity). Despite the 
CoS undecidability on desecuritisation, the human rights discourse can be seen as an 
alternative discourse to security, Le. human trafficking as migration, organised crime, and 
prostitution. It proposes a different problematisation of human trafficking. This 
problematisation is purportedly emancipatory for trafficked women, who become the 
subjects of security, where security is understood in Tickner's life-preserving terms. At the 
same time, this strategy entails a new relation to the other, a relation that is being advised 
upon law enforcement and other authorities, as well as clients or generally the public who 
could encounter trafficked women. 
Pity functions as an alternative discourse that would dis-identify women from the 
abject, the dangerous other, to re-identify them as bodies in pain. Dis-identification entails 
a reconstruction of security where women are subjects to be secured. Re-identification 
means the reconfiguration of the relationship self/other which can make the voice of the 
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other audible as 'the other in me' rather than as the dangerous other. Reshaping the 
relation to the other is, however, a minute work of details and representations. In the case 
of human trafficking, responsibility for the suffering other (in this instance, trafficked 
women) was supposed to ground a different politics from politics of (in)security. Thus, pity 
Is a direct confrontation with representations of the dangerous other, which it tries to 
dismantle. 
Pity has been advocated and practised by various NGOs involved in anti-trafficking 
campaigns with the explicit purpose of challenging practices that considered trafficked 
women as illegal migrants and foreign prostitutes involved in illicit affairs. Victimisation (in 
the sense of representing women as 'victims') was supposed to challenge what NGOs 
called the 'law enforcement' approach to human trafficking, which considered trafficked 
women as illegal migrants and quickly deported them, subjecting them to renewed 
suffering. Due to practices of re-victimisation by the state, victims of trafficking were 
thought either to fall an easy prey to traffickers all over again or to experience suffering 
and stigma when returned. Victims of trafficking, NGOs argued, were much more in need 
of rescuing rather than punishing; their suffering should be alleviated and not reinforced. 
Pity was thought to disrupt the securitisation of human trafficking, which turns 
women into dangerous others as illegal migrants, prostitutes and/or criminals; it was 
harnessed to a re-structuring of social relations in the sphere of trafficking and envisaged 
specific interventions, different from the repressive and preventive strategies embraced 
especially by those concerned with migration and organised crime. Being intrinsically 
linked to emotions, to sentiment, the suffering of the victim is supposed to trigger direct 
reactions in the spectator, beyond other rational calculations. Pity has to engage in a 
detailed reconstruction of the object of pity, a different representation of the victim in order 
to instil the 'right` way to feel about the group of trafficking women. 
To promote understanding and sympathy for their situation, these advocates will 
focus on the pain and directly physical suffering trafficking causes. The main purpose of 
these accounts is to promote identification with victims of trafficking in a way that crosses 
divisions preserved by the other approaches, to create an 'emotional contagion which 
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transmits the sociable from interiority to interiority' (Boltanski 1999: 82 emphasis in 
original). Sentimentality is in principle open to any form of distress. Although 
universalisable, suffering needs to be rooted in common sensibilities to create what 
Boltanski has called a community of 'visceral' reactions, which pre-exist their principled 
justification (Boltanski 1999: 54). The physical suffering of trafficked women is meant to 
trigger such visceral reactions, to function as a 'solidarity-inducing denominator' (Boutellier 
2000: 68) and anti-trafficking campaigns have made extensive use of a symbolic of the 
body in pain, pierced, bleeding, defenceless. The suffering of victims of trafficking is made 
directly physical, linking up with the imaginary of bodily suffering. Different anti-trafficking 
campaigns have used this imaginary of the body in pain to create a reaction among the 
audiences. 
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An ethics of pity is plagued, however, by tensions between the identification with 
universalisable physical suffering and the particular identifications of women. The strategy 
of identification with pure suffering functions as a strategy of dis-identification. Trafficked 
women have been subjected to cruelty and their undeniable suffering at the hands of 
traffickers makes them extra-ordinary, beyond the ordinary identifications with illegal 
migrants and prostitutes. Where their trajectory might have coincided with that of a 
migrant or prostitute, suffering is redeeming. Trafficked women are dis-identified from 
categories of migrants, criminals or prostitutes by the emphasis on physical suffering. 
Women who are trafficked into prostitution should not be deprived of their rights on 
grounds that they are undocumented migrants. The spectators' prejudices about or 
prejudgements on illegal migrants, prostitutes and criminals are suspended in the present 
of the politics of pity. To attract pity, women are to be made 'innocent' and not 'culpable', 
undeserving of suffering. 
'Worthy of pity' suspends the official distinction between innocent and guilty 
women present in official discourses. For Willy Bruggeman for example, former deputy 
director of Europol, only a restricted category of victims are 'sex slaves in the truest sense' 
(Bruggeman 2002). Other victims have not been entirely coerced or deceived. Although 
some would never have imagined the slave-like conditions under which they would have 
to work, they knew they were going to be employed in the sex industry. Others thought 
they were recruited to work in the service or entertainment industry, but were instead 
forced into prostitution. As many of these women signed on to be illegal migrants or even 
to work irregularly as prostitutes, they are seen to be not (entirely) innocent and not 
deserving of pity. 
And yet, not all victims have been redeemed by physical suffering, by the 'baptism 
of brutality' (The Evening Standard 10 October 2002: 16) that has turned them into 
embodiments of the suffering humanity. Despite these unifying representations of inflicted 
pain, not all victims have been physically abused, abducted and then repeatedly raped, 
beaten up, bodies burned with cigarettes ends. It is almost as if women need to be 
'purified' through blood, as in the OSCE poster. If some women are 'innocent victims', 
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others would almost fit scenarios of receiving 'just deserts': their suffering incurred as a 
result of their reckless actions, i. e. undertaking a(n) (illegal) migration project. The 
ambiguities or inexistence of suffering - increased by the emphasis on consent and prior 
knowledge, which would make victims responsible for the misfortunes that have befallen 
them - often require supplementary strategies of making 'innocent'. Beauty and religiosity 
are mobilised as strategies to render innocent where raw, physical suffering is absent. 
Rescued by a reporter in London, Romanian Natasha is described in highly emotional 
terms: 
A deeply religious girl, and stunningly pretty with dark blue eyes and 
beautiful olive skin, her hair braided into dozens of thin plaits like a 
foreign exchange student, Natasha knows that she shouldn't have come 
to Britain and blames herself for what has happened. Yet she still 
harbours dreams of Montreal and Marius. 'I just want to be an ordinary 
person, ' she says, crying gently. 'A decent person with a man who loves 
me (The Evening Standard 10 October 2002: 16). ' 
The question of subjectivity does not receive a final answer either in the representation of 
bodily pain and physical suffering or of beauty. The art of government requires knowledge 
of the individuals it is supposed to govern. Who are the women upon whom pity should be 
bestowed? The confessional answer the women themselves provide, or the NGOs' semi- 
confessional answers need to be backed up by expert knowledge. 
The question 'who are you? ' can never be completely answered by the 
incriminated individual. Although the 'psychiatrisation' of criminal danger was based on 
procedures of confession, self-examination, and revelation, as Foucault has demonstrated 
at length, it also involved an expert assessment of the future risk that the individual could 
pose. Such a doubling of confession by the knowledge of risk was linked to the shift from 
thinking that punishment should answer the crime, to thinking of it as a mechanism in the 
'defence of society' (Foucault 2000a). The question 'who are the trafficked women? ' 
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needs a supplementary answer, an answer that would turn women into subjects that can 
be known and therefore dealt with on the basis of this knowledge. 
We have already seen that an ethical approach encounters the limit case of those 
who are dangerous. Pity cannot work for those who are deemed responsible for the ills 
that have befallen them or those who are considered dangerous to the community. 
Rather, suffering must be seen as undeserved, since pity cannot be experienced towards 
the culpable and the dangerous. Similarly, desecuritising and emancipatory strategies 
also set a limit concerning the danger that the other can pose. If the other is constructed 
as a dangerous other, then the other is actually non-dangerous. Emancipation and ethics 
both work with this assumption of non-danger. The ethical approach is more interesting 
inasmuch as it is a reconfiguration of the relation to the other, a reconfiguration that is 
informed by different principles. Desecuritisation remains impermeable to the logic of 
security, to the relationality to the other that is instantiated through practices of security. 
Emancipation closes off the political potential of other concepts by claiming security as the 
concept for politics. While CSS try to universalise security and expand its remit to those 
who have been excluded, security enacts a relation to the other that subverts this attempt. 
Security entails practices that create spaces of abjection and only shifts the limits and 
boundaries between subjects and abjects. 
The elimination or alleviation of suffering is part of a process of governing, of social 
re-ordering, in which the causes of suffering are eradicated, dealt with or transformed. 
Suffering is meant to reveal 'a defect, a flaw, a disorder, a chaos in the organisation of 
society or the constitution of the individual' (Michaelis 2001). Disordered situations and 
disordered individuals become the two poles of intervention. In governmental terms such 
an Intervention has not only to represent and, in this sense, constitute a particular 
situation, but also to confer particular identities upon its subjects. As Connolly has 
suggested, the subject worthy of pity needs to be divorced from a construction of danger. 
The most important task for the politics of pity is to identify suspected victims of trafficking 
by dis-identifying them from such a dangerous subject. To activate the spectators' pity, 
trafficked women must be specified as non-dangerous. 
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Foucault's analyses of the government of abnormals have shown how 
governmental interventions have become dependent upon the specification of the 
individual. Starting from the eighteenth century, punishment was no longer to be meted 
out according to the crime, but in close relation to the potential redemption and future 
danger of the individual (Foucault 1999). The invention of the 'dangerous individual', 
neither mad nor criminal, requires expert knowledge to decide on her identity. A 
governmental technology is therefore decided and depends upon a detailed description of 
the subject that would support the ethical assertion of non-danger by the solidity of 
knowledge. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed three strategies for unmaking practices of security, 
desecuritisation, emancipation, and ethics. I have placed these strategies together as they 
all attempt to contest existing securitisations or constructions of danger and propose 
another mode of political/ethical engagement. Desecuritisation means an alternative 
discourse to security. Emancipation would entail the universalisation and democratisation 
of security. Ethics radically reconfigures the relation to the other. These three strategies 
encounter a theoretical and practical impossibility. Alternative discourses need different 
speakers. The CoS are at best ambiguous about who the speakers of desecuritisation 
would be. They are also uninterested in the effects of security in terrns of practices of 
abjectification. Desecuritisation tries to locate alternative discourses, on the model of 
Butler's non-authoritative subjects who can speak with authority. Butlers model remains 
however inadequate in the CoS framework as securitisation is restricted to a discourse 
about referent objects. Subjects enter the realm of securitisation only inasmuch as they 
are large groups such as society, nation, religious or ethnic groups. The speakers of 
security are also located among the elites, be these political or the new humanitarian 
elites. The abject who was Butler's model for resistance and 'speaking with authority' is 
absent from their definition of securitisation. 
115 
Emancipation makes the abject its concern and argues for the democratisation of 
security to all those who are outside its remit. It works with an assumption of the imaginary 
of security that can be stretched to encompass everybody. Yet, security embodies the 
promise of an always already limited universality. Groups, individuals, societies, states 
etc. can enjoy security only at the expense of others who either pose a risk to or disturb 
their normality. The emancipatory promise of security is translated into a competition 
between particularities: trafficked women or sex workers, illegal migrants or trafficked 
women, trafficked persons or asylum seekers. All these categories can become 
contradictory subjects of security constructions. Anti-trafficking strategies can infringe the 
rights of sex workers. Rights for trafficked women mean more surveillance of illegal 
migrants or asylum-seekers. A subjective politics that would replace expertise with 
silenced knowledges and lived experiences would seem to at least replicate a boundary 
and a limit of 'danger'. 
Ethics reconfigures the relationality to the other on the basis of a different principle 
which would not entail the exclusion and closure of security practices. Infinite 
responsibility or pity try to ground different modes of relationality to another, independent 
of the others particularity. The reconfiguration of relationality is possible for a whole array 
of subjects, excluding the dangerous ones. Recasting trafficked women as suffering 
victims deserving of pity cannot function until the question of dangerousness has been 
elucidated. Bodies in pain cannot be dangerous. Yet, bodies in pain do not tell much 
about the subjects to be governed and their actions. Particularity and representation are 
the premises of any governmental act. Particularity and representation are the substance 
of security, which makes possible the deployment of technologies and practices of control 
and risk management. Ethical principles need to be translated back into governmental 
technologies. Victims cannot remain pure presence, they must be known as subjects of 
government. Ethical approaches are therefore enmeshed in the social. Moreover, it is only 
in translating unconditional principles to concrete situations that one can gauge their 
disruptive potential or the rather unsettling possibility that they may be hijacked and 
rearticulated within existing relations of power. 
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However, these limitations do not obscure the important insights that these 
approaches offer. Waever implies the need for alternative discourses, although it remains 
unclear what the substance of such discourses would be, where they would be situated in 
relation to normal politics and who the speakers would be. As an analysis of pity has 
shown, the figure of trafficked women Is at the centre of discourses that contest dominant 
practices of security. CSS seem to indicate - be it only implicitly - the need for a form of 
universality that would address everybody. Most importantly, unconditional ethical 
principles show that a different relationality depends on principles that are radically 
heterogenous to the state of the world. We have already seen that discourses of security 
exist within a web of symbolic practices and are 'held together' by an imaginary of a 
universal promise of security. The next chapter will follow up on the possibility of 
unmaking security by looking at what a theorisation of governmental security practices 
could tell us about the limits of the approaches discussed in this chapter. 
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IV. Remaking security? Practices, subjects, and 
resistance 
Introduction 
Although proposing different strategies of unmaking security, desecuritisation, 
emancipation, and ethics share a normative commitment to the possibility of replacing one 
security formation by an alternative discourse (desecuritisation), universal security 
(emancipation), or a different relationality to the other (ethics). According to Waever, a 
desecuritising discourse can be uttered authoritatively independent of the speaker's 
position, allowing various actors to challenge the construction of security. Anti-trafficking 
NGOs have attempted to formulate a different discourse about trafficking, a discourse 
focused on the victims and the effects of state practices upon them. Booth and the 
students of the Welsh School more generally replace a securitising discourse by another, 
which shifts from the state to the individual, aspires to universality and is more just in its 
effects. Trafficked women can become the referent subjects of security through a 
normative engagement that is critical of the existing power distribution of security. The 
poststructuralist 'ethical turn' rethinks possibilities of relating to the other and posits 
responsibility or more directly pity as a replacement of security. 
The discussions in the previous chapter have shown that the formulation of 
desecuritising strategies is both theoretically and practically inadequate. With the CoS, it 
remains unclear what a desecuritising discourse could be in relation to the exception and 
the extraordinary practices that security entails. Anti-trafficking NGOs have been unable to 
challenge the imaginary of the border, the imaginary of threat linked with migration. 
Returning women to their home country remains the main strategy to which other 
practices need to be adjusted. A holistic approach to human trafficking, as promoted by 
many NGOs, links up the victimisation approach to strategies of prevention which include 
return to the home country. Trafficked women are to be rescued only to be later on 
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deported. Moreover, the rights of trafficked women do not entail a more universal security, 
but have pernicious effects upon other subjects (prostitutes or asylum-seekers for 
example). The relation between a normative concept of security and the practices of 
security creates a tension at the heart of CSS. The ethical approach that places pity at the 
heart of a different discourse of trafficking engages with representations of the potentially 
dangerous trafficked women. Women are never indubitably non-dangerous and detailed 
knowledge about them is required to support the premise that humanitarian NGOs and 
activists try to promote. The question of unmaking security needs therefore to consider not 
just the discursive reformulation of the relationality of self and other, but its institutional 
mediation, the mobilisation of knowledge and the logic of practices that are deployed upon 
abjects. 
The tension between the normative discourses and practices of security appears 
as a theoretical Impediment to the formulation of a critical strategy. This chapter will 
consider this tension and reformulate it as a productive tension at the heart of 
governmental practices. Security is a process of ordering social problems, of governing 
'problematisations'. I have already defined 'governmentality as the 
description/representation of social problems and interventions to remedy them. 
Representations and rationalities on the one hand and interventions, technologies, and 
practices on the other will be considered as roughly synonymous. Rationalities are 
knowledgeable discourses that represent objects of knowledge, confer identities and 
agencies upon social and political actors, and identify problems to be solved (Dean and 
Hindess 1998a). Put simply, they are ways of thinking about a social problem that will 
make its management practicable. Technologies are the means of realisation of 
rationalities, the social practices which are aimed at manipulating the social and physical 
world according to identifiable routines (O'Malley 1992: 269 ft. 2). Governmental 
rationalities and technologies affect behaviour and 'construct' forms of ordered agency 
and subjectivity in the population to be governed as part of the social problem identified. 
Considering security as 'governmental' is not a new strategy in IR. Bigo (1996; 
2002), Campbell (1992), Dillon (I 995b), Der Derian (1992), Huysmans (1 998a; 2004a), for 
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example, have used concepts from Foucault's work on governmentality to creatively 
explore security practices. In a governmental approach, the normative discourse of 
security can be thought of as a permanent incentive for deploying technologies that will 
tackle social problems. The normative and the normalising are intrinsically related and not 
at odds as with the other approaches. As I have already suggested, this tension is 
productive and, in the phrasing of the second chapter, works with the tension between the 
imaginary of security and the symbolic practices of institutions. Rather than denying the 
tension or attempting to supersede it, the governmental approach is based upon it. It is 
the imaginary of security that holds together various practices and representations of 
social problems. Even if security practices appear to be insecuring rather than providing 
security, the imaginary of security transforms this failure into an injunction to invent new 
Interventions and deploy different technologies to respond to a problematisation. 
A governmental approach will also lead to a different understanding of what it 
means to unmake securitisation. In a Foucauldian reading of security, an emphasis on the 
practices of security and their effects in terms of subjectivation shifts 'politics out of 
security towards practices of critique and resistance and not simply institutional struggles 
as in Bigo's Bourdieuean reworking of Foucault. This chapter will unpack what critique 
and resistance could mean for unmaking practices of security in light of the productive 
tension between the normative and the normalising. The possibilities of critique and 
resistance will be explored by a close engagement with the practices of security that 
govern human trafficking and the attempts to reformulate the description of the 
phenomenon. 
The first part of the chapter will focus on security as a governmental dispositif of 
representations and interventions. It will show what the failure of subjects to be 
recognised as non-dangerous entails for the reconfiguration of relationality. Rather than 
non-dangerous, trafficked women are governed as subjects that embody a continuous 
risk. If practices of security are made possible by the description of subjects, the subject's 
resistance Is a direct and immediate attempt to unmake practices of security that arises 
out of the tension between the normative and the normalising. The second part will 
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explore what resistance means in a governmental approach and will analyse its 
implications for women who resist security practices that govern human trafficking. The 
continuous deployment of security practices depoliticises women's refusal to be subjects 
of these practices. 
Security as governmental: a topology of practices 
The second chapter has shown that security has been mostly seen as part of the logic of 
war, survival, emergency and exceptionalism. To limit the expansion of the concept, the 
CoS have framed a different domain of security from the political - one linked with 
emergency and exception (Bigo 2002: 73). Yet, this limit of security is a non-sustainable 
limit. Securitisation is not necessarily framed as survival, but can also be cast as 
prevention of undesirable events. Prevention is for example an important element of 
trafficking, even if trafficking spans various practices. The survival of trafficked women is 
often at stake; yet, the threat of trafficking is not primarily about the danger to the other's 
life, but about its subversive effects upon societies and states. Restricting security to the 
sovereign logic of exception and war would mean endorsing what Der Derian has called 
the 'onto-theology of security; that is, the a priori argument that proves the existence and 
necessity of only one form of security because there happens to be a widespread, 
metaphysical belief in it' (Der Derian 1992: 74). 
A Foucauldian analysis of the 'birth of govemmentality' can analyse security 
practices as different from the sovereign 'discernment and implementation of inclusions 
and exclusions.... and, paradigmatically, according to the modern Hobbesian Carl 
Schmitt, with the friend/enemy distinction' (Dillon 1995b: 328). Security as governmental 
means the 'positing, ordering, and placing of all beings, here especially human beings as 
population, at the disposal of an enframing mode of representative-calculative order... ' 
(Dillon 1995b: 330). Individuals or populations are ordered according to a norm against 
which deviations can be measured. Security implies 'counter-measures to deal with the 
danger which initiates fear, and for the neutralization, elimination or constraint of that 
person, group, object or condition which engenders fear' (Dillon 1995a: 161-162). 
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Governing human trafficking as a problem of security would entail the regulation and 
ordering of the behaviour of (suspected) victims of trafficking, traffickers, smugglers or 
other categories that could either become victims of trafficking or could encounter those. 
Bigo has called this governmental approach a 'topology of security' harnessed to an 
analysis of 'practices of coercion, protection, pacification, static guard, control, 
surveillance, Information gathering and sorting, information management, grid-like security 
cover, calming, dissuasion, locking up, turning back, and removal from the territory that 
are deployed by security agents (private or public, police, military police, or army)' (Bigo 
2001b: 99-100). All these practices are practices of power or governmental practices 
Inasmuch as they attempt a specific type of ordering of the polis, an ordering based on 
practices of Inclusion and exclusion and imbued with a mimetic desire to make its 
members conform to Ideal images of what they should be (Hindess 1998: 59). 
As Chapter 2 has indicated, Bigo works within a mixture of Foucauldian - 
Bourdieuean tradition (Bigo 2000). As a reader of Bourdieu, Bigo analyses security 
practices as those existing in a specific field of security, formed by actors with a particular 
know-how and technologies, the 'security professionals' (Bigo 1996, Bigo, 2000). Such an 
analysis extricates security from a narrative of modernity that has attempted to secure the 
self at the expense of difference or from the narrative of a globalised world which is more 
permeable to difference and in which security would therefore be of the order of 
anachronism. Although Bigo is concerned both with the 'genesis of practices' (de Certeau 
1990) within the field of security and a Foucault-inspired analysis of 'regimes of practices', 
he is less concerned with the abject-ifying effects of security practices. If a specific 
problematisation of security allows for a diversity of actors to intervene on the problem, 
beyond the security professionals, I am also interested in the effects of their interventions 
in the logic of practice. The definition of human trafficking as a risk to be prevented has 
allowed NGOs to enter the field of EU professionals, law enforcement, police and 
immigration and to propose different technologies to deal with trafficking. 
Prevention creates a specific relation to the future, a future defined by potential 
'dangerous Irruptions in the future'which can be minimised or neutralised by intervening in 
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the present (Castel 1991). Risk requires the monitoring of the future, the attempt to 
calculate what the future can offer and the necessity to control and minimise its potentially 
harmful effects. Risk Is important for understanding how security practices functions 
because it has always been a way of ordering reality, of rendering it into a calculable form 
(Dean 1999a, Ewald, 1986, Ewald, 1991). It is exactly the calculability of risk that makes it 
Interesting for governing society, as a strategy for managing societal problems. Risk 
introduces a particular expert knowledge in the field of security, the knowledge of 
preventing dangerous irruptions. Enlarging the definition that Frangois Ewald has given of 
Insurantial risk, risk is a 'specific mode of treatment of certain events capable of 
happening to a group of individuals' (Ewald 1991: 199). 
Ewald's (1986) and Jacques Donzelot's (1984) genealogical analyses of risk have 
shown that risk provided a response to the problematisation of specific social and 
historical problems. Insurance provided an answer to the 'scandal of the poor' in the post- 
revolutionary French R6publique, where neither political equality nor capitalism could 
(Donzelot 1984). Despite equality before the law and equal sovereignty, the poor had no 
property and were therefore forced to sell their labour. Yet, free access to work did not 
mean the end of Indigence. The resolution of the social question - impossible through 
either political claims or economic measures - was given in the form of mandatory 
Insurance. The wage system was the first form of collective risk insurance, guaranteeing 
rights, giving access to benefits outside work and protecting workers from the peril of 
Indigence. In this context, other social problems of industrial modernity became governed 
by technologies of risk insurance. A rationality of risk could render contentious work 
accidents as something inherent to work, against which workers could be protected 
through Insurance. Insurance risk becomes social and is deployed as a 'technology of 
solidarity' which makes accidents, unemployment and other social problems collectively 
borne through Insurance (Dean 1999b: 140). 
The domain of risk has long been co-extensive with the insurable (Ewald 1993). 
The solidarity that Insurance risk was supposed to foster in a collectivity was 
simultaneously undermined by the division and classification of populations in high 
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risk/low risk groups. The marketisation of insurance has lead to a process of 'underwriting 
security' by means of which an insurer analyses the levels of risk that a potential client 
represents and decides whether an insurance policy can be written (Lobo-Guerrero 2006). 
The moral hazard that a client can pose for an insurer is translated in a form of prevention 
in relation to social risks. If insurers take the moral measure of the individual they insure 
(Baker 2000: 569), risk prevention takes the moral measure of groups which appear to be 
at risk. The insurance industry depends on other institutions to police society and high-risk 
groups so as to reduce risks and make them profitable. 
As a technology of governing social problems, risk management combines 
insurance and prevention. Risk prevention is based on practices of dividing and 
categorising social groups, while risk insurance is primarily a form of the statistical 
computation of probabilities. As risks are the effect of a 'combination of abstract factors, 
which render more or less probably the occurrence of undesirable modes of behaviour' 
(Castel 1991: 287), risk is doubly related to social problems and subjects. Risk prevention 
entails form of individual and group profiling, based on 'procedures for the allocation of 
individuals to risk groups, on a genealogical basis, in terms of a family history of illness or 
pathology, and/or on a factorial basis, in terms of combinations of factors statistically 
linked to a condition' (Rose 2001 b: 8). 
Formulated to tackle problems posed by'dangerous individuals', delinquents, and 
criminals, risk prevention has borrowed heavily from the expert knowledge provided by 
psychology and psychoanalysis. The clinical practices of risk initially focused on the 
likelihood of a person (in particular, a mentally ill person) committing a violent act. If 
psychological savoir was taken out of the asylum and the clinic to govern the risk of 
dangerous behaviour of criminals, mental defectives, sexual perverts, and psychopaths, it 
has been extended to more and more 'marginal' categories, such as alcoholics, drug 
addicts, and children with learning disorders. As the authors of The Psychiatric Society 
have aptly put it, psychology colonised social life (Castel et al. 1982). Psychology and 
psychiatry have gradually taken up and transformed political, economic and social 
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problems, and have made these problems thinkable in new ways and governable by 
different techniques (Rose 1989: ix). 
Castel has documented the mutation of social technologies that have minimised 
direct therapeutic intervention, supplanted by an increasing emphasis on a preventive 
administrative management of populations at risk (1981). Strategies of prevention are 
based on the assumption that if prevention is necessary, a danger exists, even if only in a 
virtual state before being actualised. As these correlations remain arbitrary and can only 
be proven a posteriori, dangerousness becomes 'a quality immanent to a subject (Robert 
Castel 1981: 146). The virtuality of danger is related to specific individuals and groups 
who are to be categorised as 'high risk'. Although linked with the risk management of 
populations, preventive risk also involves a therapeutic objective in the administration of 
individuals diagnosed as pathological (Weir 1996: 374). 
This double aspect, individualising and categorising, of risk technologies appears 
most explicitly in clinical risk management. Clinical risk, Weir has pointed out, 'breach[es] 
the distinction between disciplinary governance that acts on individual bodies and security 
governance that acts on populations' (Weir 1996: 382). It implements population-based 
calculations, forming risk groups by applying risk categories that divide the population and 
subsequently place groups 'at risk' under surveillance or treatment. These risk 
technologies are based upon a combination of the characteristics of individual case 
studies and observation of patterns in a population and the identification of associated risk 
factors (Lupton 1999: 63). Some groups are to be defined as 'high risk', with risk being 
defined as internal, due to their behaviour or biography, rather than external. 
Clinical risk management mobilises psychological expertise to create risk profiles 
and contain the risk of various categories of people deemed to have mental and/or 
emotional problems. To statistical calculation, psychology has added a more important 
promise 'to provide inscription devices that would individualise such troublesome subjects' 
(Rose 1998: 74). Psychological expertise is needed to invent diagnostic categories, 
evaluations, assessments; it is needed to provide an individuated answer to the question 
at the heart of all acts of government: 'who are you? '. Risk subjectivities are constituted 
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through a combination of therapeutic interventions, pathological categorisations and a 
statistical calculation of the incidence of certain factors in a population group. 
Risk prevention reveals an interesting dynamic between the groups 'at risk' and 
the calculation of 'high risk'. Clinical risk first locates a series of abstract factors that are 
responsible for the emergence of certain behavioural patterns, diseases, and mental 
disorders. According to this logic, it is possible to say that children of alcoholic parents are 
also 'at risk' of being alcoholic. By being 'at risk', they also pose a potential risk to the 
community, a risk related with all the 'disorders' of alcoholism. Those judged 'at risk' of 
being a danger to the community are subjected to therapeutic (e. g., counselling, self-help 
groups, support groups) and disciplinary (training and re-training) practices in an effort 
either to eliminate them completely from communal spaces (e. g., by various forms of 
confinement) or to lower the dangers posed by their risk (Dean 1999a: 189). The 
specification of subjects into categories of risk makes use of both insurantial and clinical 
risk techniques for group identification, exclusion and marginalisation. 
What does the conceptualisation of security as governmental, as risk management 
mean for its unmaking? A Foucauldian analysis of practices implies a practice of critique 
to make explicit the regime of power/knowledge underpinning the construction of threats. 
Making explicit the 'constitution of authority' can however only function as an indirect 
strategy of critique. Bigo has argued that '[e]ffective challenges can only be indirect, by 
analysing the conditions under which the authority of truth is given to a discourse that 
creates the immigrant as. an "outsider, inside the State (Bigo 2002: 66). A genealogical 
analysis of the practices of security and sovereignty can re-open and make contingent the 
assumptions with which securitisation works. Yet, showing the constitution of authority is 
not enough. In his analysis of 'What is critique? ', Foucault has pointed out that critique 
functions in relation to practices of government that are unjust and 'hide a fundamental 
illegitimacy' (Foucault 1997: 30). The simple constitution of institutional practices cannot 
ground their critique. 'Not to want to be governed thus' can be understood as a double 
contestation of the illegitimacy of practices and their authority. Analysing the conditions of 
emergence and consolidation of a regime of truth challenges its truth claims. Security 
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practices are not rendered illegitimate because of how they function within a specific field. 
These practices appear as necessary because of the imaginary of security. What is 
needed, Foucault has insightfully remarked, is 'putting forth universal and indefeasible 
rights to which every government, whatever it may be.... will have to submit' (Foucault 
1997: 30). 
A Bourdieuean analysis of the field as undertaken by Bigo limits however the 
potential of critique in Foucault's sense. Change in the field comes through contestatory 
interactions between fields and institutional actors with diverging 'interests'. Yet, the 
technologies of knowledge acquisition in the field of security short-circuit any type of 
amateur interventions. The security professionals' institutional knowledge about threats 
and the technological means to deal with those makes them relatively impermeable to the 
criticism of 'amateurs' such as NGOs, associations, churches, spokesmen and other types 
of ad-hoc organisations. Bigo speaks an 'ethos of shared knowledge between the 
professionals, a knowledge beyond the grasp of people who do not have the know-how 
about risk assessment and proactivity' (Bigo 2002: 74). Amateur actors can only enter the 
field of shared knowledge by proposing useful or similar knowledge. As society is a 
complex structuration of fields, claims of knowledge, authority, etc. can clash with claims 
from other fields. Without an over-arching epistemic authority, claims to knowledge remain 
irreconcilable. The very struggle over the representation of a social problem can make 
institutional space for various actors. As it is unclear in what sense exactly migration for 
example is a threat, it can be integrated in a whole series of practices that allow for the 
intervention of the police, border officials, judiciary, politicians, or NGOs. Migration is 
simultaneously connected with terrorism, smuggling, crime (more or less organised), 
allowing interventions from different fields and by various actors. 
NGOs have been able to enter the field of trafficking - defined initially by law- 
enforcement as a matter of policing - by proposing forms of knowledge that would be 
useful for the management of trafficking. Many trafficking NGOs in Europe already had 
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expertise in working with sex workers or victims of domestic violence. 28 NGOs have 
offered first-hand, in-depth knowledge about victims of trafficking. In her presentation to 
an OSCE conference, Stana Buchowska from La Strada has emphasised the role of 
NGOs as a valuable source of information for the authorities, information which would be 
otherwise unobtainable (OSCE 2004). The European Commission also recognised early 
on the importance of NGOs in anti4rafficking programmes and has integrated NGO 
representatives in its 'Experts Group on Trafficking in Human Beings', mandated to 
develop a plan for best practices, standards and mechanisms to prevent and combat 
trafficking in human beings (European Commission 2005b). Although NGOs have 
managed to enter the field of security professionals, their approach to human trafficking 
has proven less of a challenge to existing technologies of government. To understand 
how a 'victimisation' approach could become part of the overall govemmentality of 
trafficking, it is important to focus on the logic of practices rather than the interests of 
actors. The next section will show that practices can be reappropriated and moved in 
different directions, independent of the actors' interests or initial agenda. 
Governing human trafficking: risk practiceS29 
REM [Regional Empowerment Initiative for Women] ... will help prevent 
trafficking in the countries of origin as at-risk women are vested with the 
skills, knowledge and confidence to successfully pursue safe and fulfilling 
opportunities in their home countries and avoid trafficking schemes 
(international Research & Exchange Board 2003). 
Compared to the more straightforward examples of securitisation such as migration, 
trafficking is a peculiar case, as it has witnessed a move from security to a humanitarian 
28 Most of the NGOs in Western Europe have integrated anti-trafficking work in their work with sex 
workers. I have encountered this'history' with NGOs from Italy (On the Road, TAMPEP, 
Commitato per le Diritti Civili delle Prostitute), France (Cabiria), Germany, the Netherlands (STV). 
29 An earlier version of this section was published in Aradau (2004a). 
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or victim-based approach. A governmental analysis of risk practices allows us to see how 
such an ethical approach becomes enmeshed in the securitising logic (beyond the 
constraints imposed on amateur actors such as NGOs by their presence in the security 
field). Pity towards trafficked women becomes enmeshed with preventive strategies of risk 
and women become 'constituted' as specific categories of victims, pathological beings that 
are themselves risky rather than exposed to risks. 
Despite the ethical injunction to tend to the victims, pity is reconfigured when it 
becomes a mechanism for dealing with social problems. The representation of the 'victim' 
and of the abuse of rights made possible by her vulnerability activates technologies of 
prevention. The recurrence of such experiences needs to be stopped and detailed 
knowledge of the phenomenon and those involved is required. In Romania, one institution 
which is part of the police service is responsible nationally both for the prevention of 
trafficking and the protection Of ViCtiMS. 30 Victims of trafficking cannot remain pure 
presence; their risk identity needs to be specified for the purposes of preventing human 
trafficking. The risk prevention of trafficking relies on technologies of delimiting and 
categorising 'high risk' groups, groups which are at risk of being trafficked. Trafficked 
women are profiled for preventive purposes and it is these specific profiles, developed in 
conjunction with psychological knowledge, that make possible the constitution of these 
women's identity as a subject of the govemmentality of human trafficking. This 
representation of vulnerability is at first sight consonant with the unifying representations 
of victims as suffering bodies, as the risk of trafficking is taken to be a risk to women's 
well-being. Yet, we shall see that trafficked women also mutate into a risk to the 
state/society, as a group at risk thought to embody a permanent virtual danger that could 
irrupt in the future. 
The identification and calculability of risk depend on the construction of risk 
profiles. Studies of risk practices have emphasised the construction of biographical 
profiles of human populations for risk management and security provision (Ericson and 
30 Oficiul National de Prevenire a Traficului de Persoane si Monitorizare a Protectiei Victimelor 
Traficului (National Office for the Prevention of Human Trafficking and Monitoring of Victims of 
Trafficking), httD: //www. Dolitiaromana. ro/Prevenire/trafic Dersoane. htm, accessed 26 March 2005. 
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Haggerty 1997). Victim profiles have also become ubiquitous in trafficking reports and 
studies of the phenomenon. The Council Framework Decision on combating trafficking in 
human beings identifies trafficked women as victims of coercion, force or threats, 
including abduction, deceit or fraud, abuse of authority and vulnerability (Council of the 
European Union 2002). A report by the European Parliament explicitly defines and limits 
vulnerability as specifically due to 'poverty, lack of education and professional 
opportunities' (European Parliament 200 1). 
In NGO analyses, socio-economic conditions are being translated at the individual 
level as 'a strong desire to seek employment abroad', shifting emphasis from questions of 
inequality to vulnerability factors (EI-Cherkeh et al. 2004). Other reports employ a similarly 
psychological redefinition in terms of the victim's 'wish for a better life'. These redefinitions 
are not limited to the NGO sector, but are taken up by the EU and other international 
organisations. A Europol overview of trafficking redefines poverty and the hope or 
expectations of a more prosperous future as the vulnerabilities that are exploited by the 
traffickers (Europol 2004). Even when economic and social factors are concerned, a shift 
towards individualisation and psychologisation becomes apparent. The latest IOM study of 
vulnerability factors to trafficking in Romania completely dismisses the hypothesis of 'an 
objectively poor environment as a characteristic of vulnerability' (IOM 2003). While poverty 
is acknowledged as a 'push' factor, calls for eradicating poverty remain highly impractical. 
Another, more feasible, way of tackling the issue of poverty is by changing individual 
psychological reactions to poverty. 
Even if socio-economic risk factors such as poverty, lack of job opportunities, and 
gender inequalities are enumerated in the various reports on trafficking, their role is not 
only redefined under the influence of psychologisation, but also limited in practice. In 
interviews with the IOM and three other NGOs in Romania working for the reintegration of 
trafficked women in the country of origin, I found that, as the economic aspect of the risk 
governance is very difficult to tackle, it is eclipsed by the more easily addressable 
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concerns with psychological rehabilitation and recovery. 31 NGOs have liaised with EU 
actors by providing psychological expertise that could be more easily translated into 
practice compared to large-scale economic and social interventions. Psychological 
counselling counts as one of the most important methods for victim assistance and 
reintegration. A report on trafficking in South-Eastern Europe cites medical care and 
psychological counselling as the first two strategies of integration, while expressing 
concern about the little emphasis placed on educational assistance and lack of vocational 
and training programmes in transit and destination countries (Counter-Trafficking Regional 
Clearing Point (RCP) 2003). 
In the general assemblage of risk factors used to govern specific groups, trafficked 
women become mostly an assemblage of psychological risk factors. From the NGOs 
perspective, this shift to psychological profiling is not surprising, given that they 
understand trafficking as a traumatic experience for women. For psychological expertise, 
a traumatic experience is also linked with specific factors in the victim's past. Animus, the 
main NGO involved with returned trafficked women in Bulgaria, warns that it is important 
to consider the predispositions that exist in the personal history of women and girls 
(Stateva and Kozhouharova 2004). Typical risk profiles of victims of trafficking will 
therefore include past biographical details deemed important by the experts. Significantly, 
victims are shown to have often experienced 'exposure to violence at home or in a state 
institution' (Limanowska 2002). Most victims have been abandoned by parents, friends, 
and/or husbands, and many have been sexually abused (Centrul pentru prevenirea 
traficului de femei 2002). They often come from dysfunctional families (La Strada). 32 
Animus also indicates that the groups most at risk of being trafficked are women and 
31 In January 2004 1 conducted interviews with representatives of the IOM Bucharest, Ad Pare 
Bucharest, Reaching Out Pite§ti and Save the Children Romania. Psychological counselling and 
therapy was foremost on their agenda, all victims of trafficking having to go through a therapy 
programme. However, they were all aware of the importance of the economic and social context. 
The task of helping women find jobs or get out from poverty proved daunting for most of them, 
Reaching Out being the only NGO that makes sure women have a job before they leave the 
shelter. 
32 La Strada Is one of the first NGOs funded by the EU to prevent trafficking in women in Central 
and Eastern Europe. In 2005 they celebrated ten years of activity. 
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adolescents who have suffered traumatic experiences, e. g. victims of domestic violence, 
sexual assault, children from orphanages, and children with a large number of siblings 
and only one parent (Zimmerman 2003). 26% of the returned women at Animus had been 
victims of incest or childhood psychological abuse and all of them had untreated 
psychological trauma (Stateva and Kozhouharova 2004: 112). 
Victims of trafficking suddenly begin appearing in reports as doubly traumatised, 
both by the experience of trafficking and by earlier, childhood experiences of abuse. This 
continuity of trauma is not surprising for the psychological expertise. A classic of 
psychological trauma and an oft-mentioned reference in NGO documents, Judith 
Herman's Trauma and Recovery states that adult survivors of child abuse are at great risk 
of victimisation in adult life (Herman 1997: 111). The experience of trafficking is thus a 
repetition, an almost fateful reliving of earlier traumas. Diana Tudorache, from the IOM 
shelter on Kosovo, clearly connects the two types of traumatic events. In her words, '[t]he 
feelings of vulnerability and emotional pain that are experienced by the VoT [victims of 
trafficking], combined often with a background of childhood abuse and mistreatment, play 
a significant role in the occurrence and severity of the acute reactions' (Tudorache 2004: 
23). Within a short period (2001-2004), IOM Romania commissioned and published two 
studies of the vulnerability of the 'young female population in Romania' (IOM 2001,2003). 
Based on interviews with women who have been trafficked, IOM has produced victim 
profiles which emphasise their past traumas. 
The past however, especially the location of a traumatic event in the victim's past 
(such as childhood abuse, dysfunctional family environment, domestic violence and 
institutional abuse) activates another scenario of psychotherapeutic practices. As Julie 
Brownlie has noted in her article on the 'young sexual offenders', victimisation is not only 
an indicator of further abuse but equally an indicator of future risk (Brownlie 2001). 
Studies on victims of sexual abuse suggest that adult females who were sexually abused 
as children experience a variety of long-term sequelae including sexual disturbances, 
depression, anxiety, fear, and suicidal ideas and behaviour (Schaaf and McCanne 1998: 
1119). Victims of sexual abuse, psychological studies have shown, are likely not only to 
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be re-victimised, but they might well become 'perpetrators' themselves. In cases of child 
abuse or violence, the necessity of abused children to defend themselves at an early 
stage in life might evolve into offending behaviour later on (Romano and De Luca 1997: 
86). In a less extreme formulation, women who have been sexually abused as children 
and those who have been traurnatised are more likely to engage in future risk-taking 
behaviour than those who have not experienced abuse (Zimmerman 2003). Even those 
who claim that survivors of childhood abuse for example are more likely to be victimised 
than to victimise other people cannot deny a connection with adult antisocial behaviour 
(Herman 1997: 113). 
These insights activate technologies of risk management which attempt to limit the 
possibility of a risky offender to re-offend. The spectre of potential offences, whether 
understood as antisocial, risky or even criminal behaviour surreptitiously infuses 
victimisation scenarios. If the continuity of trauma could be thought as consonant with 
victimisation, which could still construe sexual exploitation as the undeserved surplus of 
earlier, also undeserved, abuse and violence, the risky-ness inscribed in the women's 
biographical profiles ends up by subverting pity. Strangely reminiscent of the 
governmentality of drug- and alcohol-addictions, 'rehabilitation' is the motto for practices 
of victim assistance. The expert knowledge mobilised by NGOs with the purpose of 
helping trafficking women becomes 'hijacked' by a politics of risk which is based on risk 
minimisation and containment. The women 'at risk' insidiously metamorphose into 'high 
risk' groups and risk technologies are deployed under the banner of therapy not just to 
help victims of trafficking overcome their trauma and ease their suffering, but also to limit 
the possibility of dangerous irruptions. 
What is this dangerous irruption, what is the potential offending behaviour of 
trafficked women? The EU documents are un-ambiguous on this point. If trafficked women 
are to re-offend, offence is to be understood as immigration. The EU Council Proposal for 
a decision to combat human trafficking has explicitly stated that helping victims of 
trafficking or smuggling is a way of preventing them from lapsing into an illegal 
immigration situation (Council of the European Union 2002). The joint EU-IOM-NGO 
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Brussels Declaration also sees victim reintegration as a means to reduce the risk of re- 
trafficking (IOM 2002). While trafficked women are involved in psychological therapy 
(together, for example, with victims of domestic violence and rape), it is important to 
remember that these programmes are seen by the EU as part of prevention strategies and 
therefore need to be supplemented in most cases by return to the country of origin. 33 A 
Commission discussion paper on granting short-term residence permits can even 
unproblematically conceive of the fight against human trafficking as two-pronged: by 
dismantling the networks or by helping victims get out of their illegal situation and avoid 
lapsing into it again (which would also be linked with psycho-social measures) (European 
Commission 2001 b). 
These preventive measures can only be read as the risk management of illegal 
migration which subverts the non-judgemental concerns of pity and subsumes the NGO 
discourse to the logic of security practices. The potential risk of women migrating and 
being re-trafficked is to be contained and prevented; they will be surveyed and disciplined, 
subjected to trauma therapy with the purpose of turning them into subjects able to monitor 
their own risk. Risk technologies have made possible the specification of the victim - 
previously object of pity - as inherently and continuously 'risky' and have modified the 
emotional promise of pity into an abstract suspicion of risk. Based on the aggregate of risk 
factors, vulnerability is traversed by imputations of dangerousness (Castel 1991: 284). 
Women remain risky beings, always 'in danger of being re-trafficked and thus 
embodying themselves the danger of illegal migration. Rather than rights-bearing 
individuals, women are dealt with as risk-bearing ones, subjected to a logic of risk which is 
focused on how to limit the opportunity of the 'risky' offender to offend. The risk of women 
being re-trafficked Is a risk which paradoxically dwells 'in' the subject even though it has 
not manifested itself in the act (Castel 1991: 283). 
An ethical approach to trafficking becomes complicit in a politics of security that 
uses risk technologies for the purpose of preventing human trafficking. While such an 
33 The conditions for obtaining temporary residence permits imply either the cooperation of women 
In the prosecution of the trafficker or exceptional cases of threat or abuse. Most women are either 
'voluntarily returned' or deported. 
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analysis of practices allows us to see how the two approaches are interconnected and 
traversed by a logic of risk, it does not give much help by way of unmaking these 
practices. The realisation that the prevention of human trafficking and the 'protection' of 
trafficked women are geared towards a concern with stopping illegal migration does not 
challenge the experts' regime of truth concerning illegal migration. As a complex social 
problem, human trafficking can be split between concerns for the victims and 'legitimate' 
concerns with illegal migration. While technologies of risk management make apparent 
their imbrication and interdependence, what also needs to be challenged is the imaginary 
of security that allows for the constitution of authoritative forms of knowledge. 
Without challenging both symbolic practices and the imaginary that holds them 
together and makes their deployment possible, ethical concerns can be reappropriated 
and reformulated. Their reappropriation is made possible not simply through field effects 
(the amateur actors yield to expert knowledge, the EU finances many of these 
organisations)34, but through the redeployment of technologies and knowledge. While one 
can attempt to think change along the first two lines - how would struggles among actors 
challenge dominant constructions rather than entrench them - the more urgent question is 
how to tackle the redeployment of technologies. This redeployment can either settle 
various struggles or obscure the real stakes of struggles. The following section will explore 
possibilities of challenging the reappropriation of knowledge and the redeployment of risk 
management technologies. 
Security effects: a taxonomy of subjects 
I have shown that the redeployment of the technologies of risk management and risk 
knowledge is made possible under description, under the specification of who the victims 
of trafficking are. This constitutive dimension of practices can lead to a different 
understanding of how to formulate a critical stance. The practices of risk management and 
34 The EU STOP programme has financed NGOs to tackle trafficking in women, while DAPHNE 
has provided funding to NGOs fighting violence against children, young people and women 
(European Commission 2002b). 
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prevention create specific subjects at risk or risky. Therefore, the subjectifying aspect of 
practices is of foremost importance for unmaking security. In a Foucauldian framework, 
the task of critique as exposing the arbitrariness of a regime of power/knowledge which 
has become natural, taken-for-granted and a-historical is supplemented by subjects who 
resist these very regimes of power. Focusing on the genesis of practices exposes their 
contingency, their arbitrary reification into the taken-for-granted, the familiar and the 
natural. Yet, this exposure needs to tackle the paraphernalia of actors, technologies and 
discourses. Although I do not want to claim that such change is impossible, it seems to 
me that the point of instability, the possible point of rupture resides in the constitution of 
subjects. 
Technologies of government can only attempt to foster different subjectivities and 
are reproduced by means of these descriptions. Such descriptions have been ostensibly 
refused by trafficked women. Foucault's insight on the recalcitrance of the subject, the 
resistance that is immanent to power appears in the trafficked women's refusal to accept 
these descriptions. Many women refuse to become subjectified as victims of trafficking. 
NGOs have devised guidelines that would name women as victims independent of their 
personal decision (OSCE 2004). 'Victims of trafficking' often refuse to return to their 
countries of origin and follow programmes of rehabilitation. Yet, can they extricate 
themselves from these practices? The question of unmaking security practices could 
therefore be rephrased as the 'opposition to the effects of power linked with knowledge, 
competence, and qualification... [and] also against secrecy, deformation, and mystifying 
representations imposed on people' (Foucault 2000c: 330). 
Having defined security as 'the generative and immanent principle of the formation 
of [the] political subject' (Campbell and Dillon 1993: 29), Campbell and Dillon found 
themselves In the midst of a larger theoretical field in which the relation of the subject and 
social practices was being debated. If the subject is 'constituted' by regimes of 
power/knowledge, the only possible extrication is by un-forming or de-forming the subject. 
For Campbell, security and subjectivity are intrinsically linked in a twofold way: securing a 
subject requires its differentiation, classification and definition (Campbell 1992: 253); 
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security also functions 'to instantiate the subjectivity it purports to serve' (Campbell 1998a: 
199). Security practices attempt to reproduce a secure subject by abject-ifying others. 
Linking security and subjectivity is assumed to have an insurrectional effect. Campbell's 
formulation of the subject insurrection is 'how do we orient ourselves to danger ... ? Do we 
have an alternative to the continued reproduction of sovereign communities in an 
economy of violenceT (Campbell 1998a: 203). His answer is inspired by the Foucauldian 
'ontology of freedom' which makes possible the rearticulation of different modes of being 
and forms of life. Although a more thorough discussion of subjectivity is beyond the ambit 
of Campbell's book, it is unclear how such a rearticulation is to occur given the power 
effects of security. Moreover, the subject of security is the subject and not the abject. 
As Hinrich Fink-Eitel (1992), one of Foucault's German exegetes has argued, 
Foucault's theoretical trajectory can be considered as the bifurcation of a history of the 
other and a history of the self that have continued the lines sketched in Madness and 
Civilization and The Order of Things respectively. If Madness and Civilization, Fink-Eitel 
goes on, dealt with the philosophy of the Other, The Order of Things is concerned with a 
philosophy of the Other's opposite, of the human being as a finite being on the verge of a 
breakthrough to the other (Fink-Eitel 1992: 31). The bifurcation between the dominance of 
the self and the dominance of the other in Foucault's work has lead to a dualistic 
approach to the question of subjectivity. The subject who resists her subjectification 
through practices of security can be the self or the other. 
The focus on the self, on the subject of modernity or on the multiple institutional 
locations of subjects seems to me to run into the impasse of accounting how the subject's 
'passionate attachment' (2i2ek 1999) to one's subjectivity is to be un-wrung and re- 
worked. h2ek follows the line of psychoanalysis, where subjectivity is unwrought through 
a traumatic encounter with the Real. Butler on the other hand weds psychoanalysis to the 
subjectivity of the abject. There is an implicit assumption in Butler that the undoing of 
subjectivity happens at the site of the other-subject, the one that security practices 
constitute through exclusion as the abject. Those who encounter power relations most 
directly and oppressively resist most immediately and directly. 
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The governmentality literature has de-differentiated the self and the other in its 
understanding of resistance against power relations. I have already discussed 
governmentality as an 'art' for acting on the actions of individuals, taken either singly or 
collectively, so as to shape, guide, conduct and modify the ways in which they act 
(Burchell 1993: 267). Combining the meanings of 'to conduct', 'to conduct oneself and 
'conduct' as a noun, government refers to any attempt to shape with some degree of 
deliberation aspects of our behaviour, the management of possibilities (Dean 1999a: 10; 
Foucault 2000c: 341). Resistance therefore is a question of 'counter-conducts' of the self 
and other. In the later Foucault, there is an emphasis on ethics or 'aesthetics of the self 
as a modality of engagement against the shaping of conduct. What interests me, however, 
is the second penchant of his theoretical trajectory, the other, whose resistance is at best 
silenced if not suppressed. While one could speak of the relation between the resistance 
of the self and the resistance of the other, of the congruence and resonance of their forms 
of resistance, the emphasis on the other, the infamous or the abject speaks to a Marxist 
tradition that has seen in the oppressed the makers of their own emancipation. Resisting 
counter-conducts happen at the site of those who experience technologies of government 
as oppressive and unjust. 
The subject that disrupts, transcends and challenges is the oppressed subject or 
the abject. Oppression is not a question of personal feelings, but is inscribed in power 
relations. The subjective position of the abject replaces - in this reading - the concern 
with the modern subject who is constituted through the exclusion of abject others. it is 
after all an ethics of the self along Foucauldian lines that is envisaged by Campbell. His 
later engagement with Levinas and responsibility towards the other attempts to recreate 
an ethical injunction from the site of self. Although both subjects and abjects function 
within relations of power and both could resist, the abject most directly and immediately 
resists oppression and domination. 
The related issue that arises with the resisting subject is whether counter-conducts 
or insubordination are able to displace the existing socio-symbolic network. 2-ilek argues, 
contra Butler, that 
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one should maintain the crucial distinction between a mere "performative 
reconfiguration", a subversive displacement which remains within the 
hegemonic field and, as it were, conducts an internal guerrilla war of 
turning the terms of the hegemonic field against itself, and the much 
more radical act of a thorough reconfiguration of the entire field which 
redefines the very conditions of socially sustained performativity (2i2ek 
1999: 264). 
Butler has actually raised the question of resistance that only manages to undermine (thus 
determining the failure of the constitution of the subject), but does not have the power to 
re-articulate the discourse and the normalising practices (Butler 1997b). Think, for 
example, of the sovereign deportation of undesirable asylum-seekers or illegal migrants. 
The subject's insubordination is often acutely violent. Such reactions are not interpreted 
as political and new technologies are devised to remove the struggling migrants from the 
view of other passengers at the airports. What few changes are made concern more 
effective, less visible technologies, but not the principles, the logic of representing asylum- 
seekers or illegal migrants as dangerous, bogus, criminal, in a word undesirable. 
Or - even more perversely - resistance can be re-appropriated by the regime of 
power/knowledge and technologies of security. The strategy of representing trafficking as 
the victimisation of women is reappropriated in a logic of risk, according to which women 
remain risky beings. Resistance to security practices does not mean proposing a less 
threatening representation of the other, but challenging the very imaginary and symbolic 
practices of security. It is interesting that the refusal of representations of danger 
concerning asylum-seekers or migrants generally focuses on their artistic side: poetry 
writing, drawings, and music. This artistic side silences their political claims, the 
disturbance that they cause to the existing 'regime of truth' about migration and asylum. 
Their integration through art takes away the economic and political implications of 
migration which security practices try to neutralise through the constitution of danger or 
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risk. Is such an emphasis on the artistic side of migrants not the tacit awareness that other 
challenges could be truly unsettling? Moreover, the artistic display of migrant craftiness 
does nothing by way of challenging the representation of other migrants as bogus 
refugees, welfare cheaters, criminals or potential terrorists. 
The dilemma of resistant subjectivity is that it can be consonant with dominant 
practices (such as the migrant-as-artist) or it can reproduce representations of danger (the 
migrant who violently struggles against procedures of return). The next section will 
analyse this dilemma of subjectivity in relation to the reproduction of dominant practices or 
their disruption by looking at how trafficked women refuse practices of subjectivation. 
Governing human trafficking: risky subjects 
'Psychological pain' does not by itself seem to me to be a definite fact, 
but on the contrary only an interpretation -a causal interpretation - of 
a collection of phenomena that cannot be exactly formulated - it is 
really only a fat word standing in place of a skinny question mark 
(Nietzsche quoted in Hacking 1995: 197). 
We have seen that security practices eliminate, expel or modify the destabilising element 
of the political order. We have seen how the disordering potential of trafficked women 
permeates concerns for their suffering. The psychological knowledge that make possible 
such linkage is also deployed for making sense of the women's behaviour in the post- 
trafficking situation. This section will show how women's resistance becomes 
depoliticised, integrated in a regime of power/knowledge that 'speaks the truth' about 
them and deprives them of the political clout of ordinary citizens. 
Hindess has distinguished three broad categories of subjects in need of different 
technologies of government depending on the understanding of the subject's (lack of) 
capacity for self-government and risk management (Hindess 2001: 101). The first 
category concerns those people who are far from acquiring the necessary capabilities and 
should be cleared out of the way. They are the hopeless cases, the incorrigibles or as 
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Dean calls them, the 'permanently delinquent' (2002: 48). The second category is that in 
which the capacities for self-government can only be developed through compulsion, 
through the imposition of more or less extended periods of discipline (Hindess 2001: 101). 
The third category concerns those subjects who lack the capacity for self-government due 
mainly to external reasons - for example ill health, poverty, or inadequate education. 
Trafficked women are the paradoxical case in which the three categories overlap. 
As illegal migrants, trafficked women are still to be deported. As potential criminals, they 
are to be subjected to disciplinary technologies. To be accepted to the Eaves Housing 
Center in London, for example, women have to abide by restrictive criteria, beyond their 
experience of trafficking (Eaves Housing for Women 2004). As psychologically vulnerable, 
women are to be helped through education and various forms of psychological counselling 
to become self-sufficient and reliable subjects. Although the technologies deployed for 
governance are different, what these varied descriptions of subjectivity have in common is 
their position as abjects. 
There is a double inscription of the psychological upon the subjectivity of trafficked 
women. On the one hand this inscription leads to the construction of vulnerability and 
risky-ness that accounts for trafficking and allows for the deployment of preventive 
technologies of risk management and on the other the experience of trafficking is itself 
constructed as a traumatic. In a report by the Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, an 
NGO which has funded anti-trafficking programmes in Ukraine and Moldova, the post- 
trafficking psychological reactions comprise 'severe mental or emotional health 
consequences, including feelings of severe guilt, post-traumatic stress disorder, 
depression, anxiety, substance abuse (alcohol or narcotics) and eating disorders ... self- 
mutilation or suicide' (Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights 2005). A study financed by 
the World Health Organisation to analyse the health effects of trafficking reaches similar 
conclusions: 
The forms of abuse and risk that women experience include physical, 
sexual and psychological abuse, the forced or coerced use of drugs and 
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alcohol, social restriction and manipulation, economic exploitation and 
debt bondage, legal insecurity, abusive working and living conditions, and 
a range of risks associated with being a migrant/marginalised. These 
abuses and risks impact women's physical, reproductive, and mental 
health (Zimmerman 2003)... 
Most NGOs involved in victim assistance have adopted this psychological approach to the 
'trauma of trafficking'. This is the case with many anti-trafficking NGOs in Romania, both 
due to their earlier or concomitant work with victims of domestic violence, their formation 
as social workers or psychologists/therapists, and the publication of manuals of good 
practices for the assistance of victims of trafficking. While I do not intend to downplay the 
exceptional role that the experience of trafficking has for women's lives, I argue that the 
double psychologisation of trafficking depoliticises their agency by re-reading it as 
pathological. Women as risky' functions as the primary depoliticisation of migratory 
projects and victims of trafficking. Although many women list finding work/working as the 
reason for their migratory projects, work remains the illegitimate element in the 
35 problematisation of trafficking. Work is understood either as prostitution or as any form 
of work but not prostitution . 
36 'Women as traumatised' is the second depoliticising move in 
the governance of trafficking. As they are traumatised and disordered subjects, their 
actions cannot be considered as endowed with political meaning. 
Trafficked women react against the constitution of their subjectivity as abject, as 
undesirable: women are to be removed from the territory of the country of destination and 
returned to their country of origin or made useful as witnesses against traffickers. When 
returned, women often refuse to start rehabilitation programs with the NGOs (Limanowska 
2002). All the women whose testimonies appeared in a 2004 legal file at the Galati Court 
35 Based on archival research of affidavits in trafficking trials at the Galati Court of Justice, 
Romania, in January 2004 and January 2004.1 have studied four legal files (file 2922/P/2003 in 
2004 and files 494/2005,956/P/2002 and 16/P/2005 in 2006) and the affidavits of the suspected 
victims of trafficking. I have also read five victim affidavits from the local police. 
36 Testimonies in case 956/P/2002, Galati Court of Justice. 
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of Justice had either attempted to return or returned to the country of destination (Italy) to 
resume sex work. In a personal conversation, one of the judges remarked that in another 
trafficking trial it had been difficult to obtain testimonies as most women are working in 
Spain and do not want to return .3" NGOs also report victims of trafficking returning to their 
countries of destination and take measures against such misbehaviour. Returning women 
are disqualified from receiving any further help by the IOM. 38 The refusal of victims of 
trafficking to start programmes of rehabilitation and reintegration, as well as the return of 
victims to sex work, being re-trafficked immediately after their repatriation or after 
rehabilitation programmes are problematic for NGOs and their representation of the victim 
of trafficking. Both the return to sex work and the refusal to start rehabilitation 
programmes are interpreted as due either to incomplete psychic recovery or to trauma. 
The reading of trauma and psychological disorder into women's actions suspends 
critical considerations of their situation, their relation to the 'rehabilitation and reintegration' 
programmes or to the prospects for the future that such programmes define. Although 
several NGOs have gradually started to realise the importance of work for 'reintegration 
programmes', women remain in a zone of labour precariousness, hardly different from 
their pre-migration situations. Given time and financial constraints, NGOs in Romania are 
able to offer three-month qualification courses for hairdressing or tailoring. " in my 
discussions with one of the social workers from ADPARE, an NGO working with returned 
women as part of the IOM victim assistance strategy, it has become evident that they 
struggle to help women make ends meet. 40 
Rather than raising difficult questions, psychologised disorderly behaviour 
'normalises' resistance and integrates acts of refusal by trafficked women into a cycle of 
traumatic experience-traumatic effects. A report by a Swedish NGO emphasises that it is 
'normal for the woman victim of trafficking to be aggressive to the whole world as well as 
37 Personal communication with Carmen Sandu, judge at the Galati Court of Justice, 13 January 
2006. 
38 Author's Interview with IOM spokesperson, Bucharest Romania, January 2004. 
39 See the section on'Reaching Out', a Romanian NGO in (Danish Red Cross 2005). 
40 Authors Interview, Bucharest, January 2004. 
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to the consultant. Her feelings are mixed anger, guilt, joy, helplessness, sadness' 
(Kvinnoforum 1999: 17). In guidelines for shelters that would accommodate trafficked 
women, the Romanian NGO Alternative sociale has annexed a short description of the 
psychological disorders that victims of trafficking can manifest: acute stress reaction, 
adaptive reaction, post-traumatic stress reaction, and the most severe Stockholm 
syndrome (Alternative sociale 2005a). The Stockholm syndrome refers to the victim's 
emotional attachment to the abuser. Any reaction that the victim might have or the refusal 
to identify or acknowledge a trafficker can be read as a form of traumatic empathy with the 
abuser. 41 Moreover, the Stockholm Syndrome as the creation of an emotional bond with 
the abuser can account for women beginning to Work with traffickers and becoming 
'complicit in the trafficking process through such activities as supervising other trafficking 
victims and even engaging in the recruitment of women into the commercial sex industry' 
(Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights 2005). 
In Romania, a recent overview of human trafficking, circulated to judges and other 
professionals who deal with human trafficking dedicates a whole chapter to the 
psychological consequences of trauma. The chapter was prepared by the director of 
Alternative sociale, one of most active NGOs on anti-trafficking in the eastern part of the 
country (Alternative sociale 2005b). IOM Ukraine has also drawn up statistics of the 
psychological disorders that victims of trafficking suffer from: psychological traumas, poor 
sleep, sleeplessness, fears, anxiety, depression, suicidal thoughts, frustration, self- 
recrimination, feelings of guilt, nightmares, poor concentration, low physical/intellectual 
working capacity, low self-esteem, and loss of life perspectives. 
41 The Stockholm syndrome as a manifestation of the victim's trauma has been promoted by the 
NGOs working with trafficking women. 
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IOM Ukraine: Psychological and Psychiatric Disorders (Out of 317 patients)42 
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13 Depression 
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0 General Psychological Problems 
0 Substance-Related Disorders 
0 Schizophrenia 
0 Toxic Psychosis 
0 Mental Retardation 
To these psychological disorders are added other medical conditions and different forms 
of alcohol dependency. 
Psychological expertise also reinforces gender boundaries and stereotypes and 
suspends any claims made by women as pathological. 
Victims of trafficking have been perceived to communicate through 
seduction. Seductiveness appears to be their only way to make requests. 
If we accept this to be true, we must not judge or condemn the women's 
actions, because the reasons for this behaviour are to be found in the 
psychological exploitation of the victims (Tudorache 2004: 20). 
Therefore, trafficked women cannot be seen as speaking or acting politically, but only 
clinically. Governing trafficked women through risk technologies not only 'constitutes' 
them as risky, as vulnerable categories able to pose renewed migratory risks, but it also 
deprives their actions of political potential. What can their refusal to undertake NGO 
42 1 am grateful for this doGument to Zsolt Duclas from the Danish Red Cross. 
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programmes, to return 'voluntarily' to their countries of origin or to testify in court against 
their 'traffickers' mean when these refusals are only forms of temporary disorders entailed 
by a trauma? 
The medicalisation of the subject allows for the re-incorporation of resisting forms 
of agency within the dominant modes of governing. Several researchers have attempted 
to challenge the representations of trafficking and of trafficked women as victims to be 
deported by providing different narratives of the women's experiences. They have shown 
that women are agents of their own destiny. Andrijasevic has analysed trafficking as a 
migratory project, which women undertake as autonomous agents (Andrijasevic 2003, 
2004). In viewing trafficked women as migrants and not as victims, she argues for 
women's agency in the trafficking process (Andrijasevic 2004: 10). The constitution of 
victimhood is unwarranted from the perspective of women. Yet, these various narratives, 
sparked by a feminist and poststructuralist interest in silenced subjects, fit the 
representation of migrants, those who are not 'victims of trafficking' but have at most been 
smuggled. Trafficked women are a specific category of migrants, defined by suffering as 
well as 'risk factors'. Autonomous migrants who undertake such risky projects can only be 
illegal migrants to be deported. The recapturing of women's agency in the process of 
trafficking, the 'serious thinking and planning that [they] put into migrating' (Andrijasevic 
2004: 10) fit with the representation of migration as rational actors, calculating their 
chances of success and failure. 
Narrating women's subjective experiences only shifts the representation of 
trafficking as victimisation towards the illegal migration discourse. Moreover, the 
narratives of specific subjects are always partial, unable to provide a 'universal' point of 
view. As researchers discover stories of migratory projects and autonomy, NGOs and 
other authorities tell stories of victimhood and suffering. My archival research has made 
clear that both stories are always already there: women's narratives would contain both 
elements of autonomous actions and elements of victimisation and exploitation. 43 Through 
the institutional encounter with the police, attorneys and judges, different elements are 
43 January 2004 and January 2006, archives of the Galati Court of Justice, Romania. 
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filtered out. The element of autonomy is discarded, as a certain understanding of 
victimisation is drawn out of the complexity of situations of exploitation. 
While one can be critical of the message that narratives of victimhood convey44, it 
is important not to dismiss these narratives but to understand how they are filtered out of a 
multiplicity of elements and the complexity of women's stories. One cannot simply deny 
that stories of exploitation and severe physical and psychological abuse simply happen. 
One cannot also deny that migratory projects which view 'trafficking' as part of a larger 
project towards gaining financial autonomy are also real experiences. We are here in a 
situation that Badiou has defined as 'indiscernibility of knowledge' (Badiou 2004a: 147). 
All these subjective experiences are equally real, equally true. By disentangling them from 
their situations, women as victims and women as autonomous migrants buttress different 
technologies of government. These experiences can be mobilised for specific institutional 
interests (for example, the IOM project of orderly migration or the EU policy for reducing 
illegal migration or the punitive logic of criminal law). 
We have seen how such knowledge of subjective experiences can become 
integrated in the governmentality of trafficking through risk. The mobilisation of subjective 
experiences for the purposes of governing trafficking does not render these experiences 
untrue. If women are re-identified as risky beings, this does not disconfirm their 
experiences of suffering. Re-formulating this experience as one of migratory projects 
cannot be universalised and is limited by the very experiences of those who have 
encountered forms of violence. These different narratives cannot also be seen as simply 
subjective experiences of violence, as it is impossible to decide which violence counts as 
violence and which one is integrated by the subject's adaptive capabilities. As long as we 
remain captive to different narratives and different subjective experiences, the 
'indiscernibility of knowledge' is made discernible in different expert accounts of what 
counts as trafficking, its victims and the technologies to govern this phenomenon. Experts, 
44 Andrijasevic has shown how the IOM public anti-trafficking campaigns are based on the Idea that 
women should stay home, in their countries. Danger becomes directly connected with border 
crossing (Andrijasevic 2004/Chapter 5). 
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practitioners and academics will keep disputing which category of victims is representative 
for what human trafficking means. 
The next chapter argues that what is needed to find a way out of these disputes 
about expert knowledge is a political decision. A political decision cuts across the various 
accounts of subjective violence and the multiple subjective experiences. Resistance to 
forms of knowledge and technologies can be reappropriated within the dominant modes of 
governmentality. Women's resistance to return or inscription in programmes of 
rehabilitations has been rendered pathological through a construction of psychological 
disorders that would dispose women to abnormal conduct. Other narratives that attempt to 
undermine this pathological subjectivation of women could not challenge the construction 
of trafficking and the representative category of suffering and traurnatised victims. Stories 
of autonomous and rational migrants are the 'other' of trafficking, against which trafficking 
has been defined from the beginning, by means of dis-identification from illegal migration. 
These narratives attempt to reverse the situation and claim autonomous migration as the 
normal, while trafficking speaks of the abnormal practices and violence that states inflict 
upon migrants. 
Subjectivity is therefore what is challenged and contested by governmental 
practices. On the one hand, different institutions attempt to represent and subjectify 
trafficked women and on the other women themselves challenge these forms of 
subjectivity. Yet, I have shown that the psychologisation or medicalisation of subjectivity is 
problematic for the possibility of political action. Similarly, reclaiming rational action risks 
failing back upon existing categories of willing and forced migrants. The situation of 
'indiscernibility of knowledge' appears as a situation of indiscernibility of subjectivity. What 
form of subjectivity, by what means, could traverse this situation of indiscernibility? 
Foucault has already intimated that critique needs to invoke forms of universality and 
rights that go beyond what is already captured in the particularity of governmentality. His 
remark is however at odds with the emphasis he placed on particular deployments of 
power relations and the rejection of universality. The following chapter will discuss what 
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universality could mean for resistance to power and the relation between subjectivity and 
universality. 
Conclusion 
By continuing the critical engagement with the humanitarian approach to human 
trafficking, this chapter has also led to a distancing from particular understandings of 
governmentality in security studies. It has shown that reducing governmentality to an 
analysis of fields obscures the way practices have a logic that can function independently 
of actors. While NGOs strive to impose specific representations of women and victimhood, 
these representations cannot be divorced from the cohort of institutional practices that 
represent women for the purposes of risk prevention. Women can never remain victims, 
pure presence but need to be known for the purposes of governmentality. If governing a 
social problem requires knowledge of the phenomenon and of those involved, descriptions 
of trafficked women mobilise clinical and psychological knowledge for the purpose of 
prevention. Women's biographies always already show them as pre-disposed to trauma 
and victimisation, always already victims of a violent past (family abuse, domestic and 
institutional violence, alcoholism, lack of education, etc. ). Yet, a traumatic and violent past 
also bears the stigma of potential violence in the future. The clinical and psychological 
knowledge will buttress the hypothesis of such re-offending behaviour, namely of women 
undertaking migratory projects. Trafficked women appear as risky beings, whose 
behaviour needs to be controlled and directed away from the future of illegal migration or 
re-trafficking. Prevention is therefore not only targeted at potential risk groups in countries 
of origin, but particularly at the group of victims who could be re-trafficked. 
The question of unmaking security practices has been rephrased as a question of 
the form of subjectivity that can support such practices of resistance. My analysis has 
shown that governmental practices foster and depend upon a certain representation of the 
subject, on forms of subjectivity that are consonant with the technologies deployed. The 
possibility of unmaking security practices has related the subject's resistance to the direct 
and immediate practices which attempt to define her and direct her actions. Yet, the 
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refusals and resistance of victims of trafficking appear only as medicalised, pathological 
reactions, as traumatic irrational actions. The psychological knowledge that informs the 
knowledge of risk depoliticises women's resistance through the constitution of abjection. 
When academic knowledge attempts to contest the representation of women as victims, 
they reassert the representation of trafficking as a form of illegal migration. Moreover, 
such alternative approaches or discourses cannot obliterate the stories of victimhood that 
are there, side by side to stories of migration. 
Resisting subjects are simultaneously at a distance from institutional actors and 
institutionally mediated through the constitution of subjectivity in governmental practices. I 
have shown that particular subjectivities can become reappropriated in the division of 
subjects that governmentality employs. The particularity of subjectivity and the refusal of 
dominant forms of subjectivity do not manage to disrupt the legitimate practices of 
security. As 2-12ek has indicated in his criticism of Butler, a politics of rupture cannot be 
thought from the standpoint of particular subjectivities. The complexity of subject positions 
only makes them disputable in a context of 'indiscernibility of knowledge'. The next 
chapter will discuss what a politics of rupture means for unmaking security and who the 
subject that supports this politics can be. 
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V. Politicising the excess: emancipation as universality 
and equality 
Introduction 
A genuine political thinking will attempt to find a possibility which is not 
homogeneous with the state of things. A political thinking will say: here is 
a collective possibility; perhaps it is small and local, but its rule is not that 
of the dominant rule. And a political thinking will formulate this possibility, 
practise it, and draw all of its consequences... (Badiou 2004a: 82-83). 
Badiou's formulation of political thinking speaks to the concerns that have emerged from 
the previous chapter. Attempts to unmake security practices appeared to be caught in a 
dynamics of practices and representations that would redeploy and reappropriate 
alternative discourses, ethical considerations and subjective resistance. The humanitarian 
approach insidiously transforms into the governmentality of risk and brings trafficked 
women to their initial status of 'dangerous others' through a construction of psychological 
risk which they literally embody. If pity is redeployed for the purposes of governmentality, 
ethical principles can become part of the management of social problems. Rather than 
related to actors and institutional positions, this reconfiguration of pity can be understood 
from within the logic of practices that redefine the subjects to be governed. 
The previous chapter has shown that making apparent the professionals' 'regime 
of truth' and documenting the subject's resistance does not challenge security practices. 
As traurnatised subjects, trafficked women can refuse practices of rehabilitation, practices 
that discipline and order their behaviour. These refusals are seen as simply symptomatic 
of a disorder to be 'treated' just like the trauma of trafficking. I have suggested that the 
institutional mediation of subjectivity is constitutive of the dilemma of resistance that does 
not disrupt, but functions as a failure that will only spur more governmental technologies to 
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deal with it. Particular forms of subjectivity can always be integrated within forms of 
governmentality. 
I have also suggested that the infiniteness of ethics is always translated for the 
purposes of governmentality and the unlimited is brought under the sway of what is. An 
analysis of practices is caught in the net of what is, of power relations that reappropriated 
forms of resistance and redeployed alternative discourses and strategies. A reformulation 
of relationality, of the constitution of abjects through practices of security depends on 
principles which are heterogeneous to what is. How are we to think these principles and 
political practices that challenge what is, the art of government and its technologies of 
abjectification, while not proposing a limit that always remains untranslatable and 
impracticable? 
The insight that the ethical approaches have (especially those of Derridean 
inspiration) is that of an excess that can challenge existing structures. Foucault's passing 
indication of the need for universal principles to inform critique resonates with the insights 
of the critical approaches. What needs to be reformulated is the conceptualisation of 
excess at a 'distance' from politics. This point is instrumental for the uneasiness that 
Foucauldians have about resistance. All transformation, all resistance risks immediately 
being re-embedded in the symbolic system, it can be re-appropriated in the relations of 
power. Such an impossibility of transformation is due - in Joan Copjec's superb 
argumentation - to an understanding of the system as positivity. Foucault's work does not 
allow any place for negation. What Foucault shows is always the visible, that which has 
always been there but was made invisible by a particular regime of power/knowledge. By 
endorsing a battle-model of power and discarding the earlier model of language, Copjec 
argues, Foucault reduces the social to existing relations. While language speaks in 
positive statements, it also indicates their insufficiency, their impossibility to wholly render 
meaning or'truth'. Something escapes language, something that cannot be captured in its 
positive statements. For Copjec, this negation is the very generative principle of society 
that cannot be expressed in language. The mode of a societys institution is unspeakable 
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(Copjec 1995: 10), which can be doubly interpreted as the impossibility to render visible 
the generative principle of a society and as its negation of the society's functioning. 
In Copjec's view, 'some notion of transcendence is plainly needed if one is to avoid 
the reduction of social space to the relations that fill it' (Copjec 1995: 7). Even if one 
exposes the functioning of the system, its practices and technologies, this does not 
necessarily entail any change. This notion of 'transcendence' is translated in different 
theories as universality, excess, the unconscious or the Real. Against Foucault's famous 
statement that critique is 'not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a 
matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of unfamiliar, 
unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the practices that we accept rest' (Foucault 
1998: 154), one should pit blek's bleak warning of such a move: 'ideology can lay its 
cards on the table, reveal the secret of its functioning, and still continue to function'(2i2ek 
1998b: 200). As long as one is limited by what is, by the positivity of the system of power, 
any resistance and transformative political project can be 'hijacked' and integrated in the 
system The generative principle of a system can no longer be integrated into it, it is rather 
its negation. Foucault's resistance that is immanent to power relations understood 
exclusively in their positivity needs to be displaced towards an understanding of negativity 
that cannot be incorporated by the system. 
Having given up the model of language in his later work, Foucault is not able to 
account for the non-articulable, for that which eludes expression. Whatever is not visible is 
so because rendered invisible by power. As the invisible exists only in relation to power, 
when made visible, it can be reintegrated within power relations. The migratory projects of 
women who become victims of trafficking and their desire to find work are rendered 
invisible in the encounter with institutional power. Different elements and stories are made 
visible, stories of abuse, coercion or betrayed trust. Yet, the retrieval of the migration 
element and of agency, either through interviews or from archival sources, does not 
challenge the constitution of human trafficking as a criminal law issue or as a migration 
issue. Trafficked women are either victims or they are illegal migrants; different 
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inscriptions would activate different interventions. We have seen that these interventions 
can be understood as security practices, as risk management of disorderly conducts. 
Foucault's strategy of making heard silenced voiced and stories rendered invisible, 
a strategy shared by feminist and poststructuralist approaches, does not challenge the 
functioning of the system. Making explicit more and positions and conflicts within the 
structure of power/knowledge does not say anything about what constitutes the generative 
limit of the system, the excess that it cannot incorporate and that could disrupt it. A radical 
disruption to the system is the very limit of the system, its excess. For psychoanalytical 
theory, the limit is the generative principle of a system, the Real that cannot be 
incorporated in the symbolic. Deconstruction implies an idea of excess in thinking the 
ethico-political moment. Yet, it seems to me unclear how these theories translate the 
relation between the excess and the system of power relations through processes of 
subjectivation. Although psychoanalysis is analogical in its analysis of societal processes 
and the formation of subjects, the two remain loosely linked. 
This chapter will reformulate the concept of excess by drawing on Badiou's 
conceptualisation of politics as emancipation. It is a theorisation of the excess - it will be 
argued - that can help us understand what is at stake in a disruption which would be 
heterogeneous to the dominant state of things. To understand what could disrupt a 
situation defined by power relations and practices of governing (in)security, we need to 
see what is excessive to the situation, what transcends it. I shall argue that Badiou's 
theorisation of excess allows us to understand how political action surpasses the 
conditions of possibility of a system, while being linked with processes of becoming 
subject beyond the forms of subjection inscribed in the system. Next, I shall explore the 
implications of his theory for thinking what emancipation from practices of security can 
mean for trafficking. 
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Political events, political subjects: excesses of a situation 
Badiou's concept of politics takes us beyond the structuralist and poststructuralist 
analyses of power relations. Politics - understood as a disruption of the dominant 
situation, its representations and modes of interventions - is not of the domain of the 
possible, it Is not linked with the failures of different strategies and the complexity of power 
relations that cannot entirely constitute subjects. Interpreters of Foucault have associated 
the possibility of resistance with the complexity of power relations and the dissonances 
these entail in the constitution of subjectivity. As the subject is always constituted in 
complex and sometimes contradictory power relations, the subject experiences a tension 
and resists (Ransom 1997). Badiou's politics is not a politics of the possible, but of the 
impossible, of the excess that does not and cannot be part of existing power relations. 
Politics, in 2-ilek's words, is about enacting the impossible, namely what appears as 
impossible within the coordinates of the existing socio-symbolic order (2i2ek and Daly 
2004: 80). 
The excess is not exclusively linked with Badiou's philosophy, but also spans 
Derrida's deconstructivist philosophy and the psychoanalytical theory indebted to Lacan. It 
can even be considered the main hypothesis of poststructuralist Marxism: every event that 
breaks the reproducibility of social structures already presupposes a certain ontological 
fissure, an inherent lack/excess that prevents the closure (Palti 2003: 464). Despite 
Copjec's astute exposure of the flaws of a sociological analysis of practices for a radical 
politics, I shall not follow the psychoanalytical trend that infuses her work or that of Zi2ek. 
Although both Copjec's and 2-ilek's conceptualisations of politics resonate to a certain 
extent with Badiou's, one can think their differences in similar terms to those between 
Foucault and Butler. Foucault locates resistance within the conditions of possibility of the 
system, while Butler supplements this by an emphasis on the subjective psychoanalytical 
processes that make resistance possible. Badiou himself has argued that psychoanalysis 
tries to reduce symptoms and works towards accommodating the subject to the structure 
(2004a: 84). 
155 
However, politics searches for the most radical consequences of the symptoms 
and therefore works against the structure (Badiou 2004a: 84). While psychoanalysis could 
illuminate the functioning of security practices in relation to the imaginary of security that 
sustains them and its role in the constitution of the subject, the overlapping of certain 
psychoanalytical terms and concepts with the clinical governmental representations of 
trafficked women has made me wary of a concept of politics that makes use of 'trauma' or 
of an unbearable encounter with the Real. Derrida's excess is the aporia constitutive of 
any system; the aporia is not solvable, it can only show the impossibility of closure of a 
system (Derrida 1993). This impossibility remains non-negotiable and as we have seen 
with ethical principles, it is the reminder of the aporetic closure of the system. The ethics 
of infinite responsibility was excessive to any instantiation of responsibility; yet, it 
remained trapped in this impossibility, unable to negotiate its own relation to that of an 
existing order. 
Badiou thinks the excess of instituted orders, of socio-historical situations as that 
which is absent and not representable in the system. This excess is a space inhabited by 
subjects, subjects who become political in their connection to an event. Unlike 
deconstruction, Marxism attempts to understand not just the constitutive void of an ordeer, 
but the process of coming into being of that 'ontological fissure', the mode of production of 
an event (Palti 2003: 464). 45 For Badiou, the excess is the non-representable in a socio- 
historical situation. I have shown that governmental interventions depend on the 
exhaustive representation of the phenomenon of trafficking and the subjects to be 
governed. Governing human trafficking requires an understanding of what trafficking is 
(hence its constitution as a specific field) and a description of subjects. Against 
governmentality, politics refers to that which cannot be represented, but can only present 
its own existence (Badiou 1985). Badiou has argued that situations can never be closed, 
situations as generic sets are by definition infinite; the state of the situation can never 
45 The logic of deconstruction would need to work with the excess of meaning, the absence, which 
is still necessary for the constitution of meaning. Thus, 'infinite' concepts can be productive if one 
engages with the aporia, with their disruptive potential rather than with their infinity always at a 
distance from politics. 
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exhaustively represent the elements of the situation . 
46 The event will challenge this very 
attempt at closure (in Foucault's terms - although Badiou would find this reference 
illegitimate - at governing). 
The excess separates the thinking of politics from an analysis of reality as what is, 
as power relations that shape social order. Therefore, for Badiou, politics cannot be 
considered as 'the exercise of power', as with Foucault (Badiou 1985: 54). Given the 
immanence of resistance to power in Foucault, politics could be understood as both 
'governmental' and 'anti-governmental', concerned with emancipation from particular 
systems of power, or from the effects of the employment of particular techniques of power 
(Hindess 1998: 54). We have seen, however, that 'anti-governmental' politics, the forms of 
resistance are not heterogeneous to the situation, but are redeployed within the logic of 
governmentality. What Foucault lacks is a theorisation of resistance that is not of the order 
of what is, of the state of things. 
Badiou's politics is different from the Foucault-inspired politics that sheds light on 
practices of power, analyses configurations of security and risk and makes explicit the 
existence of gaps or contradictions where the resistance of the subject can gain ground. 
True political sequences are 'excepted'from the social (Hallward 2003: 26). Politics is not 
a question of what is, but of what can be brought to bear upon what is, to disrupt it. His 
politics breaks with the idea of showing the structure of things, politics is that which 
happens, which interrupts the structure and its logic. Politics cannot be derived from the 
order of necessity; it is of the order of what happens. Politics is about searching within a 
situation for 'a possibility that the dominant state of things does not allow to be seen' 
(Badiou 2004a: 82lemphasis in original). 
While it is important to be aware of the technologies of power and, specifically in 
the case of human trafficking, of the practices of risk management which make women 
46 Given that he understands situations as indifferent multiplicities, Badiou relies on mathematics 
for the understanding of ontology. Mathematics appears as a modality of thinking multiplicity 
without any predicates. The mathematical side of Badiou's philosophy is less important for my 
purposes, as I rely on his understanding of situations. I accept the basic premise that situations 
cannot be closed, although the state of the situation attempts to close the multiplicity of 
presentation. 
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specific categories of risky victims, such a politics remains of the order of what is. It 
locates existing technologies and practices, but is unable to gauge the transformative 
potential of any practices. If women refuse to be victims, then they are either illegal 
migrants to be expediently deported or traumatised victims who have not come to terms 
with the violence inflicted upon them. What would disrupt these forms of representation 
and the interventions they buttress, what would unmake the depoliticisation of victims of 
trafficking and their subjection to practices of security? 
Such a politics does away with governmental representations and is harnessed to 
the excess of a socio-historical situation. 2-i2ek has succinctly and explicitly formulated the 
meaning of excess in Badiou's philosophy: 
The 'Excess'... takes two forms. On the one hand, each state of things 
involves at least one excessive element which, though clearly belonging 
to the situation, is not 'counted' by it, properly included in it (e. g., the 
'nonintegrated' rabble in a societal situation): this element is presented, 
but not re-presented. On the other hand, there is an excess of re- 
presentation over presentation: the agency which brings about the 
passage from situation to its state (State in society) is always in excess 
relative to what it structures ... [State power] never simply and 
transparently re-presents society, but acts as a violent intervention in 
what it re-presents (? -ilek 1998a). 
The specificity of Badiou's position consists in this doubling of excess, as both the 
element excessive to the situation and the event that ruptures it. Nevertheless, 2-ilek is 
wrong to equate Badiou's 'state of the situation' with the State. Badiou plays on the 
difference between Wat' (state) and 'ttat' (State, although English does not capitalise the 
noun) and makes the State equivalent to the state of the situation, to the ordering of 
people and things in a situation. 
158 
Politics is linked with the localisation of excessive subjects, subjects in the margin 
of a situation and of forms of action that would disrupt the excesses of the state. 
Excessive subjects are terms that cannot be organised as part of a situation (Hallward 
2003: 100), while politics as defined as evental excess. Before Badiou, Deleuze had also 
understood that there is another challenge to power relations that is not framed as 
subjective resistance. Deleuze is worth quoting at length here as he clarifies the difference 
between subjectification (in my terminology) 47 and events: 
It definitely makes sense to look at the various ways individuals and 
groups constitute themselves as subjects through processes of 
subjectivation: what counts in such processes is the extent to which, as 
they take shape, they elude both established forms of knowledge and the 
dominant forms of power. Even if they in turn engender new forms of 
power or become assimilated into new forms of knowledge... One might 
equally well speak of new kinds of event, rather than processes of 
subjectivation: events that can't be explained by the situations that give 
rise to them, or into which they lead (Deleuze 1995: 176). 
Unlike Deleuze, Badiou connects processes of subjectification and events. Subjectification 
is not simply resistance to relations of power, but the creation of a collective political 
subject that suspends classifications and representations. A political subject emerges 
through 'fidelity' to a political event. This subject is not a-relational, but comes into being 
from a specific relationality to what Badiou has called the socio-historical situation. Badiou 
does not want to replicate an analysis of power/knowledge, as politics is subtraction from 
history, i. e. from any particular regimes of power/knowledge, a particular status quo or a 
situation (Badiou 1992: 36). A situation is composed of the knowledge that circulates in it 
47 1 use the distinction subjectivation/subjection and subjectification to refer to the process of 
becoming subjected to power and of becoming a subject by resisting power respectively. Although 
the two are closely intertwined in Foucault, this distinction is at the heart of the concept of politics 
proposed here. 
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and assigns a place to different sub-sets/categories. 'The state of the situation is the 
operation which, within the situation, codifies its parts as sub-sets'(Badiou 2004b: 154). 
The 'state of the situation' can be conceptualised as similar to Foucault's notion of 
power/knowledge or governmental practices. Although Hallward has criticised Badiou for 
lacking a concept of hegemony A la Gramscl or of power 6 la Foucault, I read Badiou's 
definition of the 'state of the situation' in Foucauldian terms. After all, Badiou makes clear 
that the situation is structured by virtue of knowledge (savoir) and it is impossible to de- 
link savoir from the Foucauldian power/knowledge. The role of representation and of the 
state - which is the power of representation - is to turn inconsistency and disorder into 
consistency. The role of the state is therefore one of ordering, expelling excess, making 
secure. In this sense the state is always characterised by an excess of power, an excess 
that can be made visible in a political event. 
If the situation can be read as Foucauldian, the event goes beyond 
power/knowledge. 'Events are irreducible singularities, the "beyond-the-law" of situations' 
(Badiou 2002a: 44). Both excessive subjects and events are non-representable in the 
order or structure of the situation. Contrary to Foucault, subjectivation (becoming 
subjected to power relations and a constituted subject) is not immanent to subjectification 
(becoming a subject by resisting such power relations and refusing the given constitution) 
as resistance was immanent to power. Subjectification occurs through the mediation of a 
political event and fidelity to it. Moreover, Badiou's collective subjectification involves 
excessive subjects that are not represented In a situation, subjects whose existence can 
only appear as non-existence, as negation in a situation. Badiou makes a distinction 
between presentation (being in a situation) and representation (the process of counting 
the elements of a situation). Representation means the imposition of consistency upon the 
inconsistency (disorder) of presentation. Every situation is doubly structured: there is 
presentation and representation (Badiou 1988: 110). The glossary to Lttre et 
11&6nement defines the excess as the difference without measure or the power difference 
between the state of the situation and the situation, or between representation and 
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presentation. Governing a socio-historical situation is a form of representation that 
reduces the disorder and multiplicity of presentation. 
The theory of the event is an attempt to think the new in a situation. Yet, as Badiou 
has remarked in a recent interview, 'to think the new in situation, we also have to think the 
situation, and thus we have to think what is repetition, what is the old, what is not new, 
and after that we have to think the new' (Badiou and Bosteels 2005: 253). The event or 
the new requires an understanding of the situation, as structured by relations of 
power/knowledge. What is important is not to fold the event upon the relations of 
power/knowledge and their inherent contradictions or tensions. If power relations produce 
incoherences and inadequacies that can rupture the subject from her subjection, this 
would mean equating the event to the structure and bringing forms of collective 
subjectification back within the gaps of the situation. 
Through the event, political subjectification transcends the logic of the situation 
and suspends its forms of representation and subjection. Hence, subjectification is not a 
question of inventing other forms of subjectivity, as these would be trapped within the 
particularity of a situation. Creating different forms of identification for trafficked women 
does not destabilise existing narratives about who trafficked women and illegal migrants 
as 'rational entrepreneurs' are. As the previous chapter has argued, women remain risky 
beings, embodying the danger of 'rational' projects of illegal migration. The particularity of 
identification brings it under the sway of governmental techniques, makes it representable 
and countable in the state of the situation. 
Excessive subjects cannot be integrated within the representation of the state of 
the situation as they become political through an event that extricates them from particular 
governmental forms of representation. A political event occurs at the site that is 
symptomatic of the situation as a whole; it consists in a 'torsion of the divided situation 
back upon itself, starting from the site of the event and moving in the direction of a generic 
extension of its truth as applicable to all' (Bosteels 2004: 160/emphasis in original). An 
event is attached to the 616ment surnum6raire of a situation or, in 2i2ek's terms, to the 
symptomatic element that has no proper place in the situation, although it belongs to it 
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(2ilek 1999: 140). The proletariat in Badiou's much-favoured example functions as this 
excessive element of the capitalist system. 'To think a situation [penser une situation] is 
always to go toward that which, in it is the least covered or protected by the shelter the 
general regime of things offers if (Badiou 2000: 85). 
A political situation of migration for example needs to be thought of from the point 
of view of the sans-papiers, the Israeli-Palestinian situation from that of the vulnerable 
Palestinians. In a situation, the element which is least sheltered is 'like a point of exile 
where it is possible that something, finally, might happen' (Badiou 2000: 85/emphasis in 
original). Despite the strict theoretical analysis of the excess, Badiou's political analyses 
often go back to a rather habitual understanding of vulnerability. While workers were 
represented in the historical situation of industrial capitalism, the proletariat did not exist 
as a collective subject and could only become so through its identification as the point of 
exclusion of the capitalism system. Excessive subjects cannot be defined in the terms 
given by the state of the situation. The situation of trafficking can be disrupted through the 
emergence of a subject that is the negation of the situation and that can therefore 
reconfigure the whole situation. A politics of emancipation does not start with victims of 
trafficking, but with subjects that would be excessive to this situation. The next section will 
attempt to locate this excessive subject from whose standpoint the situation can be re- 
wrung. 
The logic of anomalous evental subjects has been cogently articulated by 212ek: 
'[w]here the logic of excluding a particular group is shown to be part of a wider problem, 
then you get a kind of distilled version of what is wrong with society as such' (2-i2ek and 
Daly 2004: 142). If not formulated from the position of the excessive element, but from 
that of a closed totality, the event becomes a simulacrum, reactionary and not progressive 
(Badiou 2002a). Thus, no change of the situation of migrants from the bias of a societal 
plenitude (e. g. what would be better for British people) can qualify as an event. Nazism 
was also the prototype of the simulacrum as it was an event that formulated fidelity to a 
social plenitude (the German people). 
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The event qualifies as an immanent break* it proceeds in the situation and it 
surpasses the situation (Badiou 2002a: 42/emphasis in original). As the event is a 
disruption, a challenge to the structuring of the situation, it also supersedes the situation 
and cannot be explainable in the terms of the situation. This disruption is not any formal 
rupture, its content is what distinguishes an event from its simulacrum. A political event is 
not only formulated from the position of excessive subjects, but it makes universalisable 
claims and it enacts equality. It is through its principles that political events appear as 
heterogeneous to practices of security. 
As I have shown with CSS, security functions as 'barred universality, practices of 
security suspend the imaginary of everybody being an equal partaker of security. 
Challenging practices of security requires a double instantiation of universality. The event 
addresses everybody equally and is itself a verification of equality as the universal 
principle of politics. One need no longer wonder about the interest of politicians or other 
organisations in formulating different discourses - excessive subjects are the 'beyond' of 
the situation, they are not defined by interests given in the configuration of power 
relations. Unlike governmental analyses, an event is not caught within existing 
representations and their mobilisation by power. The enactment of equality requires 
subjects to dispense with the naming that is ascribed by the situation and changes the 
names of the elements in a situation. If ethical principles were radically different from the 
situation, the principles of an event are radically connected with the situation. 
The situation of migration/trafficking and excessive women 
The first chapter has shown that the literature on trafficking tries to subsume the definition 
of trafficking either under the definitions of migration, prostitution, organised crime or 
human rights. By ignoring the security framework, I argued, humanitarian approaches 
could not transform the structure within which trafficking is defined and managed. In 
Chapter 41 have also shown that the imbdcation of pity and risk technologies transforms 
trafficked women into 'risky beings', equally subject to pity and compassion, as well as 
technologies of containment and disciplining. The question became one of transforming 
163 
practices of security, given that security structures the situation of trafficking. I have 
considered in turn desecuritisation, emancipation, ethics, critique and resistance and 
analysed their impasses. Now I shall try to make sense of what Badiou's radical politics of 
rupture within a socio-historical situation means for trafficking in women. I shall consider 
the phenomenon of trafficking as a socio-historical situation, with the purpose of locating 
the excessive subjects starting from which an event can lead to the re-structuring of the 
situation and its constitutive practices of security. 
As we have seen, every situation is doubly structured as presentation and 
representation. In Badiou's terms, the situation of trafficking is represented by a specific 
counting of trafficked women: those who are worthy of pity and those who are not, those 
who are useful for legal enforcement procedures against traffickers and those who are 
not. Those who have experienced horrific physical suffering at the hands of their 
traffickers are to be deemed worthy of pity. The counting of a situation leads to extremely 
inegalitarian positions. For example, the POPPY Project in the UK, set up to provide help 
for all victims of trafficking, is available to women who were brought to the UK and forced 
to work In prostitution and who have come forward, willing to co-operate with the 
authorities (Home Office 2004: 81 ). 48 Most NGO projects in Europe also work with the 
distinction between victims of trafficking and migrants. In its manual on developing 
National Referral Mechanisms (cooperative arrangements at the national level for 
promoting the human rights of trafficked persons), the OSCE places the process of 
'locating and identifying likely victims of trafficking' at the core of anti-trafficking strategies 
(OSCE 2004: 16). 
Victim identification appears as a fundamental problem, due to (or rather despite) 
the recognition that 'those caught up in human trafficking often do not want to reveal their 
status and experiences to the authorities (OSCE 2004: 17). Those who do not identify 
themselves as victims or cannot be identified as such by organisations mandated to 
48 The rationale for such discrimination is again one of risk management and containment. The 
Consultation Paper goes on to state that '[i]t Is hoped that co-operation with the authorities will 
allow Information to be gathered on the traffickers and so lead to the disruption of trafficking 
networks'(Home Office 2004: 81). 
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engage in the anti-trafficking struggle do not exist in the situation. Similarly, the EU 
proposal for a short term residence permit also discriminates among categories of 'worthy' 
and 'unworthy' trafficked women (European Commission 2002a). Those who are willing to 
cooperate with the authorities will receive a temporary residence permit. The granting of 
permits depends both on the decision of the authorities whether the presence of the victim 
is useful for the investigation and prosecution of suspects and on their judgement that 
victims have genuinely severed all links with the traffickers and are really prepared to 
cooperate. Those who are not useful or are not judged as 'real' victims are unworthy of 
residence permits. They disappear therefore from the situation as normal elements. 
Thinking the situation of trafficking along the lines of an evental politics starts from 
the excessive or anomalous elements of a situation. Locating these elements is by no 
means equivalent to a contest between victims. What matters here is to locate the 
element that subverts the very logic of security. What is excessive in the situation of 
trafficking? Who are the women that continually fall out of the representational practices 
undertaken by different authorities? I contend that these excessive elements are the 
illegal migrant prostitutes. All other representations of trafficked women are exclusive of 
this element who-should-not-be-there. Trafficked women are victims worthy of pity, victims 
to be rehabilitated and reintegrated in society, victims traumatised by their experiences of 
violence. The illegal migrant prostitute does not deny the multiplicity of representations of 
trafficked women, but it constitutes the very limit of these representations. Illegal migrant 
prostitutes are not supposed to be there, they are illegitimate entrants in the situation of 
trafficking, excessive migrants who pursue economic interests. At the same time, they are 
the spectre of the very representation of victims of trafficking from which the latter must be 
repeatedly dis-identified. 
Excessive subjects enter into a different relation with other elements of the 
situation than Butler's subjects/abjects. In Chapter 2, the space of abjection was defined 
as the negation of the space of the subject. The constitution of a space of abjection 
excludes the institutional mediation of this constitution except as an abstract intervention. 
Yet, we have seen that security practices involve 'actors' - who are constituted 
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themselves in relations of power - as well as the creation of subjects to be made secure 
and abjects. Contrary to Butler's dichotomy of subject/abject, Badiou's situation can 
integrate all these elements and define their inter-relations. According to him, there are 
three modes of appearance in a situation: normality, excrescence (excroissance), and 
singularity (or excess) (Badiou 1988: 125). A normal element is both presented and 
represented in the situation. In the situation of trafficking, there is a double construction of 
normal subjects. On the one hand, there are the legally resident sex workers, the ones 
who are both presented and represented as endowed with agency. Every element of the 
category of legally resident sex workers belongs to the situation by virtue of their quality of 
citizenship. On the other, there are the victims of trafficking, those who are presented and 
represented as coerced and abused. The normal subjects of a situation do not refer to the 
governmental meaning of 'normalisation', but to what is taken to be the 'norm' of existence 
in a situation. Excrescence is represented but not presented in a situation. For example, 
the state and its institutions are represented but not present as such in the situation of 
trafficking. The police, immigration officials or even NGOs do not appear as elements of 
the situation of trafficking in the same way that traffickers or migrants do. Singularity is a 
term that is presented in the situation but not represented in it. Such an element only 
exists in the situation as a fundamental anomaly (Hallward 2003: 99), as an excessive 
subject. By not being represented, these subjects are excessive to the ordering power of 
the state of the situation. 
Badiou's theory of the situation can be used as a cartography of the situation of 
trafficking. The relation between subject and abject is no longer at the heart of concerns 
with transforming practices of security. The situation appears now as tripartite, with 
multiple relations established between the normal and the excrescent elements, the 
normal and the singular and the excrescent and the singular. This analysis of the situation 
goes beyond the dualistic forms of relationality that security studies have dealt with. The 
self/other or subjectlabject relation was mediated through institutions, through the 
excrescent elements. Badiou's cartography provides us with tools to understand the 
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differentiated relations between normal elements and institutions, between institutions and 
the anomalous elements and finally between normal elements and the anomalous. 
Illegal migrants working as prostitutes are this element which is present in the 
situation but does not belong to it, is not represented as properly belonging to it. Or rather 
it only belongs to the situation by negation. Illegal prostitutes are those who should not be 
prostitutes and also those who should not be there. Illegal prostitutes cannot belong either 
to the category of sex workers or to the category of (regular or legal) migrants. They are 
an impossible category in the situation of trafficking: illegal migrants cannot be prostitutes, 
they are suspected victims of trafficking and vice versa, illegal prostitutes cannot be 
migrants as they have been abused and coerced into it. The category of illegal migrant 
sex workers is consistently dismantled within representations of trafficking. Trafficked 
women are represented as either unwilling, forced prostitutes or as unwilling, forced 
migrants. They are thus integrated as a specific subcategory of prostitutes and migrants. 
In a different situation, that of society and its moral boundaries, the prostitute 
herself might be 'excessive'. As Jo Bindman has formulated it, '[s]ex workers, usually 
referred to as prostitutes, have occupied an anomalous position in societies throughout 
history... Outcast status denies them whatever international, national or customary 
protection from abuse is available to others as citizens, women, or workers' (Bindman 
1997). Her statement is sweeping in its generalisation as prostitutes, by virtue of their 
citizenship, are represented in the trafficking situation. Prostitution has a more uneasy 
relationship with workers' and women's rights. The prostitute is the other within the 
categorical other, 'woman' (Bell 1994: 2). She is also the other of the 'worker', the one 
who is not willing to undertake proper work. 
The excessive subject of the situation of trafficking is the illegal sex worker. Even if 
she can be counted in the situation as an innocent or coerced victim, forced prostitute or 
unknowing migrant, this count cannot make sense of women who engage in illegal 
processes of migration for the purpose of work. Trafficked women overwhelmingly report 
an intention to migrate to find work (Corso and Trifiro 2003). The category from which 
trafficked women are extracted is that of illegal sex workers. Yet, their constitution makes 
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the category of illegal sex workers impossible. The work of trafficked women is not work, 
they are not willing migrants, they have been coerced, forced, abducted or simply misled; 
in short, migration for work no longer counts. This is what is negated by the trafficking 
situation, although it is upon this very element that the construction of trafficking is built. 
Women who migrate for work are the symptomal element of the situation inasmuch as 
they are 'absence embodied' (Hallward 2003: 90). Victims of trafficking emerge as a 
category only by the negation of the category of illegal migrant sex workers. 
If prostitutes were excessive both to the representation of the worker and the 
representation of women, illegal sex workers are also excessive to the representation of 
the nation and state sovereign practices. The Home Office White Paper on migration, 
'Secure Borders, Safe Haven' represents illegal sex workers as an excessive presence in 
a space that is forbidden to them (Home Office 2002). Berman has shown that the 
particular combination of the movement, 'race', and gender of migrant East European sex 
workers turns them into both an external and internal threat by 'disrupt[ing] the ability of 
the state to adjudicate membership in the political community' (Berman 2003: 59). 
In the situation of trafficking, the prostitute becomes normalised against the 
representation of illegal sex workers. The prostitute becomes the normal case of the 'free' 
woman choosing its occupation against the potentially 'forced' foreign and illegal 
prostitute. Extracting the category of trafficked women from that of illegal sex workers 
generallses suspicion to all foreign women who do sex work. The relation between the 
normal and the excessive elements is presented as one of antagonism. In an article on 
the legal debates in Sweden, Arthur Gould has quoted from a tabloid such an antagonistic 
representation of the situation of prostitution: 
Without exaggeration one can say that there is an invasion of foreign 
girls... They are exploited by pimps, mistreated by their clients and 
spread life-threatening diseases... Girls from the east have no tradition of 
using protection ... They are used to unprotected sex and bring this 
tradition further into Sweden (quoted in Gould 2002: 206). 
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Recently, The Economist has also presented similar arguments concerning the 'influx' of 
foreign prostitutes in the UK. The arrival of large numbers of foreign prostitutes is 
apparently causing complaints among London prostitutes (The Economist 2004: 30). The 
antagonistic presentation of the relation between legal prostitutes (citizens or legally 
resident) and illegal sex workers reiterates the discriminatory logic of the state. This 
discriminatory logic finds its echoes into the logic of the market. As there is competition 
between prostitutes for clients and prices are going down because of the 'cheaper and 
more varied offer' of foreign prostitutes, this statist distinction between legality and 
illegality is served to justify a 'monopoly' position of legal prostitutes. Any possible 
common fight between the legal and illegal prostitutes seems impossible in this situation. 
Politics itself - in Badiou's understanding - would become impossible given the 
antagonistic representation of the situation. 
Principles of the event: universality and equality 
Political events do not only start from the excessive element of a situation. According to 
Badiou, they are not simply formal, but are given content by two principles: universality 
and equality. Through the mediation of events, subjects achieve forms of political 
subjectification that are predicated on universality and equality. If excess subjects engage 
in the transformation of the situation from outside the governmental regime of 
representation, university and equality suspend the possibility of incorporating resistance 
into a particular regime of governmentality. 
Universality and equality as the principles of a political event reformulate the 
postructuralist politics of formal contestation and agonism. Formulated on the antagonistic 
model of legal versus illegal sex workers discussed above, resistance to an institutional 
order becomes itself a practice of security. An event is not everything that happens, not 
any form of resistance. As already argued, an event only emerges in connection to the 
excess of the situation and it is based on the principles of universality and equality. Badiou 
opposes all situations of domination by invoking a strictly egalitarian politics inscribed in 
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the event. Equality needs to infuse a strict politics of non-domination that addresses 
everybody in a situation. 
Universality is understood only from within the situation and refers to an event that 
addresses every person present in the situation. This address is not in terms of the 
particularities of those present, but entails a 'subtraction' from particularity. Badiou agrees 
that the universal cannot mean the sublation of all particularity and in this sense joins the 
poststructuralist critiques against the domination of universals which are actually exclusive 
of particularities. Yet, Badiou's argument goes further inasmuch as he criticises respect 
for particularities (Badiou 2004b). Respect for particularity still has to construct hierarchies 
of particularities, to delimit good and bad particularities. The respect for difference or 
particularity only applies to those differences that are consistent with a tolerant identity 
(Badiou 2002a: 24). The much-vaunted liberal concept of toleration is limited in its 
universal deployment by those who are not tolerant themselves. To translate it in security 
terms, anybody can claim security, except the dangerous. The claims for security are 
limited by the practices of securitisation and risk management. 
After the poststructuralist criticism of universality, Badiou's endorsement of the 
universal might strike us as old-fashioned, but it is a reaction to the problems that 
particularities have raised for poststructuralist political projects. After all, we have seen in 
Chapter 4 that particularities are always a matter of government. Subjects of government 
are always classified and represented in their particularity. Badiou therefore maintains that 
'every universal presents itself not as a regularization of the particular or of differences, 
but as a singularity that is subtracted from identitarian predicates; although obviously it 
proceeds via those predicates' (Badiou 2004b: 145). The universal of the event proceeds 
through a subtraction from sociological predicates towards and enactment of 'sameness'. 
Politics is always divorced from identitarian predicates, from particular identifications that 
integrate subjects in a governmental regime. 
'Identity politics', Hallward has noted, is a contradiction in terms (Hallward 2002). 
An event disrupts a certain situation by virtue of a principle that needs to hold to all 
members of a situation. Identitarian predicates cannot hold for the whole of community, 
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they cannot address everybody. Politics can therefore never be linked to a social or 
economic expressivity (La distance politique 1991), to interest or position within the social 
fabric. Moreover, identitarian predicates cannot break with the dominant forms of 
representation as these are caught within governmental representations and 
interventions. Identities are particular and unequal, while politics is defined by the 
principles of universality and equality. 
However, universality does not mean subordinating the particularity of political 
sequences to universal moral judgements (Hallward 2003: 258) anymore than it means 
the sublation of particularities. Any assertion of the type 'violence is always wrong' or 
'suffering is always bad'will blind us to the requirements of the political situation to which 
we should attend. The universal that Badiou has in mind can only emerge from the 
particularity of that situation; an event would only use the elements and tools internal to 
the situation and could not appeal to universal principles of morality/ethics. For him, there 
is no infinite responsibility to the other that applies independently of the particulars of a 
situation. Universality has to remain open, otherwise the event risks becoming a 
simulacrum. 'If the universal is for everyone'- Badiou implacably asserts -'this is in the 
precise sense that to be inscribed within it is not a matter of possessing any particular 
determination' (Badiou 2004b: 151). Political movements need to be indifferent to social, 
national, or sexual predicates, be 'indifferent to differences' (Badiou 2002a: 27). The 
indifference to differences consistently defines politics from the emergence of an event to 
the fidelity to its consequences. Events are subtracted from the regime of governmentality 
both formally through their linking to the excess and with respect to content through its 
principles. 
The other principle that gives content to politics is equality. Equality is Badiou's 
chosen 'word for politics' due to its abstraction; equality does not presuppose a closure, 
does not qualify the terms it refers to and does not prescribe a territory on which to be 
exercised (Badiou 1992: 242). One can think of governmental practices that structure and 
order the social as hierarchical relations and of the event as an egalitarian break. In a 
lecture on 'Philosophy and politics', Badiou has argued in favour of equality against other 
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possible words for politics, namely community and liberty (Badiou 1992). Rethinking 
'community as more open and less exclusive has been an important way of 
reconceptualising politics from liberal political theory to deconstruction and 
poststructuralism (Agamben 1993; Nancy 2001). Badiou has argued that the word is 
incapable of sustaining a politics of emancipation, even if it implies an impossible closure. 
'in whichever form', he stresses, 'the word community still contains the supposition of a 
real being of justice in the form of a collective which is its own truth' (Badiou 1992: 222). 
Community would therefore still contain the promise of a future embodiment of real 
politics. Embodied politics is not politics, as politics is of the order of what happens, of the 
event. 
Similarly, Badiou is wary of freedom as a concept that has been captured by 
liberalism, by the ideology of commercial and parliamentary freedoMS. 49 Freedom can 
only become of use for politics if it is reconstructed from a different angle, if it is 
subordinated to another word (Badiou 1992: 247). He does not attempt, however, to 
engage with the possibilities of thinking to what words liberty could be subordinated and 
directly moves on to favour equality. Equality is the word for politics inasmuch as it does 
not suppose an achieved totality (totalN advenue) (Badiou 1992: 246). Given the 
importance that freedom holds in the context of security practices as well as the 
ontological principle of the modern subject, the next chapter will engage with the relation 
of liberty, equality and security. In this chapter, I shall explore equality as the content-filling 
principle of politics. 
Equality is de-linked from the social, from the idea of redistribution, solidarity or the 
state's solicitude towards difference, as any programmatic use would entail a closure of 
equality upon identity or community. Equality must not be equated with equality of status, 
of wages, of functions or even less with the supposedly egalitarian dynamics of contracts 
and reforms (Badiou 2004a: 71). It cannot be objective and it has nothing to do with the 
social. Any definitional and programmatic approach to equality transforms it into a 
49 Chapter 7 will explore In more detail Badiou's discontent with 'liberty' as a word for politics and 
the role that liberty can play against security, as security has been thought to enter a trade-off with 
liberty. 
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dimension of State action (Badiou 2004a: 73). It is, according to Badiou, a political maxim, 
a prescription, not 'what we want or what we project, but what we declare in the heat of 
the event, here and now, as what it is, and not what it should be (Badiou 2004a)50. It is a 
starting and not an ending point, the objective of political action. As equality cannot be 
closed and it is indifferent to all particularity and representation, it is universal. The 
poststructuralist criticism of universality has concerned its 'false' embodiment in a 
particularity that becomes the stand-in for universality. Through the predication of equality, 
universality cannot be closed, but remains open to the contestation of equality. The 
principle of equality sustains the non-identitarian politics of excess. Is there a politics 
informed by universality and equality possible in the situation of trafficking? I have shown 
that the situation has as its excessive subjects illegal migrant sex workers. The next 
section will explore how equality and universality have been formulated in this situation. 
The universality of work and its equal subjects 
Human trafficking has become visible as a form of illegal migration, transnational 
organised crime and prostitution, a threat to Western states and societies. At the same 
time, human trafficking has been gradually visibilised as a threat to the women who have 
fallen prey to networks of traffickers. This logic of double threat (to states and women) led 
to an impasse as those who were supposed to be saved (trafficked women) were actually 
the illegal migrants and potential criminals that states were supposed to neutralise. The 
'half-hearted' protection of women (Pearson 2002: 56) was the logical outcome of the 
impossibility of reconciling these security concerns. 
Rather than thinking human trafficking as a complex security issue, the challenge 
is to think it politically and especially to think an event that would disrupt the structure of 
the situation in which illegal migration and foreigners are constructed as a threat to 
Western states. Women's suffering, no matter how intense or life threatening, does not 
displace the logic of threat that governs illegal migration. Following Badiou, the situation of 
50 Translation mine. Feltham and Clemens translate it as'under fire of the event' (Badiou 2004a). 
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trafficking needs to be thought from the perspective of excessive subjects, of illegal 
migrant sex workers who are anomalous in the situation of trafficking. Although serving 
both as a pool for identifying victims of trafficking and as the spectre of the other from 
which victims must be dis-identified, illegal migrant prostitutes are not co-extensive to 
victims of trafficking. 
The shift from victims of trafficking as subjects of pity and suffering to illegal 
migrant sex workers moves us not only from the normal to the singular or excessive 
elements but makes possible an understanding of the radical transformation in the 
trafficking situation. Although they exist in the situation either as 'bogus' victims, the 
'happy hookers of Eastern Europe' (The Spectator 25 April 2003: 25), or as illegal 
migrants, foreign prostitutes are represented in their negativity, as the ones who should 
not be here or who have got here only by being coerced, forced or deceived. 51 It is only 
logical that they should be either voluntarily sent 'home' or deported. 
Although studies on trafficking have pointed out that anti-trafficking campaigns 
serve to reinforce stricter migration control and to make migrants even more vulnerable 
(Deimleiter 2001; Sharma 2003), their criticism has hardly had any impact on practices. 
Similarly, anti-trafficking campaigns have been shown to entail pernicious consequences 
for prostitutes (Doezema 2002). Criticism against anti-trafficking measures on grounds of 
the effects that these entail for specific categories has not challenged the governmentality 
of trafficking. Such criticism has disallowed any commonality between sex workers and 
victims of trafficking, creating another form of antagonism besides the antagonism of the 
market. In this account, the rights of sex workers are threatened by the anti-trafficking 
campaigns, while the rights of victims of trafficking are threatened by the very existence of 
prostitution. 
Moreover, the division between prostitutes and 'trafficked women' in terms of the 
effects that anti-trafficking measures have on prostitutes only serves to reinforce the state 
division between legal and illegal migrants/workers. The antagonism of the market and 
51 The European Council Framework Decision on combating trafficking in human beings defines 
trafficked women as Victims of coercion, force or threats, including abduction, deceit or fraud, 
abuse of authority or vulnerability (European Council 2002). 
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that of rights is embedded in a construction of migration as the more general context of 
human trafficking. As the European Commission's proposal for a Council Directive on 
short-term permit to stay for victims of trafficking has made clear, the same permit is to be 
granted to victims of action to facilitate illegal migration who cooperate with the authorities. 
According to the proposal, these two actions (trafficking and illegal migration) overlap in 
practice and measures for the prevention of trafficking have the aim to step up the fight 
against illegal migration (European Commission 2002a). As I have argued in the first 
chapter, trafficking is vectored by the construction of migration as a security issue. 
Unmaking the security vectoring of trafficking requires the simultaneous challenging of 
security vectoring of trafficking, migration, prostitution, organised crime, and human rights. 
These divisions and antagonistic relations between sex workers, migrants and 
victims of prostitutes can be surpassed exactly from the perspective of illegal migrant sex 
workers. In the UK, repeated raids have led to detention of all foreign sex workers under 
the suspicion of having been trafficked. On such an occasion, the Evening Standard 
reported that the women taken into custody were born abroad with most coming from 
Eastern European countries (CNN 2001). In February 2001, the English Collective of 
Prostitutes tried to stop deportations of women who said they were working independently 
and earning money to support themselves and their families (international Prostitutes 
Collective 2001). 
What has made possible this form of organisation is the egalitarian claim that all 
prostitutes (be they foreign or not, illegal or not) are workers. This claim is clearly opposed 
to facts and 'impossible' in the current situation. As any political event first disrupts that 
situation, the claim that all prostitutes are workers not only re-names all actors in the 
situation, but in doing so, it makes differences indifferent. The differences that count for 
the governing of human trafficking, those between foreigner and native, legality and 
illegality are done away with. The event also names a wrong that is being done to 
prostitutes by not considering them as workers and not acknowledging them worker rights 
as well as for trafficking as a form of exploitation. Foreign prostitutes as workers function 
as a 'symptomal torsion' of the situation inasmuch as they make visible both the 
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exploitation entailed by the recognition of only certain forms of work as legitimate and 
inegalitarian state practices towards foreigners. 
My argument that prostitution-as-work can function as a political event differs from 
the significant feminist literature which has debated the issue of whether prostitution 
is/should be work (O'Connell Davidson 1998; Pateman 1988). According to Maggie 
O'Neill, feminist analyses have pointed out the social inequalities to which prostitutes are 
prey and the reproduction of patriarchal hierarchies (1997). From this standpoint, 
prostitution could be revelatory of all social relations. In one approach, prostitution was 
thought to be a condition 'true' of all other women. The exploitation that took place in 
prostitution was just another form of the exploitation of women generally. 
Counting all women's work, including sex work, is a strategy for crossing 
the divide between sex workers and other women. It strengthens all 
women's case for compensation, in the form of increased benefits, 
wages, services and other resources, for the poverty and overwork which 
have been forced on most of us - the economic power to refuse all forms 
of prostitution (English Collective of Prostitutes 1997: 100). 
When considered from a sociological point of view, such a declaration entails the question 
whether all other work is similar to prostitution. Much of the feminist debates have focused 
on the difference between prostitution and other types of work, and the main stances on 
prostitution are derived from this initial argument. The abolitionist perspective sees 
'prostitution as slaver/ (Barry 1995) and degradation of women. The 'work argument' 
sees prostitution as simply another form of work. Such different approaches to prostitution 
have been supported by the specific experiences in prostitution; the prostitute body has 
been contestedly represented as a site of work, a site of abuse, power, sex, addiction, and 
even pleasure (Bell 1994: 99). 
Arguing in favour of prostitution as similar to other types of work or other types of 
work as similar to prostitution (on the side of the defenders of the sex industry) does not 
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lead politically anywhere, as the debate remains entangled in comparisons and analogies 
that only show differences and similarities. Prostitution is and is not like other types of 
work: endless sociological comparisons do not provide any answer to the situation in 
which trafficked women and prostitutes find themselves nowadays. What counts is not 
whether prostitution is or is not work, is or is not similar to other forms of work, but 
whether naming it publicly as 'work' has any political potential. Similarity or dissimilarity to 
other types of work, analysed with the tools of sociology, does not tell us anything about 
the political potential of prostitution-as-work. Hilary Kinnell from the UK Network for Sex 
Work Project (UKNSWP) refuses either the equation of all work with prostitution or the 
acknowledgement that prostitution is a job like any other. She also speaks about 'the total 
disregard of many anti-trafficking programmes for not only the choices and aspirations of 
the women and girls targeted, but also for the most basic economic and social realities of 
their lives' (Kinnell 2002). 
The European Parliament motion for a resolution on the consequences of sex 
work in the EU shows the impossibility of deciding what prostitution is based on 
knowledge. There have been no less than seven amendments proposed in the Committee 
for Women's Rights and Equal Opportunities, all of which are incompatible to one another 
(European Parliament 2004). One amendment claims that a clear distinction must be 
drawn between enforced prostitution, enforced migration and slavery, as the 
empowerment of individual women - with the aid of state bodies - even vis-A-vis the 
state, may lead to a self-determined life and career. Another amendment sees the sex 
industry as having an adverse impact on equality; because it is based on the pursuit of 
profit by focusing on buyers as a target group (generally men), it constructs an image of 
unequal relations between men and women (and increasingly frequently also children), in 
which women are presented as objects for consumption, domination and exploitation; 
because this industry normalises sexual violence, it undermines all the efforts which the 
EU and its Member States have made to give women and men fundamental human rights. 
The sex industry is deemed to promote and help to create and maintain men's aggression 
and women's commercialisation. Or, in another amendment still, the sex industry can be 
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defined as an undertaking which legally or illegally puts on the market sexual services 
and/or products for profit-making. 
We are here in a zone of the indiscernibility of knowledge where political action is 
needed. Hallward has persuasively formulated this task of political thinking and acting: 'If 
there Is a task specific to politics, it must be to articulate and impose collective principles 
that break with the infinite complexities, the interminable "negotiations" of culture and 
psychology' (Hallward 2001: xx). Prostitution-as-work breaks with the complexities of 
knowledge and with the differences that are always to be discovered in analogies between 
prostitution and other forms of work. Prostitution-as-work redefines the situation of 
trafficking from the standpoint of illegal migrant prostitutes. Yet, this redefinition that brings 
to the fore those that counted for nothing in the situation of trafficking also reconfigures 
the relations to other elements in the situation. Claiming prostitution-as-work can function 
as a true rupture in the situation and be emancipatory for women who are otherwise left to 
the exploitation of traffickers. In this reconfiguration of the trafficking situation, victims of 
trafficking are not potential harbingers of dangerous irruptions, but equal workers who can 
claim rights. Forms of abuse and exploitation that had defined 'victimhood' are now 
assessed from the standpoint of the worker. 
The argument in favour of the political potential of prostitution-as-work in the 
situation of trafficking does not mean that issues about the exploitative aspect of 
prostitution itself are closed. Acting in favour of prostitution-as-work also means thinking 
about its effects in a different situation and struggling for more egalitarian forms of work. In 
a letter to the organisers of the European Conference on Sex Work, the representatives of 
the English Collective of Prostitutes note that 
[economic] alternatives can only help all of us, whether we want to work 
in the sex industry or not, to combat violence and discrimination. We do 
not need to glamorise sex work to get recognition for the rights and skills 
of the workers who do it. Most other work is not glamorous and workers 
don't have to claim to love their jobs in order to get recognition as 
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workers. Let's not lower our working class standards (Adams and Mitchell 
2005). 
Prostitution Is reclaimed as a form of labour and this re-naming is related to struggles for 
the 'recognition of women's work, for basic human rights and for decent working 
conditions' (Kempadoo 1998: 3). The sex workers' claim that 'we are all workers'- in a 
form of universal address that refuses to distinguish between native and foreign 
prostitutes - also points to the gap between rights granted to those who do 'respectable 
work' and the non-rights of prostitutes. As workers, foreign prostitutes can claim rights by 
virtue of their work and not their nationality. Kinnell has argued that 'to denigrate women's 
choices as self-delusional or based on *false consciousness' Is not feminism but fascism' 
(Kinnell 2002). 
Reclaiming prostitution as work has to preserve Its element of universality and 
avoid the cJosure that partial state recognition of work rights can entail. Work is not a 
particular Identification, it cannot be closed and remains subject to contestation. States, 
however, attempt to cJose or exclude considerations of work. Even where discussions 
about prostitution-as-work are rendered acceptable by the state, such acceptability is 
limited to 'regulation'. Regulation or legalisation refers to a system of criminal regulation 
and government control of prostitutes; some prostitutes are given licenses to work in 
specific and limited ways. Such laws regulate prostitute businesses and lives, prescribing 
health checks and registration of health status, telling prostitutes where they may or may 
not reside, etc. (Prostitutes' Education Network 2004). Against such system of state 
control, activists ask for the abolition of laws against prostitution (English Collective of 
Prostitutes 2004). In response to the recent consultation paper on prostitution Issued by 
the Home Office, 'Paying the Price', Carl Mitchell, from the English Collectives of 
Prostitutes has argued that the licensing of brothels Is used by the police to crack down on 
Immigrant women. As they can't get a license, they are forced underground and become 
easier targets for deportment (Mitchell quoted In BBC 2004). 
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The political event of claiming that prostitution Is work functions both as the 
verification of equality (if we are all workers, then worker rights should apply to us tool) 
and as a form of universal address in the situation of trafficking. By renaming trafficked 
women, legal and Illegal prostitutes as workers, the event disrupts the power relations 
governing human trafficking. It does so by claiming a new capacity for all prostitutes, legal 
or Illegal, foreign or not. The enunciation of prostitution-as-work challenges state practices 
against both legal and illegal prostitutes. It shows that an Inegalitarian stance leads to 
Increased exploitation of both legally working prostitutes and illegal migrant prostitutes. As 
the phenomenon of human trafficking takes place in the shadows of the illegality of 
migrants and the criminallsation of prostitution, the equality of the worker disrupts 
trafficking as a continuum of migration, prostitution, organised crime and risk. Claiming 
prostitution as work also reconfigures the situation of abuse and coercion In which many 
trafficked persons have found themselves. Prostitution-as-work redefines the situation of 
trafficking from the standpoint of work and therefore suspends the Inegalitarian conditions 
that have been conditions of possibility for abuse and exploitation of victims of trafficking. 
Prostitution has been largely unacceptable as a form of labour because it makes 
explicit the exploitation the market can lead to. On the one hand, prostitution as work 
points to the hypocrisy of liberal capitalism which accepts certain forms of labour while 
disregarding others. The Idea of the market as the ordering function of society implicitly 
contains the Idea that human beings are marketable beyond their 'labour force'. Rather 
than a benign force, the market does not distinguish between the demand for beauty 
products, human organs or sex for that matter. On the other. It shows that state 
boundaries and the creation of the national labour force Is a form of protection against the 
effects of capitalism. As this research Is concerned with how practices of security can be 
unmade by a politics of universality and equal subjects, it will not engage with the logic of 
capitalism. It Is nonetheless Important to bear In mind that security practices attempt to 
make Invisible the logic of capitalism through the divisions and distinctions they create 
within the working force. Exploitation always happens to others, to illegal migrants or 
trafficked women, It Is no longer linked with the function that labour plays within capitalism. 
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Alienation and exploitation appear as no longer connected with labour In capitalism - 
especially when millions of other people would be willing to work under the conditions of 
Western capitalism. 
Having recast prostitution-as-work within the situation of trafficking does not mean 
that work does away with any exploitation or that work In general would not be a form of 
exploitation and oppression. After all, labour Is also a biopolitical technology of governing. 
However, a universallsing claim for prostitution-as-work allows not only for egalitarian 
claims of Illegal migrant women to be enacted but also shifts the description of trafficking 
towards that of tabour exploltation. I do not deny that prostitution can entail forms of more 
serious exploitation than other types of labour. Prostitute activist networks themselves do 
not only claim prostitution-as-work, but attempt to find economic alternatives to it. Several 
activist groups that work with sex workers and Illegal migrants In Europe, independent of 
the conditions In which they have arrived In the EU as well as the conditions of their work, 
have pointed out the need for alternatives that would allow women to move out of 
prostituOon. The English Collective of Prostitutes in the UK, Cabirla In France, Comitato 
per I Dlritti Civill delle Prostitute In Italy do not draw distinctions between the legal and 
administrative categories of migrant sex workerS. 52 
The equality and the universality of work have the potential to radically change the 
situation of trafficking. Rather than described and divided In categories of legal sex 
workers, trafficked women, and Illegal migrants (prostitutes), the situation of trafficking is 
rethought from the standpoint of equality. Trafficked women can no longer be extracted 
from the category of illegal migrant workers, while work creates a common struggle 
between sex workers and Mctims of trafficking'. A political event like the claim for 
prostltutlon-as-work renames subjects and radically challenges the security practices that 
were governing the situation of trafficking. This does not mean that "workers' or 'sex 
workers' cannot become names In other security practices at some other point. 
u For CabIrla, see httD: 1AY", cablHa. asso. fr1 (accessed 20 April 2006), for English Collective of 
Prostitutes, httD: Ihvww. allwornencount. net/EWCý/ý2OSexý/ý2OWo*ers/SexWorkfndex. htm 
(accessed 20 April 2006), for Cornitato per I Dirittl Civill delle Prostitute, httD: /Avww, lvcciole. o 
(accessed 20 April 2006). 
181 
Nevertheless, the equality of work and Its universal application allow for political actions to 
take place. As workers, subjects can be political rather than medicalised, psychologised 
and traurnatised victims. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the philosophical conceptualisation of the excess as that 
which goes beyond power relations could be used to understand a politics of change for 
trafficked women that Is heterogeneous to dominant practices. Excessive subjects, 
subjects that are anomalous to a situation and have no place within the representation of 
the situation. can disrupt the existing structure, as argued In relation to illegal migrant 
prostitutes. Political events are local formulations of political names, names which are 
heterogeneous to the state of the situation, followed by fidelity to these formulations. I 
have shown that Illegal migrant sex workers, although present In the situation of 
trafficking, do not belong to Its representations or rather only exist through negation. They 
should not be there - unless having been trafficked - and should not be prostitutes - 
unless legal residents. Work' redefines the situation for Illegal migrant workers and turns 
all these different categories Into the sameness of the 'worker. As all these categories are 
figures of the worker, all these categories partake of equal rights. Unlike security, equality 
is a universal formulation without a closure. Following Badiou's concept of politics, 
equality Is enacted by subjects who become political In their fidelity to an event. 
What CSS and their equation of emancipation to security have missed Is the 
element of universality that a politics of emancipation entails and that security lacks. 
Security cannot be democratised, It cannot be universally partaken of. Its fiction is 
subtended by practices that divide and exclude categories of subjects deemed dangerous 
or risky. By not looking at the effects of security at the subjective level, desecuritisation 
also mIsses the element of struggle and emancipation. A politics that would unmake 
securitisation Is a politics formulated from the site of the excessive subject, of those who 
do not belong to the situation. An analysis of security practices as proposed by Bigo 
keeps us within the limits of 'what is' and of what security experts do. Yet, It Is not 
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competing knowledge that can challenge the knowiedge of security experts and their 
practices - subjects that name themselves as equal subjects In politics can radically 
suspend professional knowledge. 
Badiou's conceptuallsation of a politics of emancipation allows us to think both a 
more complex situation and the disruption of this situation. The situation is defined as 
relations between normal, excrescent and excessive elements beyond the dichotornical 
relation subjectlabject. Through the excrescent element of the state and bureaucracies, it 
has Introduced the Institutional mediation of practices of subjection. Although normal and 
excessive elements are differentially governed, Badiou's cartography of the subjects In a 
situation allows us to understand the specific position of those who should not be there, 
who represent the negation of the situation. Moreover, the principles of a politics of 
emancipation are heterogeneous to the governmental practices of security inasmuch as 
they destroy the division between the normal and the excessive. They also disrupt the 
relation of knowledge that the excrescent element had With the normal and the excessive 
elements by Instating equality. Division becomes equality and exclusion Is replaced by 
universality. Yet, can these political events only exist at a distance from the field of 
experts, only at a distance from the state? Badiou's politics would appear to be a form of 
organisation at a distance from any state Institution. Illegal migrant prostitutes have 
however emerged as equal political subjects exactly In Institutional locations and have 
made their claims Inscribed In law. The next chapter will analyse what these institutional 
forms of action entail for a politics of emancipation. Can politics be restricted to forms of 
self-organisation by excessive subjects? 
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VI. Rehistoricising the excess: emancipation and 
transformation 
Introduction 
The previous chapter has shown that a disruptive political move to unmake security 
practices along the lines of Badiou's theorisation of politics is informed by the principles of 
equality and universality, and is connected with the supplementary, the supra-numerary 
element of a situation, the very limit of a situation, an anomalous presence in a situation 
governed by security practices. A politics harnessed to the excessive elements of a 
situation is radically different from the forms of politics articulated in security studies and 
international relations. A speech act analysis of security functions as a conservative, 
order-preserving politics circumscribing its analysis to the sphere of speakers of security. 
The CoS have been concerned with speakers and their audiences, to what is given in a 
situation. Even Butler's interpretation of speech acts as performatively constitutive of 
spaces of abjection that could become spaces of resistance does not account for 
emancipatory politics as radically heterogeneous to practices of security. Similarly to the 
CoS, a Bourdieuean analysis of the security field is restricted to actors and their habitus, 
Le. the visible and invisible structures of power. I have shown that the subject of a politics 
of emancipation that disrupts security practices is the excessive element in a situation 
such as the security-governed situation of trafficking. A politics of equality and universality, 
formulated from the standpoint of excess, suspends differential forms of subjectivity and 
reconfigures the tripartite relation between excrescent, normal and excessive elements in 
a situation. 
Following Badiou, the collective subjectification of those who are excessive can 
open the space for a disruption of security. The theorisation of the excess has allowed me 
to move from the terms in which the situation of trafficking is governmentally represented, 
from trafficked women, to workers. Those who were not supposed to be there due to 
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illegality and were not workers due to involvement in prostitution enter the situation of 
trafficking as equal workers. We have seen that trafficked women are not dangerous as 
4victims', as coerced, abused, or exploited migrants. They are dangerous inasmuch as 
they embody the permanent risk of the illegal migrant prostitute, inasmuch as they 
reactivate the category from which they have been extracted and from which they should 
dis-identify. Victims of trafficking are other4han-illegal-migrant-prostitutes, while 
simultaneously dangerously close to the later. Analyses which attempt to think alternative 
possibilities of subjectification do so by reducing it to private strategies of resistance that 
can be incorporated within securitising discourses and practices. Moreover, most attempts 
to unmake security practices would not consider how to unmake the exclusionary logic of 
security. If ethical approaches are acutely aware of the need for radical principles of 
politics, the link between radical principles and existing practices remains unclear. A 
politics of emancipation thinks the link between its principles and the situation. 
I have shown that the predicate of 'work', 'worker' - when claimed by prostitutes 
and trafficked women - introduces a radical claim of equality within the inegalitarian 
sovereign definitions of citizenship and governmental practices of risk management. The 
claim of equality turns trafficked women from illegitimate intruders into the political 
community of Western states into visible speakers and equal partakers of the community 
of workers. Through the body and voice of sex workers, the migrant other becomes a 
sharer in the community as a worker. Rather than radical alterity, the foreign sex worker 
becomes collectively subjectified together with all other sex workers. They are the 
subjects of their own emancipation, contesting the situation which divides them into 
antagonistic categories. 
The claim to work introduces an unexpected and in this sense evental claim within 
the state of the situation. The dangerous or risky trafficked women are migrants crossing 
borders and risking their lives in search of work, those who might return even if deported 
to their countries of origin, rehabilitated and reintegrated within the normal. Rather than 
the predicate of inequality between high-skilled and low-skilled migrants, legal and illegal, 
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work becomes the signifier of equality, the possibility of collective subjectivation beyond 
sovereign and governmental categorisations. 
According to Badiou, this politics is enacted through forms of collective 
organisation at a distance from the state. The distance from the state is however not a 
form of anti-statism, it is a politics enacted at a distance from state institutions. As Badiou 
has summarised the stakes of the situation of the sans-papiers, 
Considering the fate of the sans-papiers in this country, a first orientation 
might have been: they should revolt against the state. Today we would 
say that the singular form of their struggle is, rather, to create the 
conditions in which the state is led to change this or that thing concerning 
them, to repeal the laws that should be repealed, to take the measures of 
naturalization (r6gularisation) that should be taken, and so on (Badiou 
2002c: 98/emphasis in original). 
A politics of equality and universality makes prescriptions against the state, it brings the 
state within its political field without participating in the state and its institutions. Yet, a 
politics that enacts equality and claims the equality of work is not exclusively enacted at a 
distance from the state institutions through collective subjectification. In his political 
practice, Badiou has a rather reductionist understanding the excrescent or the institutional 
element which is not presented but represented in the situation. Institutions perform the 
process of ordering and government, but do not exist outside the state of the situation. In 
historicising the politics of equality and universality, one obtains a different view of the 
situation and the excrescent elements. Previous forms of collective subjectification and 
politics might have inscribed their political principles in institutions. In the history of political 
struggles, equality also exists inscribed in various institutional locales and can be open to 
verification. 
This chapter will attempt to make sense of the struggles that activate institutionally 
inscribed equality and claim it for categories a priori excluded from its purview. 
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Understanding the link of such institutional politics with a politics of collective 
subjectification at a distance from the state would lead us to a more nuanced 
understanding of how a politics of unmaking security functions. As equality and 
universality already exist as principles inscribed in liberal state institutions, struggles for 
emancipation start from already existing inscriptions (Balibar 2004a). Can the excessive 
elements, the illegal migrant sex workers, reclaim these principles from within state 
institutions? 
To answer this question and consider its implications for a politics of emancipation 
along Badiou's lines, I shall start by locating the political sites in which equality and 
universality have informed the political struggles of sex workers and will question their 
relation to an evental politics of collective subjectification. The relation between a politics 
that unfolds within institutions and a politics that is at a distance from the state will be 
discussed through the mediation of equality and universality. Finally, I shall consider this 
double determination of politics for unmaking practices of security. 
History and the struggles for equality 
We have seen that Badiou's politics of universality and equality is formulated 'at a 
distance'from the state (Badiou 2004b: 156). Sex worker activists refuse any involvement 
with the state on matters of regulating prostitution and claim that anti-trafficking legislation 
is primarily used to deport sex workers, no evidence of force or coercion being needed to 
prove the offences (English Collective of Prostitutes 2004). Their politics could be put in a 
nutshell as 'those who work here are from here', echoing Badiou's own claim about the 
sans-papiers that 'those who are here are from here [les gens qui sont ici sont d'ici]' (La 
distance politique 1996a). In a recent action concerning the status of illegal workers in 
France, IOrganisation politique has stated that '[p]ayment slips are not fake, even if 
residence papers are fake. Payments slips are genuine because work is genuine' (Balso 
2005/translation mine). Such a claim evidently enacts an impossibility in the current 
political situation on the basis of the principles of universality and equality. It also appears 
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articulable only at a distance from state institutions. Yet, an analysis of the situation of 
human trafficking makes apparent other sites in which an impossibility is enacted. 
In the EU, a politics of equality and universality, a politics of the equality of work for 
migrants who have been rendered illegal has been formulated at other political sites, most 
notably the European Court of Justice (ECJ). If politics is not just at a distance from the 
state, but also prescribing against the state, as Badiou argues, then state institutions can 
become loci for such prescriptions. Just as political events are linked to a situation through 
the excess, principles of equality and universality already exist inscribed in the situation, 
as a logical consequence of other political events and other struggles. Badiou's 
mathematical ontology makes this theory oblivious of the historicity of the concepts which 
opens avenues for political struggles. As equality is a principle that cannot be subjected to 
closure, locating it In different situations can allow for its expansion. 
Political struggles are often struggles over these inscriptions, of equality and 
universality that exclude certain categories of people as the very possibility of the system 
functioning. For example, the right to vote excluded at different points in history different 
categories of people. Their exclusion from the voting system was part of the functioning of 
the early modern capitalist state, which made voting dependent on property. Women's 
struggle for the eight to vote could be read along these lines of challenging the universal 
inscription in the name of an equality that is denied or suspended. Badiou has been wary 
of such a politics he would see as only contributing to an 'oppositional' stance, i. e. a 
position of protest from within the state-sanctioned structures and rules (parties, elections, 
trade unions, constitutional amendments... ) (Badiou quoted in Hallward 2002/ emphasis in 
original). When such an oppositional stance buttresses or sustains through its principles a 
politics of emancipation, what role are we to give to this form of politics? 
In what follows, I shall consider how a politics of equality is formulated from within 
existing institutional inscriptions in the situation of trafficking. An egalitarian statement 
concerning illegal migrant sex workers has emerged based on an inscription of equality in 
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the Agreements signed between the EU and the Accession States in the nineties. 53 These 
agreements give the right to nationals from Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEECs) to 'take up and pursue economic activities as self-employed persons' (European 
Community 1991). These agreements extend therefore the right of residence by virtue of 
work to nationals of other non-EU countries. Work (as self-employment) is extended 
beyond the realm of the EU and it also introduces a claim to equality (as non- 
discrimination) between CEECs and EU citizens. Although these agreements were set up 
in the context of an increased liberalisation of economic relations between the EU and the 
accession countries, what interests me here is how these agreements, drafted in 
completely different circumstances and for a different purpose, are given a different 
meaning and political purchase. 
The Association Agreements have been at the heart of several cases in front of 
the ECJ. The right to residence as self-employed workers has been repeatedly invoked by 
those who had fallen out of the representations of a situation of migration and were 
present in it only as a negation. They either had their asylum claims rejected or had been 
in an irregular situation. Thus, although present, they were represented only as 
anomalous, as excessive, those who should not be there. In all the cases that have been 
the subject of judgements by the ECJ - Gloszczuk (Gloszczuk 2001), Kondova (Kondova 
2001), and Barkoci and Malik (Barkoci and Malik 2001) - the right of establishment and 
residence was formulated from the subjective position of the worker, of the self-employed. 
The first case concerned two Polish nationals whose applications to stay in the UK as self- 
employed workers were rejected on the grounds that they had stayed irregularly in the 
UK. The second case concerned a Bulgarian national who started work as a self- 
employed cleaner and claimed residence after her asylum application had been rejected. 
In the third case, two Czech nationals applied for residence as self-employed workers 
after their asylum claims had been rejected. 
53 The Europe Agreements (or Association Agreements) were part of the pre-accession strategy 
and concerned Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Turkey. At present, given the 2004 enlargement, these 
agreements remain applicable to Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. 
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In another case, Jany, the issue of self-employment and residence became 
directly connected with that of prostitution. In this case, the ECJ dealt with two Polish and 
three Czech nationals who wanted to establish themselves as self-employed persons in 
the Netherlands, but were denied residence permits by the Netherlands Secretary of State 
for Justice (Jany 2001). The six women were residing in the Netherlands and working in 
Amsterdam as Window prostitutes'. In accordance with the Association Agreements 
between the European Community and Poland and the Czech Republic, the citizens of 
the lafter states are allowed to 'take up and pursue economic activities as self-employed 
persons', where 'economic activities shall in particular include activities of an industrial 
character, activities of a commercial character, activities of craftsmen and activities of the 
professions' (Jany 200 1 /emphasis in original). 
The women were refused residence permits on grounds that 'prostitution is a 
prohibited activity or at least not a socially acceptable form of work and cannot be 
regarded as being either a regular job or a profession' (Jany 2001). The commissioner of 
the Amsterdam-Amstelland regional police for residence permits rejected the prostitutes' 
application holding that the expression 'economic activities as self-employed persons' 
used in the Association Agreements between the EU and Poland and the Czech Republic 
did not have the same meaning as the same words used in Article 43 of the Treaty of 
Rome. The six prostitutes asked for a judicial review. 
The ECJ had already ruled in GIoszczuk and Barkoci and Malik that the provisions 
in the Association Agreements represented a 'precise and unconditional principle which is 
sufficiently operational to be applied by a national court and which is therefore capable of 
governing the legal position of individuals' (Barkoci and Malik 2001; Gloszczuk 2001). The 
ECJ also concluded that if a Member State accepts prostitution on the part of its own 
nationals, it could not regard prostitution on the part of Polish and Czech nationals as 
representing a 'genuine threat to public order' (Jany 2001). The Court decided that the 
activity of prostitution pursued in a self-employed capacity can be regarded as a service 
provided for remuneration. The Court also established that such a relation must be carried 
outside any relationship of subordination concerning the choice of that activity, working 
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conditions and conditions of remuneration; under that person's own responsibility; and in 
return for remuneration paid to that person directly and in full (Jany 2001). 
In all these case (including Jany), the ECJ ruled that the right of establishment has 
direct effect and CEECs nationals can invoke it against the Member States. Since the 
Jany judgement, several hundred prostitutes have claimed residence as self-employed 
sex workers (136cker 2002: 35). Although not at a distance from the state in Badiou's 
sense, such a politics still prescribes against the state. Illegal foreign prostitutes, the 
excessive element of both a situation of migration and trafficking, enact equality and the 
transformation of prostitution through work from within institutional locales. Although not 
having been framed with a universal intent, the effects of this institutional engagement 
become universalised through the recognition of prostitution as work. 
Although formally different from the sex worker activist movement, the Jany case 
cannot be considered in isolation from their movement, as it redefines the situation in 
which sex workers themselves are struggling for the recognition of prostitution-as-work. 
The Jany case has inscribed prostitution-as-work in the history of institutions. Institutional 
struggle over the representation of prostitution and the representation of trafficking will 
continue. The European Parliament motion and the amendments to it discussed in the 
previous chapter were a reaction on the one hand to the Brussels Declaration on Human 
Trafficking and ways to fight the phenomenon and to the Jany case on the other. The 
Jany case can consequently only be considered in relation to a struggle of collective 
subjectification that works in the margins of institutions and challenges at all times their 
authority and their decisions. 
Politics in history: the transformation of universality 
Badiou's politics of equality and universality is minimally historical. Historicity is reduced to 
the relation to the situation, to the excessive elements of a situation. The principles which 
politics itself invokes are not historicised, but considered as abstract principles which can 
challenge the state of the situation. If thinking the new entails thinking the old, the 
situation, what is repetition (Badiou and Bosteels 2005: 253), then thinking politics entails 
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the separation of what can lead to the new and what is a repetition in the situation in 
relation to equality. Is there a politics of equality that can invoke exactly the history of the 
principle itself and not amount to a simple repetition of what is, of the governmental logic 
of security? I suggest that the action undertaken in the Jany case is a political verification 
of institutionally inscribed equality, a verification that radically displaces the limits of 
equality given in the Europe Agreements. Migrant women presented themselves as sex 
workers and verified the equality of work, while bringing prostitution under the remit of 
work. Equality appears as a maxim of action, a principle that is under verification by 
subjects that present themselves as equal. 
This does not mean that politics should be reduced to institutional politics - we 
have seen that institutional struggles tend to subvert rather than support the claim of 
prostitution as work. To understand the role of the Jany case and the historicisation of 
equality and universality, politics at a distance would need to be supplemented by a 
historical politics of equality and universality. Critics would legitimately wonder at this point 
whether this supplementation of evental politics by a historical politics does not contradict 
both the repudiation of historicism and the importance of the excess. The historicisation of 
equality remains linked to the standpoint of the excessive element and functions as a 
verification in a situation where inegalitarian practices and forms of representation are at 
work. Moreover, the historicisation of equality is at odds with analyses of power that 
remain within the sphere of what is. If equality can be thought as the result of struggles 
whose consequences have been inscribed in institutions, could we not speak about the 
historicisation of a politics of excess? 
In a sense, what Badiou misses is the historicisation of political events, the fact the 
subject's fidelity to an event can lead to the inscription of its consequences in institutions. 
Although a historical element appears as a necessary supplement to Badiou's politics, 
equality is prescriptive, a maxim and not a consequence of governmental actions. 
Governmental definitions of equality and calculations of what an optimum would be for the 
life of the population are not political. The Czech migrant women in the Jany case have 
made use of already existing universal inscriptions. Such inscriptions already exist within 
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the nation-state, or at the level of supra-national institutions. The multiplicity of locations 
for political action can be better understood through the interpretations of universality 
offered by Balibar. 
Balibar has extensively dealt with the same words for politics as Badiou. 
Equaliberty (or equality and freedom) and universality inform Balibar's concept of 
emancipatory politics. I have shown that equality can function as radical principle that 
asserts the equality of political subjects and that it can also be invoked in different 
institutional locations. Equality has become inscribed in institutions both as a result of 
struggles or simply contingently, as in the case of Europe Agreements. A political action 
would take equality from the economic rationale with which it is linked and move it to 
another realm. From the commonsensical understanding of services and of self- 
employment, equality is transferred rather unexpectedly to the realm of sex industry. 
The verification of equality in different locations is linked with Balibar's 
interpretation of universality. The collective subjectification of the worker created a form of 
universal address in the situation of trafficking. The worker as an equal subject made 
those who counted for nothing in the situation, the illegal migrant prostitutes, count for 
something. Victims of trafficking are transformed from silenced victims of trauma into 
workers who can process their experience of exploitation and abuse. Work redefines the 
situation of trafficking and does away with the divisions that security practices had 
imposed. In the Jany case, universality is obviously limited, referring initially to Czech and 
Polish citizens. The accession of ten Central and Eastern European countries to the EU in 
2004 has restricted even more the scope of universality. Moreover, in the newer 
Association Agreements signed with the Euro-Mediterranean countries, the right of self- 
employment has been taken OUt. 54 
Yet, these limitations do not mean that the principle of universality is lost. Balibar's 
differential concept of universality can make sense of a universality that does not address 
everybody. Universality is not about equality gradually incorporating more and more 
54 For example, the difference between the agreement signed with Morocco in 1996 and the one 
signed with Egypt in 2001. In the latter, there is no longer any mention of the right of establishment. 
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citizens. Universality does not mean the silencing of difference and the obliteration of 
particularity. Badiou claims that every universal originates in an event and it is linked with 
a 'precarious supplement whose sole strength resides in there being no available 
predicate capable of subjecting it to knowledge' (Badiou 2004b: 146). Universality is 
therefore intrinsically linked to the excessive elements of a situation. Badiou's universal 
can only be for everyone if it is divorced from any particular representations. Hence, rather 
than a characteristic of the situation, universality is linked with the element that cannot be 
represented, that has no positive properties in the situation. We could probably say that 
the universal is a negative universal inasmuch as 'to be inscribed within it is not a matter 
of possessing any particular determination' (Badiou 2004b: 151). As 2-i2ek has put it in a 
nutshell: 'it is those who are excluded, with no proper place within the global order, who 
directly embody true universality, who represent the Whole in contrast to all others who 
stand only for their particular interests' (2i2ek and Daly 2004: 109). 
For Balibar, the universality that we associate with politics has 'to be constructed 
practically and empirically-, it has to be approached through confrontation and conflict' 
(Balibar 2004b). We should refuse the opposition between universality and particularity 
that has led to an endorsement of identity politics at the expense of an understanding of 
universality. While these assertions could be read as reinforcements of Badiou's claims 
that the event is universal both in its form of address and in its content, Balibar has offered 
an analysis of the ambiguities of universality which makes room for a differentially located 
politics. He has distinguished between three forms of universality- universality as 'reality, 
universality as 'fiction' and universality as 'symbol' or ideal universality. Although Balibar 
does not explicitly link all these forms of universality to a politics of emancipation, I shall 
attempt to understand what these ambiguities entail for the politics of unmaking security 
as formulated so far. 
Universality as 'reality, which refers to the expansion of institutions and techniques 
to the entire world, to the interdependency between different parts of the world that 
analysts of globalisation have explored, alerts us to the practices of insecurity that 
constitute it. Despite the existence of a generalised web of economic, political and cultural 
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relations, of an increased interdependency between different areas of the world and of the 
4generalisation of minority status', real universality is actually equivalent to the creation of 
identities which are 'less isolated and more incompatible, less univocal and more 
antagonistic' (Balibar 1995a: 56/emphasis in original). 
Increasing forms of 'internal exclusion' (Balibar 1995a: 55) make universality as 
$reality appear as revelatory of security practices. It also alerts those who have rejoiced at 
the processes of globalisation and the destabilisation of identities defined in statist and 
majority terms that multiple and floating identities do not by themselves lead to a politics of 
emancipation. Not only are these identities inscribed in patterns of inequality, but their 
multiplication says nothing about how their particularity could be transcended. What real 
universality lacks are the two other forms of universality, fictive and symbolic, forms of 
universality that make possible the contestation of security practices. Real universality, the 
universality of a purely extensive humanity, is coterminous with inegalitarian and 
exclusionary practices of security. 
Universality as 'fiction' can be understood as synonymous to the concept of 
hegemony or even the discourses of the dominant that sustain the constitution of political 
communities that can be extended to the whole of humanity. 'Fictions' refer to the reality 
constructed by institutions and representations. Construction is however not a flat process 
and Balibar points out that there are differences between forms of private identification 
and more abstract forms of universal identification that have historically taken two forms: 
religious and national-political (Balibar 1995a, 2002b). Universality as 'fiction' is also 
ambiguous inasmuch as both nations and religions have spoken to individuals universally, 
beyond their given forms of subjectification and have served to question relations of 
inequality and domination. The anti-colonial struggle can be seen as a struggle for the 
universalisation of the nation through struggles for self-determination. At the same time, 
religions and nations have been instruments of oppression. 
Yet, true universality resides in the possibility of challenging the embodiment of the 
universal, in what he calls the intensive aspect of universality as 'fiction'. It is not the 
extension of the nation that embodies true universality, but the intensive aspect of 
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universality as 'fiction'. This intensive aspect allows for an emancipatory politics to be 
formulated in the name of the superior values of the community. If one were to read 
Balibar's universality as 'fiction' in Badiou's terms, universality also exists in the state of 
the situation. These locations of universality and its intensive aspects can ground forms of 
a politics of emancipation that are not always at a distance from the state. 
Universality as 'fiction' is important inasmuch as it leads dominated groups to 
struggle for rights in the name of the superior values of the community: the legal and the 
ethical values of the state itself (Balibar 2002b: 161). Such values can be suffrage, justice 
or freedom and equality. Fictive universality is 'the very point where the two inverse 
movements of inclusion and exclusion meet and contradict each other' (Balibar 2004b: 
61). Rather than dismissing this universality as false, as most of the poststructuralist 
literature does, its internal split can be thought as a springboard for emancipatory politics. 
One can therefore confront hegemonic structures by denouncing the gap or contradiction 
between official values and practices. 
No ideology or dominant form of power can function without some remnant that 
has come from the language of the dominated. The dominant forces in society, Balibar 
has argued, 'can speak to the masses in the language of universalistic values (rights, 
justice, equality, welfare, progress ... ) because in this language a kernel remains which 
came from the masses themselves, and is returned to them' (Balibar 2002b: 164). The 
promise of universality would therefore function beyond its historical appropriation within 
particular power relations. Such struggles will eventually reinforce the universality of 
principles such as freedom and equality. 
Universality as 'symbol' or ideal universality introduces the unconditional in politics, 
the ideal of non-discrimination and no-coercion, which Balibar translates as equaliberty. 
Universality cannot be reduced to the nation-form or a religious community, but has as an 
ideal of the 'subject' of politics the common humanity, the individual without particular 
qualities (Balibar 2004a: 312). This aspect of universality excludes exclusion as it cannot 
be subject to closure. Ideal universality refers to the expression of revolt against all 
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discrimination, against inequality, against interdictions and obstacles to freedom of 
expression or other individual and collective freedoms (Balibar 1993). 
The Declaration of rights that founded the French modem nation-state and the 
institution of citizenship are based on the 'proposition of equaliberty, which considers all 
individuals of equal value and is open onto the idea that, at least potentially, all men are 
citizens (Balibar 2004b: 59). The existence of forms of universality inscribed in institutions 
can be understood both as the result of previous struggles for emancipation and as the 
specificity of how power relations function in modernity. If power is not to be simply 
repressive or violent (even when its violence means constituting subjects), there is an 
element of shared universality and values that would bind the governing and the 
governed. I have shown that practices of security can be bound together by an imaginary 
of security. 
Universality as fictive and symbolic is absent from what I have called the 'barred 
universal' of security. The tension at the heart of universality that allows for dominant 
practices to be challenged in the name of equality and even the common humanity of 
subjects is undermined by the exclusionary move of security practices. Security can only 
be embodied in forms of life or forms of community to the exclusion of other ones, through 
a simultaneous imaginary of disorder and insecurity that borders or penetrates the 
imaginary of security and order. Unlike equality or equaliberty, security is subject to 
closure and boundary drawing. The ambiguity of universality that has led to productive 
tensions and a politics of emancipatory struggles is barred from security practices. Ideal 
universality or universality as 'symbol' is the impossible universality in relation to practices 
of security. Security always appears as a non-event, incapable to address everybody as 
equal. 
Security that could be 'democratised', extended to every individual refers to real 
universality. Real universality does not speak politically as fictive and symbolic universality 
does. Some poststructuralists have interpreted the inter-linking of identities, their 
fragmentation and de-stabilisation as the conditions of possibility for coming to terms with 
insecurity and suspending the inflationary practices of security that attempt to govern any 
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form of disorder and instability. Others still have argued against the paranoid security 
reaction of states to generalised conditions of fragmentation. Real universality is, 
however, exclusively captured in the terms of what is. It is at the same time increased 
interconnection and creation of more heterogeneous identities and the exclusion of whole 
categories of population globally. 
Symbolic and fictive universality can also be depoliticised, 'a contradictory 
combination of an outline of universality and its arbitrary limitation' (Balibar 1994: 46) 
suspended, when a different logic is applied, according to which 'freedom' represents a 
status and 'equality is a function and right of this status. Challenging the arbitrary 
limitations that fictive universality can entail is based on an ideal universality, the 
unconditional principle of the participation of all in politics. Ideal universality is based on 
the simultaneous enactment of freedom and equality, of 6gafiberO (equaliberty). Just like 
Badiou, Balibar sees universality as necessarily linked with the performative enactment of 
equaliberty. 
Equaliberty can be seen as what Balibar has referred to as the kernel of 'truth' in 
the name of which the dominated could struggle for their rights. Equality and liberty 
became principles of democracy only in the wake of the French Revolution, of specific 
struggles by the dominated. They have informed political struggles as 'unconditional 
principles' ever since. The grounding of politics in the principles of the French Revolution 
could appear as Eurocentric, unaware of the subaltern voices and possibly different 
modes of thinking and practicing politics. Yet, universality and equality are principles that 
have been claimed in struggles against Western-based practices of domination and 
security. Security and the state are dominant Western concepts and practices and it is 
against their expansion that the same very principles can be mobilised. 
Balibar's conceptualisation of universality makes apparent both a contradiction and 
an excess between ideal universality, the universality to which state practices (including 
dominant practices) must refer and the fictive universality, the universality that appears as 
split between its particular embodiment and what it excludes. Symbolic or ideal 
universality is in excess over fictive universality. What has been missing from a 
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Foucauldian analysis of practices has been the realisation that governmental 
interventions, the relation between the governed and the governing can be held together 
not just by a common understanding of what the political community is, but by universal 
values. Otherwise, power becomes simply violence, it cannot work an free subjects, but 
must repress. 
Foucault's understanding of power as positive, as constitutive of subjects would 
need to be correlated to an understanding of universality that legitimises those practices. 
Ideal universality has made fictive universality contestable outside the boundaries it has 
set to itself through the principle of equal liberty or unconditional participation in politics. 
Universality is more than the event in the sense of distance from the state and its 
institutions; it is inscribed in institutions and part of the deployment of power. Not losing 
such universality from sight (and especially not dismissing it as hegemonic or false) allows 
for claims for rights based on the principle of equaliberty to be formulated. Balibar's 
conceptualisation of universality supplements the prescriptions against the state at a 
distance from the state by prescriptions against the state from within institutions. 
Transformative-emancipatory politks 
How can we understand the relation between Badiou's politics and Balibar's? Can a 
politics that challenges the arbitrary limitations of universality in the name of unconditional 
equaliberty be a supplement to Badiou's evental politics that prescribes against the state 
from a distance or are their conceptualisations of politics and political action 
irreconcilable? Hallward has suggested that Balibar stands for a sociological position that 
Badiou repudiates as it is connected with an oppositional stance from within state- 
sanctioned structures and rules (Hallward 2002). Political action remains at a distance 
from the state and prescribes against the state. Balibar's position, which attempts to 
locate sites where universality can be opened to intensive contestation, shares with 
Badiou an understanding of the excess. Badiou sees the excess as linked with the 
anomalous elements of a situation, while Balibar links it with unconditional principles that 
have informed political struggles in history. In a sense, there is an implicit understanding 
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of equality as excess in Badiou too, as equality does not pertain to the structuring of the 
situation but to the indifferent multiplicity of presentation before and beyond 
representation. 
To understand the difference between Balibar's and Badiou's politics and the 
possibility of thinking political action as egalitarian and universal prescriptions, I shall 
loosely borrow two 'names' for politics from Balibar himself. Balibar has distinguished 
among three forms of politics: transformation, emancipation, and civility. He has 
associated the proposition of equaliberty with a politics of emancipation and the 
transformation of the structures of power as a form of politics with the work of Marx and 
Foucault. These two forms are supplemented by civility, which Balibar sees as the 
currently necessary mode of politics. 
Civility refers to the conditions of possibility of politics itself as transformation and 
emancipation. Civility is not synonymous to tolerance; it is a mode of relating to ourselves 
and of imagining possibilities of identification and dis-identification that would not take us 
to the extremes of violence which are destructive of the space where political claims can 
be made. This mode of politics designates the speculative idea of a politics of politics, or a 
politics in the second degree, which aims at creating, recreating, and conserving the set of 
conditions within which politics as a collective participation in public affairs is possible, or 
at least is not made absolutely impossible (Balibar 2004b: 115). 
While Balibar has chosen the very example of people whose organs are trafficked 
and who cannot present themselves as a stand-in for any universal, the situation of 
trafficking in women is different. Although victims of trafficking cannot present themselves 
as a stand-in for the universal of an equal political subject, the space of politics is kept 
open through the subjectification of the worker. The space of politics is kept open by the 
illegal migrant sex workers and sex workers themselves. The situation of trafficking in 
women is open to a politics of emancipation, in which subjects present themselves as 
equal participants in politics. By making political claims against the state within institutions 
such as the ECJ, illegal migrant sex workers transform the power relations that govern the 
situation. The theoreticians of transformative politics privileged by Balibar are Marx and 
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Foucault. Despite the nuanced differences between the two thinkers, one can define 
transformative politics as envisaging the transformation of historical conditions or power 
structures. If Marx sees such a transformation led by a world-historical subject and 
Foucault links it with the subject's 'techniques of the self, their common concern is the 
transformation of the conditions of possibility of domination/power. Balibar shifts this 
concern with the historicity of power relations/historical structures to the historicity of 
emancipatory struggles (i. e. the history of struggles around concepts such as equality and 
liberty). He starts from the premise that emancipatory politics needs concepts like 
equaliberty and cannot function without them. 
Balibar joins Marx and Foucault through his historical approach to the conditions of 
possibility of equaliberty, but differs from their predicament by avoiding the claim that 
transformative politics is made of the same fabric as practices of power/domination. I have 
shown previously that a politics of unmaking security cannot be of the same fabric as 
security, it needs to rupture these practices radically. As Balibar himself has put it, the 
problem is that 'the conditions of existence which are to be transformed are woven from 
the same cloth as the practice of transformation itself (Balibar 2002b). Politics needs 
ideals which would be heterogeneous to practices of power. Ideals or principles constitute 
a break with the logic of security. It is by activating such principles that politics breaks with 
the logic of security or domination. With a hint of self-irony, Balibar describes his position: 
Old Marxist, old materialist that I am, I am convinced on this point: the 
main way of being a materialist, a realist, in politics today is to be 
'Idealistic' or, more precisely, to raise the question of ideals and choices 
to be made between ideals. These ideals will necessarily be expressions 
of very old ideas to which democracy appeals, but of which democracy, 
in its current manifestations, provides a very sad spectacle... (Balibar 
2002b). 
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One can say that Balibar's work is about transforming the conditions of existence of 
emancipatory practices, of equaliberty. He follows the historical consequences of political 
events, namely the occurrences of equaliberty in history. 
Unlike Balibar, Badiou's politics considers claims to equality as indifferent to 
history, even if related to a socio-historical situation and its elements. In his words, a 
politics of radical emancipation cannot originate in a proof of possibility that an analysis of 
55 the world could offer (Badiou 1992). Even if forms of political action can be distinguished 
historically, events speak of the excess of history itself, of the contingency that cannot be 
captured by what is. However, an historical analysis of the situation could locate the 
traces that previous events have left in history. It is this historical awareness of struggles 
that can support new forms of political action. What is important in naming these two 
modes of politics is to understand that the two poles are not mutually exclusive, but enter 
into a relation of strategy. Such a logic of strategy can be inferred from the lessons that 
the struggles of trafficked women and sex workers offer. The political struggles against the 
securitising practices of human trafficking have mobilised both emancipatory and 
transformative political actions. 
Claims about the equal rights of sex workers as 'workers' rather than as state- 
defined categories inscribe a new principle of equality. This politics gives new valence to 
the anomalous and excessive subject of the situation of trafficking, the illegal migrant sex 
worker. Claims about equal rights of residence by virtue of work that Eastern European 
sex workers or immigrants have been putting forth activate already existing principles. 
These claims challenge the restriction of rights to 'decent' and commonsensical forms of 
self-employment and argue that prostitution is an independent form of work. The 
challenge to existing migration law on the basis of already inscribed institutional rights 
relates to the recognition of prostitution-as-work. Transformative politics is therefore an 
inscription of equality against its arbitrary limitation and closure. It ties in with 
55, 
... une politique Ornancipation radicale ne s'origine pas clans une preuve de possibilit6 que 
1'examen du monde fourniraif (translation mine). 
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emancipatory struggles, the struggles that argue that prostitution is a form of work based 
on the exchange of labour force against remuneration. 
It is now possible to reformulate the status of a political event in relation to a 
history of political struggles. While the event itself ruptures the situation from the 
standpoint of the excessive elements by means of verifying the principle of equality 
(excessive to any rationality of domination), the event is linked to a series of struggles that 
go on in a situation. A political event does not emerge in the interstices of power or from 
the dissonant complexity of discourses and practices, but from the indeterminable 
struggles that go on in a situation. Illegal migrant prostitutes can claim the equality of work 
given the existing struggles to rename prostitution as work. Renaming prostitution as work 
appears as an event in a situation of trafficking inasmuch as it suspends the particular 
categorisation and governmentality of security. 
In their link with other struggles, political events have an ambiguous relation to 
universality. Real universality is of the order of what is and cannot be the principle of an 
event. The universal address that Badiou mentioned cannot be extensive. After all, 
prescriptions against the state are divisive, they create camps in a situation between 
those who support it and those who do not. The situation of trafficking is divided between 
those who dismiss the equality of work on the basis on national protection and those who 
support it. Universality as fiction can be emancipatory and a principle for political events 
only if it is harnessed to universality as a symbol or an ideal. 
A transformative-emancipatory politics works with the principles of equality and 
universality, which counter the inegalitarlan and exclusionary logic of security. As I have 
previously argued, practices of security are always at the expense of somebody else. The 
logic they activate is one of delimiting, categorlsing, neutrallsing and excluding an-other 
(where 'other' is to be read as specific categories of population). The imaginary of 
ontological security presents itself in similar terms to real universality. Ontological security 
was after all a concrete development in the context of the modem state and destabilised 
by late modernity. Unlike equality, the principle of a transformative-emancipatory politics, 
security depends upon the enactment of practices of inequality that divide dangerous and 
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non-dangerous, risk and at-risk, creating spaces of abjection to be excluded from the 
space of normal and normalised subjectivity. Looking back from the perspective of a 
politics of equality and universality, security can be seen as practices of inequality, 
particularity and closure. 
The logic of universality and equality remains open, despite its historical 
embodiments and particular closures. Fictive universality is historically false, as national 
and religious communities have simultaneously buttressed practices of security against 
disorder and practices of normalisation against deviants. Yet, it becomes political from the 
standpoint of excess, the excess of ideal universality and of equality. The Association 
Agreements, for example, which have been invoked by migrant sex workers in the 
Netherlands, concern only CEECs. Moreover, since May 2004 their scope has been 
reduced to Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey, as the countries to which these agreements 
56 initially applied have become members of the EU. While their universality is limited in its 
expansion, this is not the politically important aspect of universality. Their universality has 
been challenged in an intensive aspect through its application to a new situation. The 
ambiguity of universality between reality, fiction and ideal would allow us to avoid political 
positions that either claim 'open borders' for all or see already their realisation in the 
global transformations. These positions cannot formulate another principle in the situation. 
It is through the intensive aspect of universality politics can function as a form of 
contestation. Universal fights cannot be bestowed upon the whole of humanity, but are 
conquered in struggle. 
A transformative-emancipatory politics begins from a concrete situation that it 
disrupts and transforms in accordance to egalitarian aspirations. Equality and universality 
as the principles of politics impede its closure. I have called security 'barred universality' 
inasmuch as closure and the creation of spaces of abjection are intrinsic to its practices. 
Security cannot remain open, it needs to draw boundaries between those who are to be 
secure and those who are endangering this security. The ultimate horizon of security can 
56 Interestingly, the issue of human trafficking would also become obsolete in such countries, given 
the redefinition of borders and freedoms. The centres of trafficking would move further, beyond the 
borders of EU, mainly in Moldova and Ukraine. 
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be therefore named as fascism, the ultimate community of security that has drawn its 
internal boundaries. The democratisation of security, as certain critical security theorists 
would want, is limited by an arbitrary closure. While critical theorists can shift the 
boundary of this arbitrary limitation, they cannot challenge its logic. 
Conclusion 
A politics of emancipation informed by equality and universality takes place at a distance 
from the state. Even if politics prescribes against the state, thus prescribing against state 
practices, Badiou is adamant about the distance between the self-organisation of 
collective subjects and the state. Yet, I have shown that there are forms of politics that 
formulate equal claims from within institutions. This chapter has shown that a politics of 
unmaking the securitisation of human trafficking has taken place in courts such as the 
ECJ. Rather than undermining or subverting the collective subjectification of sex workers, 
Czech and Polish sex workers have helped redefine prostitution as work. Although they 
have not changed the valence of illegal migrant sex workers within the situation, as they 
have themselves been dis-identified from illegal migrants through the mediation of the 
Europe Agreements, they have inscribed in an institutional locale the equality of work. A 
politics of institutional transformation emerges from the history of political struggles that 
have inscribed the principle of equality in institutions. 
I have shown that a politics of transformation is intertwined with a politics of 
emancipation by opening up the concept of universality. Universality is not just a form of 
address, it is a principle that has been historically enacted, a principle that exists both in 
the arbitrary limitation of political institutions and as an unconditional principle of politics, 
as equality. Emancipation works with an understanding of universality linked to the 
emergence of the excessive subject as a political subject. It is the subject that is deprived 
of positivity, of representation and only exists as an anomaly that stands in for universality, 
sheared of all particular characteristics. To this universality, Balibar adds an aspect of 
universality which is institutional. Fictive universality allows for relations of power to be 
deployed without falling back upon forms of violence. Universality is also a characteristic 
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of equality or equaliberty. Equality cannot be closed, cannot be limited, but remains open 
as a principle to be enacted by political subjects. It is in this impermeability to closure that 
equality as a principle of politics is qualitatively different from security. Equality is universal 
inasmuch as it remains open, while security appears as 'barred universality. Closure is 
the constitutive element of security practices. 
In discussing Balibar's concept of transformation, I have used the concept of 
'equaliberty' as analogous to equality. Yet equaliberty is Balibar's coinage to name the 
inseparability of equality and liberty. Besides historicising emancipatory struggles and 
redefining the relation between political action and a situation, Balibar adds liberty to the 
principle of equality. Badiou has however rejected liberty as a universal concept for 
politics, arguing that liberty has been captured by capitalism. The next chapter will unpack 
the implications of liberty for a transformative-emancipatory politics. Liberty has been after 
all the concept that has been oppositional to security, the instantiation of contingency 
against necessity. Yet, security studies have not engaged with liberty in their discussions 
of the construction of security or their analyses of practices. Hobbes, the paradigmatic 
thinker of the relation between liberty and necessity and the privileging of security, has 
been referred to mostly in acquiescence of the inescapability of security practices and the 
necessary limitation of liberty. I shall therefore engage with the relation between equality 
and liberty to understand what they mean in relation to practices of security. 
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VII. Equality and liberty: the politics of inseparability 
Introduction 
The previous chapter has reformulated politics as transformative-emancipatory, a politics 
of events that emerge from a history of struggles against forms of domination. A 
transformative-emancipatory politics is indifferent to particular governmental 
identifications, it verifies the principle of equality and is harnessed to the standpoint of the 
excessive elements in a situation. The parallel reading of Badiou and Balibar has allowed 
me to formulate a hybrid conceptualisation of politics that can disrupt practices of security 
in the situation of trafficking. What I have bracketed is the disparity between Badiou's 
equality and Balibar's equaliberty. 
Equaliberty is itself a hybrid coinage that points to the inseparability of equality and 
liberty as concepts for politics. Badiou limits politics to the principle of equality, while 
Balibar contends that equality and liberty are inseparable for an emancipatory politics. The 
latter introduces the concept of liberty as intrinsic to a politics of emancipation, while for 
the former it has no immediate value for politics as it has become captive to liberalism. 
Yet, he also wams us against what he calls the 'egalitarian dogmatism', that of equality in 
being placed in front of commodities (Badiou 2004a: 161). Although Badiou thinks 
democracy as the 'singular adjustment of freedom and equality' (Badiou 2004b: 160) and 
indicates that liberty could be retrieved by thinking it from another point than itself (Badiou 
1992), he has not attempted to do so himself. 
Badiou's approach to liberty is clearly indebted to Marx, as he dismisses liberty for 
being reduced to the freedom to sell one's labour force. As Marx has argued in the case of 
the proletariat, workers are free, but as they do not possess anything, they can only sell 
their labour force. Yet, selling one's labour force can also be a form of emancipation, even 
if Badiou glosses over this aspect that the figure of the worker entails. Work is not just the 
form of an egalitarian collective subjectification, but also the key that opens the door of 
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capitalism. For example, a claim like 'We are all workers' implies - besides an equalitarian 
subjectification - the freedom to sell one's labour force. Illegal migrants and trafficked 
women can break free from conditions of more serious, more violent exploitation by selling 
their labour force in the regulated framework of the market. One has, however, to concede 
to a Marxist critique the fact that the position of the worker entails other forms of 
exploitation, not necessarily of a much subtler nature than the exploitation of trafficked 
women in the shadows of illegality. While this form of emancipation remains partial and 
requires further struggles, it represents an emancipatory move from the securitising 
practices that categorise women as risky foreigners. Forms of exploitation will still exist 
and I have not attempted to think emancipatory politics as doing away with all exploitation. 
I have started from a concrete situation of securitisation, which entails particular and 
arbitrary exclusionary effects for trafficking, and I have tried to think a disruption of this 
particular situation. 
Badiou's inattention to liberty in this context is even more puzzling given that he 
has actually rescued 'equality from a similar quandary, i. e. what is understood as 
economic equality or the 'nihilism of virtual equality. This equality in front of the 
commodity is the only equality that can be conjointly claimed by both Western' 
governments and billionaire terrorists; it is the equality that must be firmly rejected (Badiou 
2002b). Against this, he privileges an axiomatic equality, equality that simply is. The 
advantage of equality over freedom remains for Badiou its abstraction and the 
impossibility of its closure as equality does not qualify the terms it refers to and it does not 
presuppose a territory for its exercise (Badiou 1992). Balibar on the other hand does not 
privilege one concept over the other and introduces the equation of liberty and equality. 
His 'proposition of equaliberty' can be translated succinctly as 'no equality without liberty, 
no liberty without equality' (Balibar 2002b). This equation is especially of interest for a 
politics out of security as 'liberty has been thought and used as a tool against 
securitisation. Claims to liberty feature prominently in the activities of those who oppose 
for example counter-terrorist practices of securitisation. 
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Yet, claims to liberty are absent from any discourse concerning trafficked women. 
The humanitarian approach is based on their specificity as victims, relegated outside the 
boundaries of politics where they could make claims to liberty or exercise freedoms. 
Whatever rights and benefits women can be accorded, it is never in terms of freedom. 
Temporary shelter, food, and even residence are granted either in exchange for 
testimonies against the traffickers or on a humanitarian (actually a risk-management) 
basis. The victimisation approach itself, although claiming a series of rights for trafficked 
women, has never formulated any criticism in terms of infringement of liberties. 
Interestingly, the defenders of the rights of victims of trafficking have never made the 
argument that their liberty (for example, the free movement of persons or freedom to 
choose a better life) has been trespassed by states that restrict their movement, locate 
and deport them. The assumption at work here is that a specific category of foreigners, 
women, do not have freedom of movement. Freedom does not appear as an argument 
when women should have the right to choose whether they want a trial against the 
'trafficker'. The assumption of trauma makes any decision by women potentially an unfree 
decision. Women's liberty is a matter of the needs of the police or of the judiciary. If the 
investigative and prosecuting authorities decide that women's testimonies are useful for 
the trial, then they are allowed to stay and testify. 
Although different authors have emphasised forms of agency in the process of 
trafficking, liberty has been largely absent. Liberty has become agency in the ontological 
sense, while political claims to freedom are non-existent or appear as impossible. Given 
that freedom of movement is defined in the European Treaties as applicable to citizens of 
the Union, their remit has not been challenged. How does freedom of movement differ 
from the equality of work discussed in the previous two chapters? Why is the claim to the 
freedom of these foreign women almost unthinkable in the situation of trafficking? As in 
the first chapter, I am concerned here with an absence or, rather, with the impossibility of 
a presence. In the situation of trafficking, liberty cannot become a direct argument against 
security. Why is liberty silenced when women and other migrants need it most? Drawing 
on Balibar's insight that equality and liberty are inseparable, I shall argue that liberty is 
209 
never a concept against security in the absence of equality. A politics that unmakes 
security practices is therefore a politics of the inseparability of equality and liberty. Claims 
to liberty can be formulated only when there is a presumption of equality at work or when 
equality is axiomatically introduced into a situation. 
The lack of theoretical engagement with the concept of liberty in security studies is 
therefore quite surprising. Even more surprising is the inattention to liberty in critical 
security studies. Although critical explorations of the concept of security and the attempt to 
understand its effects have been driven by an emancipatory interest, critical security 
studies have not engaged with the concept of liberty or its political formulations. " Born 
from discontent with how security was traditionally conceptualised in IR and unease with 
inflationary practices of (in)security, critical security studies have however avoided a direct 
engagement with the security-liberty debate. One reason for this shunning might be the 
very form of the security-liberty debate. The relation between freedom and security most 
often reactivates a discussion of the trade-off entailed in the constitution of sovereignty. 
The idea of trade-off or balance entails an understanding of security and freedom as 
values, not as socially constructed practices. It is probably this epistemological gap that 
has impeded a dialogue between critical security studies and the debates on the relation 
between liberty and security. Yet, if there is little engagement with the political 
contestation around what liberty can mean today in relation to security practices, liberty is 
not totally absent from the security literature. 
The subject that is presupposed by various schools of critical security, from the 
58 CoS to the feminist, poststructuralist or Welsh School is an ontologically free subject . 
The implicit counterpart to the construction of security as a speech act or to a contingent 
assemblage of discourses and practices is the free subject that can challenge those. 
57 An exception to this inattention to freedom is found in Huysmans, who has analysed the 
governmentalisation of freedom in the EU (Huysmans 2004a). 
5'3 The concept of 'ontological security', recently introduced in security studies can be considered as 
the counterpart of ontological freedom. The constituted subject is ontologically insecure, not 
ontologically primarily free. Ontological security raises important political questions not just in 
relation to the constitution of the social, but about the modern subjected more generally. What 
happens to politics when Its subjects are no longer constituted by freedom, but by insecurity? 
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Alternative discourses to the constructed discourse of security can be articulated, as long 
as subjects are supposed to be ontologically free. Even if institutionally limited, as more 
sociologically-oriented security scholars would remind us, the liberty that is at stake is that 
of producing alternative discourses and of challenging existing ones. Paradoxically, critical 
approaches cannot accommodate this assumption in an explicit way. The subject's 
ontological freedom is recognised, but not theorised in relation to security. Ontological 
freedom provides a resource of agency against security practices, but liberty as a political 
construct is not theorised. In a way, critical security studies reformulate the debate of 
security and liberty as the problematique of the modern subject: ontologically free and 
endowed with agency, yet constituted in relations of power. As long as liberty functions 
only at the level of ontology, it is unclear how such an ontological premise can play a role 
politically. Rather than failing back upon a discussion of agency understood as the 
ontological freedom of the subject, I shall consider freedom in its political implications. 
How is freedom conceptualised in relation to security? What happens to equality in 
this dichotomy of liberty and security? In the first part of this chapter, I shall explore the 
role of liberty in the constitution of political communities to try and understand the 
impossibility of claims to the liberty of trafficking women. I shall therefore start from 
Thomas Hobbes, the paradigmatic thinker of the relation between liberty and security and 
of the privilege of security and necessity. Through a Foucauldian rereading of Hobbes, I 
discuss a more dynamic concept of liberty, a liberty that is understood as practice rather 
than as a static, given sum from which security deducts certain quantities. Liberty is not 
simply diminished or suspended through security practices, but also reconfigured as 
practice from within the secure political community. An understanding of liberty as practice 
would allow me to place it in relation to practices of security. In the second half of the 
chapter I shall inquire into the conditions of liberty as both a practice of governmentality 
and as a principle of a politics of emancipation and transformation. 
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Governing the excesses of libert19 
Hobbes is still considered the paradigmatic thinker of the relation between liberty and 
security. Individuals give up freedom for the security they can enjoy within the Leviathan. 
In light of the discussion of security undertaken in this thesis, such an approach is 
blatantly wrong. Security is a practice and a discourse and its imaginary is only what holds 
together different practices. As I attempt to formulate liberty and understand its role in 
Hobbes' constitution of the Leviathan along similar lines, I shall not engage with the many 
sophisticated readings of Hobbes in political theory. Given my intent of understanding 
liberty as practice, I contend that Foucault's concept of governmentality can shed light on 
how liberty functions in the Leviathan. 
Hobbes has a very restricted concept of liberty understood in a mechanistic sense. 
Despite this limited understanding of freedom as determined by the laws of motion, there 
is the spectre of other freedoms that hovers over the Leviathan. His institution of 
sovereignty is based on the distinction of two types of freedom: freedom as a prerogative 
of the individual prior to the social contract (which will be shown to be no freedom at all) 
and freedom within the constraints and limitations of the Leviathan (freedom as 
necessity). The shift from natural to civil liberty is that from state of nature to the civil state 
of peace and order. The shift from the state of nature to the commonwealth is also a 
change in the status of equality. The equality in the state of nature was pernicious as it led 
to the war of all against all. Through the authorisation of the Leviathan, the equality of the 
state of nature is replaced by the political equality of individual wills who decide to 
authorise the Leviathan to govem them. There is therefore a moment of political liberty 
and equality in Hobbes' theory, the constitution of Leviathan by a multiplicity of discrete 
individual wills. Moreover, with Hobbes, nobody is unfit for the task of political community. 
There are no slaves or people of lesser intellect who could not join in the constitution of 
59 Balibar has distinguished liberty and freedom as the republican concept and the liberal one 
respectively. I loosely follow this differentiation. The main point of the distinction I make is to show 
the conditions of emergence and different deployment of two concepts that are interlinked. 
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the state and the 'equality of all under one'. Yet, this moment of the constitution of the 
state contains the very promise of its unmaking. As the Leviathan has been constituted 
through individual wills, it can also be undone through 'civil war'. The ambiguity of the very 
constitutive moment of the Leviathan leads Hobbes to set up a mechanism of government 
that would make the eruption of civil wars impossible. 
As early as 1978, Richard Ashcraft suggested that Hobbes' statement that the 
Leviathan had been 'occasioned by the disorders of the present time' should be read as 
part of his political theory and not simply as a background note (Ashcraft 1978: 28). Other 
Marxists and post-Marxist have seen the problem of revolts and political revolutions as 
immanent to the constitution of the Leviathan rather than simply a historical incentive to 
the theory. Hobbes' theory can therefore be understood as a theoretically preventive 
attempt of the causes and outburst of civil wars. Or, in Balibar's formulation, '[h]is entire 
organization of the state, including the way in which the distinction between the public and 
private sphere operates, can be understood as a system of preventive defence against 
the mass movements that forms the basis of civil wars (of classes and of religions) and of 
revolutions' (Balibar 1994: 16). Foucault has also argued that'[i]t is a discourse of struggle 
and permanent civil war that Hobbes wards off by making all wars and conquests depend 
upon a contract, and by thus rescuing the theory of the state' (Foucault 2004: 99). 
This potential reversal of civil peace into civil war is evident from Hobbes' 
continuous concern with seditions. He has dedicated considerable space to seditions in 
both De Cive (1642) and Leviathan (1651). Behemoth is entirely devoted to the issue of 
the civil war and seditions; it takes these analytical considerations and applies them 
historically to the English civil war. Seditions are to be prevented not only through 
'forewarning' and 'forearming' as he suggests in De cive; Hobbes devises a much more 
subtle and varied tools for it. The Leviathan does not only provide for the protection of 
citizens against the state of nature, must ensure the impossibility of its re-emergence, to 
avoid the dissolution of the commonwealth. 
The transfer of rights to the state does not do away with the possibility of civil war 
and excessive freedom. Even when Hobbes attempts to restrict freedom to 'corporeal 
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freedom', the freedom of moving without impediment, the subject thus constituted seems 
to be haunted by the spectre of excessive liberty. If individuals give up freedoms in search 
of security, the state is allowed to 'do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, 
both before hand, for the preserving of Peace and Security, by prevention of Discord at 
home and Hostility from abroad' (Hobbes 1985: 233). Although subjects are free to 
disobey commands that would contradict natural law and free to resist the sovereign when 
attacked, they cannot challenge the actions of the Leviathan. And yet, the very spectre of 
sedition and disobedience still haunts the Leviathan. 
Who are the subjects of potential seditions, those who threaten the body politic 
and forebode its dissolution? The very enemies of the Leviathan are its own citizens and 
the spectre of excessive liberty. Hobbes is adamant against the freedom of man to be the 
judge of good and evil (1985: 365), as this liberty could be a direct challenge to state 
action. Citizens cannot be private judges of public affairs and need to submit their 
judgement to that of the sovereign. This freedom of judgement can only be true of the 
state of nature, as in the Leviathan the freedom of judgement would undermine the 
sovereignty of law and would be dangerously close to seditious actions. Hobbes' diatribe 
against Roman and Greek understandings of liberty, which could buttress claims of 
individuals against the state (1985: 369), entrenches the boundary between forms of 
liberty linked to the two forms of life, nature and civilisation. In Behemoth, he clearly states 
among the causes of the English civil war the exceeding number of men who had been 
educated by famous books on ancient Greece and Rome, in which 'popular government 
was extolled by the glorious name of liberty, and monarchy disgraced by the name of 
tyranny' (Hobbes 1990: 3). The liberty that the Leviathan allows can be undermined by the 
very horizon of excessive liberty. 
The state can deprive individuals of freedom to various extents, depending on the 
role that is attached to state-undermining actions by the citizens or seditions. One could 
argue that citizens are allowed to enjoy as much freedom as does not lead to seditions. 
The only logically possible freedom is a qualified form of freedom, a freedom with limits 
enforced by the sovereign state (Walker and Neal 2005). The rest of the freedoms are 
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defined by the 'silence of the law'; and for such silence to be correctly interpreted and not 
lead to revolt, ordered and disciplined citizens are required. The preservation of civil 
peace requires practices of liberty that are consonant with the goals of the state. As David 
Burchell has put it, civil peace requires both an absolute sovereign and a population 
trained and educated in the civic virtues of justice, gratitude and complaisance 60. He 
persuasively makes the argument that Hobbes' 'education' (disciplina in the Latin original) 
covered a wide range of 'discipines' by which human beings are made into citizens 
(1999). Chapter xxx of the Leviathan lists the virtues that need to be inculcated into 
people so as to make rebellion impossible: not to exalt fellow-citizens above the 
sovereign, not to speak evil of the sovereign, to respect their parents, not to deprive fellow 
subjects of their legitimate possessions, and not to have unjust intentions. The sovereign 
appears from its inception governmental, engaged in the 'normalisation' of freedom, the 
prevention of the subject's excessive liberty. The individual is 'the product of the civil 
society which is to regulate it, and the Hobbesian problem is how to form it so that it will 
be able and willing to abide by the natural laws and contracts appropriate to civil society' 
(Connolly 1988: 27). 
Although Foucault has distinguished disciplinary and governmental practices from 
the prerogatives of the sovereign state, Michel Senellart, the editor of Foucault's lectures 
on governmentality, has located the police function of the sovereign state alongside its 
military role (Senellart 1995). Sovereignty needs 'policing' techniques for its own 
reproduction and perdurability. Peace, security and order can only be achieved through a 
process of permanent ordering, regulation and normalisation of the subject. Ordering 
entails the normalisation and regulation of excessive liberty, a liberty that continues to 
manifest itself within the Leviathan through excessive practices. Hobbes is wary of the 
'multitude', the crowds who shun political unity and resist authority. If the constitution of 
the Leviathan entails the move from the 'multitude' to the 'people', the multitude reappears 
in the governing of the state. Yet, it is not the same multitude, but rather the spectre of a 
multitude endowed with excessive freedom. The multitude of the state of nature was 
60 'Man is made fit for society, not by nature, but by education' (Hobbes quoted in Burchell 1999). 
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already 'decomposed, reduced in advance (preventively) to the sum of its constituent 
atoms (people in the state of nature)' (Balibar 1994: 16), who can enter the social contract 
one by one, individually. When they rebel against the state, the citizens are the multitude 
against the people' (Vimo 2002: 10). For Hobbes the multitude appears as a permanent 
remainder of the state of nature in the middle of the commonwealth . 
61 As Virno has noted, 
the multitude is for Hobbes a negative concept, it is the very negation of the state of civil 
peace with its entailing techniques of normalisation. In De Cive, Hobbes defines a faction 
as a multitude of subjects united in opposition to the sovereign authority. Factions, he 
points out, are unjust, being 'contrary to the peace and safety of the people' (quoted in 
Ashcraft 1978: 42). 
In rejecting the multitude and other forms of illicit associations, Hobbes rejects the 
very possibility of resistance against the Leviathan. Hobbes uses the concepts of liberty 
and equality in a counter-revolutionary move to create a pact, a social contract through 
which everybody is alienated (Balibar 2002a). The political equality on which Hobbes 
bases the constitution of the Leviathan is only a point of departure, distanced both from 
the equality in the state of nature and the governmental techniques deployed in the 
functioning of the state for the purposes of its conservation. The moment of political 
equality is at a distance from the hierarchies of power and honour in the state. Hobbes' 
equality is a partial equality, subtended by relations of inequality - hence the continuous 
concern with disciplining subjects who might revolt against such inequality. 
To avoid the peril of its dissolution, the sovereign state is from its inception 
'governmental', it reshapes and tames excessive liberty to make it consonant with civil 
laws. One of these dangerous practices, one of the 'diseases' of the Leviathan is the 
practice of excessive words, words improperly used or words without a referent. The body 
politic is threatened by words and phrases like 'one must listen to the voice of conscience 
not to the voice of authority' or 'it is right to kill a tyrant! (Ranci6re 1992: 43). The greatest 
fear of the Leviathan is not the 'regicide', the sedition itself, but the naming of regicide as 
61 Malcolm Bull has suggested that it is a 'faction' as a simulacrum of the people and not the 
multitude that Hobbes opposes (Bull 2005). Yet, factions are a 'multitude of citizens', in many ways 
similar to other illicit organisations that Hobbes finds dangerous. 
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tyrannicide (Rancibre 1992: 369). When the king is called a tyrant, other forms of 
justification of political action challenge the authority of the Leviathan. Tyrannicide is 
synonymous to the excessive use of liberty and the enactment of equality against 
relations of domination. The word 'tyrant' challenges the rightfulness of the sovereign and 
points to relations of domination and inequality. Claims of tyrannicide also enact the 
political equality from which Hobbes could make solely a moment of departure of the 
commonwealth. Political equality is suspended, however, in the functioning of the state 
and its reassertion by practices of excessive liberty is what the Leviathan fears most. 
Political equality cannot last in the functioning of the Leviathan, as the narrative of the 
constitution of the state is divorced from the insurrectional moment of politics, the moment 
of collective action against forms of domination and inequality. 
Practices of security make possible the separation between the constitution of 
political communities and the insurrectional moment of equality. The most troublesome 
enemies for the state are not those who threaten its survival - after all Hobbes is aware of 
the fact that a state does not die like an individual - but those who threaten to reveal the 
relations of domination at the heart of the Leviathan. Migrants become interchangeable 
with terrorists, with anti-globalisation protesters, neo-Nazis and skinheads with enemy 
states. Practices of security are consequently a way of suspending forms of excessive 
liberty against domination and inequality. 
Governing through freedom 
The separation between the insurrectional and the constitutional moment in the 
constitution of the state is not the only strategy for preventing the possibility of 'war' or of 
challenges to the sovereign. The normalisation of liberty in the sovereign imaginary and 
the distancing of the moment of political equality in Hobbes is supplemented by another 
move that will render the practices of excessive liberty and revolts against injustice and 
domination unthinkable. Besides the disciplinary taming of excessive liberty, there is 
another element that appears as part of the state function to prevent seditions. Hobbes's 
enlarged definition of safety as not just 'bare Preservation, but also all other Contentments 
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of life, which every man by lawful Industry, without danger, or hurt to the Commonwealth, 
shall acquire to himself (Hobbes 1985: 376) spells out a governmental function of the 
state. Freedoms are produced by the state to ensure the prosperity of the population. 
They are not normalised but fostered, artificially created by the state without any reference 
to a false/excessive liberty or (non-)freedom. It is no longer the Leviathan that appears as 
the artificial creation of the social contract, but the individual itself is being re-fashioned, 
artificially re-created. 
In De cive, following the chapter on seditions, Hobbes prescribes upon the 
sovereign state the duty to 'ensure that the citizens are abundantly provided with all the 
good things necessary not just for life but for the enjoyment of life' (Hobbes 1998: 144). 
Such an approach deriving from the state function of ensuring prosperity entails a different 
conceptualisation of freedom. This concern with population, its 'multiplication', prosperity 
is the other side of disciplinary normalisation, it is encapsulated by biopolitical practices. 
Foucault had located the emergence of an art of government as early as the fifteenth and 
sixteenth century. Yet, it was only in the eighteenth century that the art of government 
found its own rationality by inventing the notion of the population. The population becomes 
the ultimate end of government itself (Foucault 1991: 100). 
In Hobbes, an account of governmentality avant la lettre subordinates the concern 
for the welfare to the population to the prevention of seditions. The state has therefore to 
take care of the reproduction of the population, of their prosperity, to ensure domestic 
peace and defend them against external enemies. The state does not simply avoid the 
resurgence of the 'state of nature' in its middle, I. e. as civil war, through repressive and 
disciplinary means, but is also supposed to ensure the good living of its subjects through 
governmental technologies. The policing function of Leviathan is not simply repressive 
and dissuasive; it also needs to facilitate the circulation of persons and goods, the 
provision of goods, use all forces, restrict superfluous spending, etc. The creation of 
regulated freedoms can prevent resistance to domination. The governmental function of 
creating prosperity is linked to the prevention of civil wars and forms of internal resistance. 
In Behemoth, the 'admiration [of] the great prosperity of the Low Countries after they had 
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revolted from their monarch' (Hobbes 1990: 3-4) is again mentioned among the causes of 
the English civil war. Protected and prosperous, citizens have no reason for discontent 
with the Leviathan. 
What does this 'governmental' function of the state mean for liberty? To ensure the 
prosperity of the population, the state needs to foster certain liberties, like the liberty of 
circulation or commerce. The state becomes a producer of freedom; it creates a series of 
freedoms which can serve to enhance its prosperity and the welfare of the population. It 
needs freedom and therefore it has to produce it and it also has to organise it. Liberty 
becomes a 'technical requirement of governing the natural processes of social life and, 
particularly, those of self-interested exchange' (Burchell 1991: 139). These freedoms, 
however differently interpreted by mercantilism, Keynesianism or (neo-)Iiberalism, 
constitute the subject as the artificial homo economicus. 
Governmentalised freedom as freedom without an outside is no longer defined by 
its excesses, but immanently, through considerations of proper use. Is the use of liberty 
aligned to the purposes of the state? The logic of governmentalised freedom is totally 
different from liberty under conditions of necessity. Freedom becomes a question of use 
value which would allow for certain economic and social processes to unfold. The creation 
of artificial freedom eliminates the outside of excessive freedom. Social and economic 
processes have no outside, they become constitutive of the community without the 
mediation of political subjects. Political equality is no longer the basis for the constitution 
of community, equality as a principle of action is replaced by equality as a goal, by 
programmatic equality in Badiou's terms. Freedom becomes a governmental creation 
linked to specific processes that ensure the 'ordered' functioning of the state and its 
population and that also contains the criteria for its own control. The constitution of the 
subject as self-regulating has become an explicit political stake. The imperative of self- 
government is internal to the functioning of economic processes. Such freedoms can be 
effective, utile to the social and economic processes if certain 'technologies of agency' 
and 'technologies of performance' are united in the subject (Dean 1999a). The former 
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seek to enhance the possibilities for agency and the latter subsume actions to a 
calculative regime. 
Artificial freedoms are governed according to a different principle of necessity 
namely efficiency. Efficiency is, however, no longer understood as the calculation and 
62 adjustment of ends and means which would be part of any political decision. The criteria 
of efficiency are already given by the knowledge of economic and social processes. 
Subjects adjust their freedoms to these processes. Governmentality no longer works with 
a paradigmatic relation between the state and the citizen. With the invention of the 
population and the use of political economy as a rationality of government, the relation 
between the state 63 and its citizens or certain spheres to be governed works with the 
principle of utility. Is the liberty of certain categories of the population or in certain areas 
desirable for proper government? The answer varies and can only be supported by a 
detailed knowledge of the population. Only a certain kind of liberty -a certain way of 
understanding and exercising freedom, of relating to ourselves individually and collectively 
as subjects of freedom - is compatible with liberal arts of rule (Rose 1999). 
The differentiation between excess and proper use is important inasmuch as it 
allows me to think not just the double of liberty/security, but the triptych of 
liberty/security/equality. 64 Freedom as excess speaks of the insurrectional moment of 
politics, the moment in which political equality is allied with freedom in actions against 
domination. Freedom as proper use suspends the problem of political equality. Equality 
becomes programmatic, it is to be understood as substantive, a goal to be achieved by 
governmental programmes. Programmatic equality is based on a constitutively 
inegalitarian society, with subjects labelled as capable or incapable of aligning their 
62 1 am grateful for this point to Lene Hansen. 
63 The state is understood here in its Foucauldian sense, including practices of 'government at a 
distance'. For a discussion of state practices and government at a distance, see Rose and Miller 
(1992). 
64 Huysmans has analysed border control and surveillance as different types of technologies to 
tackle the excesses of freedom. In the context of the EU, he defines security policy'those political 
and administrative practices that address excesses (e. g. a sudden inflow of very large numbers of 
immigrants) endangering the orderly conduct of freedom' (Huysmans 2004a: 305). 
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actions to the purposes of government. Moreover, this constitutive inequality suspends 
excessive liberty and the enactment of political equality. The criteria for the proper use of 
freedom are given by immanent processes which are deciphered by professionals: 
economists, social scientists, demographists, etc. A proper use of artificially created 
freedoms - e. g. freedom of movement, freedom of commerce - divides populations 
among categories. Inequality is not only characteristic of social relations, but becomes 
constitutive of who subjects are. Those who use freedom properly are the self-governing 
subjects, able to manage themselves and their liberties. The paradigmatic liberal subject 
is therefore the subject capable of self-control, the subject that harnesses her freedom to 
the purposes of the state and avoids its excesses. However, such a freedom - Hindess 
warns us - is not something 'granted to individuals as such and in general: it is granted to 
certain individuals only and within particular circumscribed domains' (Hindess 2001: 97). 
The relation between those who are governed and those who govern is variable, 
depending on the categorisation of the governed. Freedom is to be granted to these self- 
governing subjects. Those who are not yet capable of self-regulation have their freedoms 
restricted under the imperative of utility or efficiency. 
The liberal state has a long history of people who are deemed not to possess or to 
display the attributes required for the juridical and political subjects of rights and who are 
therefore subjected to all sorts of disciplinary, bio-political and even sovereign 
interventions (Dean 1999a). Alongside the minority of self-governing subjects, the rest are 
constituted as subjects whose freedom is to be severely restricted. I have already shown 
that security practices constitute categories of subjects and abjects. This division is made 
possible given the use of freedom by these subjects. The governmentalisation of freedom 
introduces a new aspect to the excessive liberties of the multitude. Calling a king a tyrant 
made visible a wrong and a form of oppression. It was available as a practice to anybody 
who could hold the state accountable for its practices, it was the insurrectional moment 
that always haunted the constitution of political communities. Political equality can only 
appear as superfluous in relation to artificial freedoms that are supposed to ultimately lead 
to relative equality. The insurrectional moment can no longer be invoked. 
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As social and economic processes have become naturalised, the state will hold 
individuals and groups of the population accountable for the proper use of their freedoms 
so as not to impinge upon the natural unfolding of these processes. Hobbes has warned 
against the dangers that commerce in some products can mean for the state. Trading too 
much can be dangerous for the state as well as trading too little. Those who do not 
conform to the limits and conditions set by the state become dangerous. They are not 
dangerous to the state itself, but they pose a risk to the good functioning of certain 
societal and economic processes. Thus, they become dangerous to society, to the rest of 
the population. The danger posed is not one of direct sedition against the state, but one of 
indirect disordering of the processes that make up the state. The governmentalisation of 
freedom is doubly removed from the insurrectional moment of politics. Not only was 
constitution separated from insurrection, but the constitutional moment is unimportant in 
the temporal rendering of the state as constituted by economic and social processes. 
Trafficked women are not dangerous only because they have broken the law or 
because of their difference. They are dangerous given the ways in which illegal migration 
is understood, as unordered disturbance of the processes of free movement. Women 
pose a threat to freedom of movement -a governmental process devised by the EU as a 
method of effective government. Breaking the parameters set by the state for what 
freedom of movement should be turns women into risky others. As the risk they pose is 
one of renewed migratory projects, it must be understood as a risk to a process, not to the 
state, society, groups of people. 
Migrants are not simply defined as a threat to Western societies, values, etc. - 
they are defined as threat to processes that ensure the prosperity and smooth functioning 
of the state. Freedom of movement is beneficial for the state as long as there are not too 
large a number of migrants who increase the strain upon the labour market. Hence, there 
is a categorisation of migrants depending on their economic usefulness. These people are 
not, however, directly inimical, they do not threaten the state - even if in more extreme 
versions such is the threat that is being formulated in the media. They endanger the 
proper functioning of freedom of movement. 
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Yet, there is another element that makes migrants most dangerous besides their 
role in the processes of the state or their (illegally) crossing of borders. The French 
discourse of the 'seuil de tol6rance' [threshold of tolerance] regarding migration is 
revealing in this sense. Migrants can be tolerated as long as they as they play a role in the 
functioning of social and economic processes, as long as they do not migrate in higher 
numbers, for other reasons than work or political asylum and do not raise any claims 
politically. Interestingly, as Balibar has pointed out, the question of the 'seuil de tol6rance' 
has not been raised in relation to labour, but in relation to housing, welfare, education, 
everything that serves for the reproduction of labour force (Balibar 1992). Migrants 
become a problem when they try to have access to social housing, welfare benefits, when 
they manage to bring their families, when their children go to schools, when they are no 
longer reduced to raw labour force. Migrants become dangerous when they no longer 
enact freedoms granted to them in certain areas, but attempt to enact political equality, 
claim equal treatment or equal rights. 
Migrants become the embodiment of an insurrectional form of politics that both 
political theory and state practices have attempted to distance and prevent. In light of the 
reformulation of the relation between liberty, equality and equality, one can argue that 
migrants become dangerous when they attempt to reactivate the insurrectional moment of 
politics. The threat of trafficking and the risk that victims of trafficking pose is embedded in 
the threat that illegal migrant (sex) workers - the category from which victims of trafficking 
are extracted - can pose. Illegal migrant (sex) workers can activate an insurrectional 
politics that challenges the inegalitarian premises of the constitution of states and the 
exclusionary effects of their governmental practices. 
The two forms of freedom that appear in Hobbes, liberty and its excesses on the 
one hand and artificial freedoms and their proper use on the other point to a differential 
relation between liberty, equality, and security. Although Hobbes thought that equality (or 
the lack of enough difference) between men led to the war of all against all, political 
equality was the point of departure in the constitution of the Leviathan. If this equality was 
suspended through preventive disciplinary practices of excessive liberty, it always 
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harboured the risk of being reactivated by 'factions' and 'multitudes of citizens' as a form 
of insurrectional politics challenging state practices. The artificial freedoms that the state 
creates suspend equality by dividing the population into categories depending on their 
capacity for self-govemance and proper use of freedom. Without an outside or a fiction of 
the state of nature, a state differentiated from the state as political community, artificial 
freedoms naturalise the inequality of political subjects. Equality as the form of action, as 
the principle that informs insurrections and revolts is replaced by programmatic equality, 
equality that can be achieved by working upon the inequality of subjects or practices. 
Those who resist state practices are categorised as unable to behave properly, or as 
unequal in some other way, by virtue of some particularity (class, race, nationality, mental 
or intellectual condition, etc. ). 
The freedom of trafficked women is therefore doubly unthinkable: both as 
excessive liberty and as properly used freedom. Freedom of movement cannot be 
practiced by subjects who are not useful to the social and economic processes sanctioned 
by the state. Trafficked women cannot enact excessive freedoms as they are not 
participants in the constitution of the political community where they attempt to claim 
rights. Women are aliens to both the Member States and the EU as a whole. Hobbes' 
lesson is that the freedom of women who cross border in search for work - making 
themselves vulnerable to abuse and exploitation - is unthinkable inasmuch as the 
insurrectional moment of politics has become unthinkable. My reading of Hobbes and of 
the treatment of freedom and equality has attempted to bring back the spectre of an 
insurrectional politics and make insurrection thinkable again. 
Inseparable equality and liberty or equaliberty 
The discussion of liberty and equality in Hobbes has revealed different understandings of 
these concepts. I have attempted to retrieve an understanding of excessive liberty linked 
with equality in forms of insurrectional politics that have been suspended by the 
constitution and functioning of the Leviathan. Political theory has often gone along with 
this suspension of an insurrectional understanding of liberty and equality and has seen 
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equality as substantive and liberty as a status. Consequently, equality and freedom could 
be thought only as separable and incompatible rather than intrinsically related. Liberalism 
for example is characterised by the paradox of liberty and equality. 'Premising itself on the 
natural equality of human beings', Wendy Brown has argued, 'liberalism makes a political 
promise of universal individual freedom in order to arrive at social equality, or achieve a 
civilized retrieval of the equality postulated in the state of nature' (Brown 1995: 67). With 
liberalism, equality is deferred, turned into a goal to be achieved, while liberty is seen as 
primary. Socialism sees equality as primary and subordinates liberty to the requirements 
of equality. 
In coining the awkward concept of equaliberty (reading equally awkward in 
French), Balibar has argued that equality and liberty are inseparable, that privileging either 
equality or liberty is equivalent to denying both. The concept of equaliberty posits the 
inseparability of equality and liberty as a historical realisation: 
... the reasoning that underlies the proposition of equaliberty (E=F) is not 
essentialist. [I]t is based on is the historical discovery, which can 
legitimately be called experimental, that their extensions are necessarily 
identical. To put it plainly, the situations in which both are either present 
or absent are necessarily the same (Balibar 1994: 48). 
Equality and liberty can only be verified in particular situations, none is given 
substantively. Equaliberty is to be verified by political actors in concrete situations. The 
proposition of equaliberty can be translated as the historical inseparability of equality and 
liberty or that equality is identical to freedom. In practice, 'neither can true liberty go 
without equality nor can true equality go without liberty' (Balibar 1994: xiii). As the 
equation of liberty and equality has emerged out of historical practice, there is no proof of 
this truth but a negative one: equality and liberty are always contradicted together (Balibar 
1994: 48). Equality and liberty are contradicted in the same situations, there can be no 
situations which suppress or repress freedom and do not also suppress or diminish 
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equality. In the situation of trafficking, the inequality of illegal migrants is also a form of 
unfreedom, be it freedom of movement or even freedom of choice. 
The opposite of the proposition of equaliberty is therefore the proof of its truth: 
situations of constraints on freedom also mean social inequality. Unfreedorn is identical to 
inequality as freedom is identical to equality. The deferral of equality through the creation 
of the Leviathan would make the liberty granted to citizens a form of unfreedom. The 
creation of artificial freedoms is in itself a strategy of division and inequality of categories 
of the population. The body politic is doubly constituted through a double deferral of 
equality* first citizens can enjoy only formal liberty and second, the majority of the 
population is subjected to practices of unfreedom. Balibar has emphasised three aspects 
of equaliberty that contradict the Hobbesian constitution of the body politic. The first is that 
politics is founded on the recognition that neither freedom nor equality can exist without 
each other, i. e. that the suppression or even the limitation of one necessarily leads to the 
suppression or limitation of the other. Secondly, equaliberty implies universality. 
Democracy is a historical process of the extension of rights to all humanity. In the third 
place, equaliberty implies... a universal right to politics, the right of every man and every 
woman to become the'subject'or agent of politics' (Balibar 1994: 49). 
The imperative of security constitutes political communities through practices of 
inequality and unfreedom. Those who make use of excessive liberty to resist a tyranny or 
to resist oppressive practices challenge the inequality of domination. The multitude 
challenges the right of the sovereign to judge on good and evil and manifests itself as an 
equal judge. Governmental freedoms depend upon an inegalitanan premise; through the 
distinction that is traced among categories of the population, freedoms become 
unfreedoms. Equaliberty refers to the freedom of every subject to resist oppression and 
domination; such freedom can only be enacted or claimed through equality. Equality 
challenges the very logic of population division (as the logic of security) and therefore 
opens a space for liberty. Equaliberty is universal in that nobody can be excluded from 
politics based on particular characteristics or predicates; it functions in the tension 
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between fictive and ideal universality, between the arbitrary limitation of politics and its 
universal promise. 
The equality that informs a transformative-emancipatory politics needs to be set at 
a distance from the concept of difference. As Badiou has separated the politics of 
emancipation from any cultural predicates, equality needs to be separated from the very 
popular concept of difference. In a recent article on Balibar's concept of equaliberty, Alan 
Johnson has argued that it has an affinity with the feminist 'equality-versus-difference' 
debate (Johnson 2003). Despite apparent similarities, I contend that political equality 
points to an idea of indifference to difference, to particularity. 
The feminist problematique of equality-versus-difference derived from the political 
question of claims to equality, claims which were interpreted as subduing and erasing 
difference. Therefore, the question that has beset feminist struggles and political theory is: 
how can women claim equality with men, while at the same time needing claims based on 
difference? The equality theorists were thought to accept the basic claims underpinning 
liberal political theory, that the idea of equality is neutral vis-6-vis gender (Squires 2000: 
118). The difference theorists argued that equality is actually anthropocentric and called 
for women's specificity to be recognised in feminist struggles rather than effaced in claims 
for equality. 
One of the ways out of the quandary of equality-versus-difference has been to 
refuse the terms of the question altogether, to refuse the dichotomous mould in which the 
question of equality-versus-difference has been formulated. The deconstruction or 
displacement of the dichotomy has challenged the connection of equality with sameness 
and of difference with dichotomous sexual difference. Sexual difference could be 
deconstructed in a criticism of dichotomous thinking (see Lloyd 1984; Prokhovnik 2002) 
and its simplification of the world. On the side of equality, a similar strategy of 
displacement has consisted in the deconstruction of the equality-sameness equation. The 
definition of equality as sameness, 'a condition in which humans share the same nature, 
the same rights, and the same terms of regard by state institutions' is intrinsic to liberalism 
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(Brown 1995: 153). The conceptual force of equality rests on the assumption of difference, 
which should be in some respect valued equally (Squires 2000: 129). 
Joan Scott has proposed to 'rela)e the concept of equality by redefining it as 
'deliberate indifference to specified differences' (Scott 1994: 294). Equality no longer 
presupposes sameness, but a deliberate ignorance of some differences. She would be at 
pains to accommodate the claims of dominated groups of women against the equality of 
Women (defined as white, middle-class, and straight). The challenge of lesbians and 
feminists of colour to the equality-versus-difference debate has shifted it onto the side of 
difference, of differences-within-difference, the different voices of oppressed and 
dominated women under the category of Women. Feminism therefore had to preoccupy 
itself with how to give voice to these different categories. 
Yet, a continual emphasis on 'differences that differ can lead to a political 
quagmire. Victims of trafficking are already different - one can create other differences, be 
indifferent to certain differences while pointing out others. What counts is not a list 
differences, but how one gets out of listing differences. It is an important insight of the 
intersection of feminism and poststructuralism that subjects are different from their 
constitution through history and practices of power. However, this awareness is not 
enough for political struggles. Why should one difference be supported as opposed to 
another? The answer has variedly concerned the history of injustice or the hierarchisation 
and polarisation of differences. The difference of black women has been doubly 
subordinated to the difference of men and the difference with white women. The challenge 
for feminist politics was how to formulate this antagonism/agonism of differences without 
losing all possibility of a common struggle. 
In a historical view of women's struggles, one can argue that struggles for 
liberation have sometimes involved the right to be equal and at other times the right to be 
different. Scott has brilliantly shown how 'difference' and 'sameness' have both been 
present - although in tension - in the struggle of women as early as the French 
Revolution. Feminism is the paradoxical expression of that contradiction in its effort both 
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to have 'sexual difference' acknowledged and to have it rendered irrelevant (Scott 1996: 
168). In her own words, 
Feminism was a protest against women's political exclusion; its goal was 
to eliminate 'sexual difference' in politics, but it had to make its claims on 
behalf of 'women' (who were discursively produced through 'sexual 
difference'). To the extent that it acted for 'women', feminism produced 
the sexual difference that it sought to eliminate. This paradox [ ... I was the 
constitutive condition of feminism as a political movement throughout its 
long history (Scott 1996: 3-4). 
The usage of sexual difference arguments is therefore contextual. In relation to work, she 
claims that at certain moments it may make sense to claim a re-evaluation of the status of 
'women's work' (as a 'comparable worth' strategy) and contexts in which it makes more 
sense to argue for the entry of women into 'nontraditional' jobs (Scott 1994: 296). 
Interestingly, both claims are actually not 'difference' or 'sameness' claims, but egalitarian 
ones. What Scott's comments reveal is that the question of 'equality-versus-difference' 
has been interpreted as a question of 'sameness-versus-difference'. The equal ity-versus- 
difference debate made equality stand for the erasure of difference. 
Genevi6ve Fraisse has convincingly criticised the awkward joining of 'equality' and 
'difference' by feminist theorising. She has asked why a philosophical, ontological concept 
such as difference - whose correspondent is obviously identity - has been connected with 
a political principle such as equality -whose correspondent is liberty (Fraisse 2001: 251 - 
253). Feminist literature has brought together the ontological discussion of 
identity/difference and the political one of equality/liberty through a combination of equality 
and difference. The rationale of such a move takes equality through the ontological prism 
of identity and assumes that equality is destructive of difference. Yet, difference itself is 
hierarchical and leads to inequality. Fraisse has suggested that the 'difference of the 
sexes' should not impede the formulation of a politics of equality and liberty. Instead of 
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opposing identity and difference, one should play upon their possible conjunction: women 
are different from and similar to men. Here, paradoxically, she has joined Scott in the 
intimation that claims to identity/difference can be formulated depending on the context. 
Drawing inspiration from the critique that Fraisse formulates, my contention is 
rather that the question of equality/liberty should not be joined to that of identity/difference. 
I have shown that an emphasis on particularity, on difference leads to a politics of 
inequality that is the politics of the status quo and of security. The equality-difference 
debate in feminism obscures the importance of equality as a principle for politics, by 
reducing it to an identitarian concern. While it is true that identity and especially 
sexual/gender difference has been a major problem for feminist thought, it is important 
that one should not lose the political potential of the concept of equality. Badiou is worth 
quoting at length here, as his comments are an interesting alternative to the feminist 
debates around identity/difference: 
The progressive formulation of a cause that engages cultural or 
communal predicates, linked to incontestable situations of oppression 
and humiliation, presumes that we propose these predicates, these 
particularities, these singularities, these communal qualities, in such a 
way that they become situated in another space and become 
heterogeneous to their ordinary oppressive operations... But in the end, 
between this particularity present in the practical, concrete support of any 
political process, and the statements in the name of which the political 
process unfolds, I think there is only a relation of support, but not a 
relation of transitivity. You can't go from one to the other, even if one 
seems to be 'carried' by the other (Badiou 1998b: 118-119). 
'Difference' arguments can be mobilised contextually in support of a politics of equality, 
but they are not transitive to a politics of equality. The terms that need to be connected 
are equality and liberty. 
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Equality is not identity or equalisation as this would mean a denial of freedom. 
Such is the problem that feminism encounters once more when it attempts to think politics 
for the woman-other. I have shown how a transformative/emancipatory politics for 
trafficked women has to be divorced from identity/difference concerns, even if 'sexual 
difference' and the naturalisation of woman (or a certain category of women) has been 
instrumental in the imaginary of prostitution. The situation of prostitution can be 
approached politically by means of questions of inequality and unfreedom rather than 
difference. 
This insight bears a lot of weight for my previous discussion of the divisibility of 
freedom exactly through the construction of difference. If difference is the primary 
instrument of political struggles, it can become consonant with governmental strategies of 
population categorisation and division. As the defining principle of politics, equality 
suspends the possibility of such categorisation. The separation of equality and freedom 
allows for the deployment of practices of security. A politics out of security, a politics of 
transformation and emancipation is based on the insurrectional enactment of equality and 
liberty as indeterminate principles whose extensions are to be verified in particular 
situations. 
Although Balibar does not consider inequality as preceding unfreedom, a 
Foucauldian analysis of governmentality and security has shown that hierarchy and 
division precede unfreedom. Governmental freedoms operate through the division and 
categorisation of populations. The case of trafficking in women is one of those historical 
instantiations of the absence of both equality and freedom. The unthinkability and 
absence of freedom or liberty is linked with the absence of equality. Freedom can only 
become thinkable from the standpoint of a form of equality, the equality of work. Balibar's 
proposition of equaliberly offers an important insight as claims to freedom are impossible 
in the absence of equality. Trafficked women are categorised by the state as a specific 
population group, whose risk is to be ascertained and upon whom a variety of sovereign, 
disciplinary and governmental technologies are to be deployed. It is the difference of the 
trafficked women that makes them unequal and risky. Politics starts with a subjectification 
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that is universalising and not differential. Work functions as a universal that suspends the 
specifications of difference in the situation of trafficking. 
The analysis of the linkage between inequality and unfreedom, as well as the 
discussion of equality and freedom has shown a point absent in Balibar, namely that 
(in)equality precedes (un)freedom. If certain historical situations display either both 
political principles or none, transformative/emancipatory struggles enact the principle of 
equality in order to politicise liberty. Liberty can become thernatised, politicised, contested 
or enacted only from the standpoint of equality. Otherwise liberty remains presupposed as 
the 'unlimited power of the negative' (Badiou 2003b: 74), the ontological freedom of the 
modern subject to resist oppression and domination. Equality disrupts the dividing 
practices of security and allows the dangerous and risky to enter the stage of politics, to 
invent egalitarian names for themselves and derive political freedoms from these names. 
The relation between equality and freedom understood as the political practice of 
emancipation and transformation reconfigures situations defined by inequality and 
domination. Rather than substantively defined, equality and freedom can only be 
understood as non-domination and non-discrimination. As the principles of non- 
domination and non-discrimination, equality and freedom are maxims for action, principles 
that are not linked to any form of particularity or difference, but which intervene in any 
situation in which difference is formulated as domination or discrimination. Unlike Balibar, I 
understand equality as the condition of liberty. Without the prerequisite of non- 
discrimination, of equality, interventions against domination cannot be formulated. It is the 
unconditional equality of all subjects as political subjects and participants that supports the 
enactment of liberty in situations of domination. Liberty is also necessary as a word for 
politics inasmuch as a politics of transformation and emancipation is a politics of 
excessive liberty, of forms of insurrection that take rights and freedoms beyond the 
boundaries assigned to them and challenge situations of domination. 
The transformative-emancipatory politics in the situation of trafficking suspends 
what I called in the first chapter the 'vectoring' of security by suspending its structuring of 
the situation as a situation of domination and discrimination. The situation of trafficking 
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can be reconfigured through the maxim of equality that starts from those who would count 
for nothing and that transforms, through political action, into a struggle for liberty and 
rights. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has questioned another absence in the struggles that unmake practices of 
security in the situation of trafficking, namely that of claims to liberty/freedom. It has 
started from the assumption that the presence and thernatisation of freedom, the 
formulation of political liberties is actually impossible in such a context and has attempted 
to understand what turns freedom into an impossibility. To this purpose, I have revisited 
the conceptualisation of freedom and its relation to equality and security in Hobbes' 
political theory. Through a re-reading of Hobbes, I have shown that what makes claims to 
liberty unthinkable in relation to the situation of trafficking is not security, but the absence 
of equality. I have shown that the definition of liberty entails several moves away from 
equality as a political principle and insurrectional politics. Firstly, the state curtails the 
possibility of excessive liberties and minimises citizenship through disciplinary and 
repressive practices that attempt to prevent and make impossible insurrections against 
situations of domination and discrimination. Secondly, the state also creates freedoms to 
be enjoyed as part of the immanent social and economic processes of the population. 
These freedoms are to be differentially enjoyed, depending on the capacity for self- 
government in accordance to state goals. The move from liberty to freedom can be read 
as an intensified attempt at suspending equality and insurrectional politics. The 
governmentalisation of freedom undermines equality even more as it classifies individuals 
in different categories depending on their capacity for governing their freedom. Political 
equality remains only a moment of departure in the Leviathan, a moment from which the 
Leviathan departs in its functioning. 
I have argued that the dangerous are primarily those who could reactivate the 
spectre of the insurrection beyond the constitution of the state through the social contract 
or its reproduction through the governance of social and economic processes. Those who 
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could enact a politics of equality and liberty against situations of domination and 
discrimination are to be incapacitated through practices of security. Trafficked women 
become dangerous through the excessive and disallowed use of freedom of movement. 
As non-nationals, non-citizens, trafficked women are a priori excluded from freedom of 
movement. Other differences (e. g. risk profiles) re-construct them as a category 
continually prompted to endanger processes of migration and freedom of movement 
defined by the EU and its Member States. Trafficked women are already outside the 
equality of citizenship and its national content. Their past biographies add to this social 
inequality the inequality of 'nature': they are unable to govern their freedom and 
permanently incapacitated from the use of freedom. Yet, beyond this constitution of 
danger there is the spectre of the more dangerous illegal migrant (sex) workers, the 
category from which the victims of trafficking are extracted. Illegal migrant (sex) workers 
embody the danger of reactivating insurrectional politics, of exposing situations of 
domination and discrimination. If forms of insurrection are to suspend the vectoring of 
security in the situation of trafficking, if a politics of emancipation and transformation 
happens, it is because an instantiation of equality has been made possible. Equality 
disrupts situations of discrimination and suspends the divisions of freedom depending 
upon categories of subjects. Non-discrimination entails the attempt to reconfigure 
situations as situations of non-domination. 
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VIII. The politics of writing 
Introduction 
A transformative-emancipatory politics of human trafficking engages locally with 
institutional practices and enacts the principle of equality-liberty in any situation of 
domination and discrimination. Politics means singular decisions by subjects to enact the 
impossible in given situations: decisions by trafficked women to claim the equality of 
prostitution as work before the ECJ and have freedoms that derive from it, the 'impossible' 
decision by sex workers to become a collective subject that holds accountable state 
practices that deny to some people the right to sell their labour and the freedom to create 
a better life for themselves. 
While these struggles happen in various sites, this thesis has mitten about them. It 
has brought concepts and abstractions to work within politics, while simultaneously 
holding these concepts accountable to the thought of politics. Therefore, reflecting upon 
this relation between abstraction and politics, between theory and praxis is the 
responsible engagement with the 'conditions' of one's own work. This (self-)reflection is 
even more important in the context in which this research has been formulated, namely 
that of the 'governmental' social theorising about human trafficking and security. 
I have started with an exploration of the ways in which human trafficking is 
depicted: varied 'governmental' ways, attempting to describe and locate this 
heterogeneous and illusory phenomenon so that technologies of government can be 
deployed to manage it. Human trafficking has been problematised as illegal migration, 
organised crime, prostitution or abuse of human rights. In attempting to impose a regime 
of truth about the problem of trafficking, these representations remained indifferent to the 
problematisation of security. Migration, organised crime, prostitution and even human 
rights are also subjected to governmentalisation through security, vectored through 
discourses and practices of security. Migration is almost consensually considered a 
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security issue and human rights can become similarly securitising through practices of risk 
management. Given this 'deeper' structuring of human trafficking by discourses and 
practices of security, I have tried to think how these very practices can be challenged, 
rather than opposing human rights to organised crime constructions and reinforcing the 
logic of security. 
In writing about security or human trafficking, I have not entered any of the fields 
attempting to define an 'object' of study, but have undertaken a 'problematisation of 
problematisation'. I have explored the ways in which human trafficking and security are 
problematised and the effects that specific problematisations entail. The 'problematisation 
of problematisation' is not singular to my research; it has been at the heart of critical 
approaches in security studies. Yet, the problematisation of problematisation as critique 
was insufficient without an understanding of how the existing problematisations of human 
trafficking and security could be unmade. Thus, the 'problematisation of problematisation' 
is also a 'politics beyond problematisation'. Problematisation opens a range of possible 
answers and the problematisation of problematisation shows how these answers create 
specific categories of subjects/abjects. 
I have shown that a politics that disrupts the effects of the problematisation of 
human trafficking as security, that un-vectors security is a universal politics of equality and 
liberty. Formulating prostitution as work, this 'impossible' politics challenges the 
representation and value of illegal migrant sex workers in a situation from nothing to those 
who count as workers. Although this politics is the thought of those who organise and 
mobilise, this author has also (re)thought the situation of trafficking and tried to locate 
forms of politics that would unmake its security problematisation. How is theoretical 
thought linked to transformative-emancipatory politics? As mentioned before, this question 
stems not only from the political interest in 'how others write', but from a reflective 
judgment on how this author has written. 
Reconsidering the politics of writing also means considering the politics of this very 
writing. Can such theorising avoid becoming governmental, has this theorising avoided 
the trap of governmentality? If this research has started by assuming a link between the 
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theorisation of human trafficking and the institutional practices to govern the phenomenon, 
this chapter will open up this relation. It will explore different modes of conceptualising the 
relation between theory and practice (with reference to theories of security and security 
practices) and will attempt to situate a theory that is linked to a politics of transformation 
and emancipation. I shall argue against the assumption that theory is immediately 
political/governmental, entering a field of politics directly - an assumption that functioned 
to a certain extent in the field of human trafficking. I shall also contest the belief that theory 
is only an a posteriori rationalisation of what happens. 
Although the spectre of 'governmentalisation' haunts both the trafficking and to a 
certain extent the security literature, scholars have tried to propose theories that would 
resist this governmental temptation. If 'what is human trafficking? ' or 'what is security? ' is 
the starting point of a theoretical approach, the answers given can be mobilised to 
buttress dominant practices. Their descriptive undertaking becomes constitutive of the 
modes of governmentality of human trafficking. By answering the question of 'what' needs 
to be governed, academics provide similar answers to those given by 'professionals' in a 
field. This literature is also governmental at a meta-level inasmuch as it subordinates its 
ends to the means of governing the social. The purpose of theory is to explain certain 
undesirable phenomena in order to stop or prevent such phenomena from occurring. Yet, 
within both literatures there have emerged attempts to think a 'differenr politics. On the 
side of human trafficking, a radically different representation of trafficking was thought to 
subvert the state-led representations of illegal migration, crime and prostitution. On the 
security side, the question of how to write about security has emerged as a concern with 
desecuritisation, emancipation or ethics. 
I have shown at length the problems that all these attempts to divorce writing from 
governmentality have led to. The rights of trafficked women are actually the non-rights of 
risky migrants. Even when 'human rights' were formulated as being at odds with the 
predominant discourse, this discourse has in turn been governmentalised, infused by 
technologies that have made it consonant with risk management. Desecuritisation is only 
an off-hand attachment to analyses of security, emancipation is conceptually identical to 
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security. Ethics is most radical in this triad inasmuch as it attempts to replace security with 
other modes of relationality, e. g. responsibility. Ethics does not inscribe its concepts in 
political struggles and attempts to 'authorise' a prior! what should be. Moreover, all these 
theoretical approaches are confronted with the political translation of concepts into praxis. 
Interestingly, this points to a relation between two forms of praxis, intellectual and political, 
rather than a general relation between theory and practice. 
A politics of emancipation and transformation necessarily starts from an 
anomalous position in a local situation. A transformative-emancipatory theory would also 
start by making sense of its subjective position within intellectual praxis. Yet, theory is not 
entirely accountable from this subjective position. Just as politics needs principles, theory 
needs more than its subjective position. It is defined by its own logic of writing besides the 
logic of what happens politically. I shall argue that theory is configured by the 
contradictions between its own subjective position (intellectual praxis) and a context of 
writing (existing theoretical debates) with its conventions on the one hand, political praxis 
and freedom of thought on the other. 
To sketch out how theory can think its relation both to intellectual praxis and a 
politics of emancipation and transformation (political praxis), I shall draw once more on 
Badiou's and Balibar's discussions of philosophy and politics. Although not engaged in 
questions about being and ontology like philosophy, theory shares with Badiou's 
understanding of philosophy the fact that it works under the condition of politics. It also 
cannot escape the fundamental inequality that Balibar has pointed out, namely the 
'intellectual difference' between forms of practices. Theory itself, I shall argue, needs to try 
and enact the principles of equality and freedom, as 'impossible' a task as this may be. To 
develop an understanding of a theory of emancipation and transformation and its relation 
to praxis, I shall proceed in two stages. I shall first revisit several of the theories discussed 
in the first two chapters of this thesis and explore how they relate to praxis. Building on 
some important insights from these theories, but also contra them, I shall reflect on this 
particular writing in the light of Badiou's and Balibar's discussions about the role of 
philosophy in relation to praxis or political action. 
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Human trafficking and security. - locating the aporias of theory 
Theories of human trafficking and theories of security span a continuum between the 
governmental and the anti-governmental, to use Hindess' distinction of Foucauldian 
politics. Theories attempt both to provide particular answers to the specificity of a problem 
and to resist this formulation. The relation between the governmental and the anti- 
governmental is never clear-cut. There is an anti-govemmental impulse even in the most 
scientific theory that attempts to tell the truth of the world, as this truth can potentially be 
different from the truth proposed by existing power relations. The governmental temptation 
resurfaces even in the most radical anti-governmental theories that attempt to give voice 
to the silenced. We have seen that the particularity of different voices cries for integration 
within a governmental regime. Yet, this tension between the governmental and the anti- 
governmental makes theorists grapple with different understandings of theory. In what 
follows I shall consider five such understandings of theory. adequacy to the world, habitus, 
speech act, immanent critique, and limit of power. These approaches are not exhaustive 
and they clearly resonate with the approaches and theories I have engaged with in this 
thesis. Their relation to the governmental and the anti-governmental, to emancipation and 
transformation will also vary. In a rather loose way, I have named adequacy as the theory 
of the literature on human trafficking, habitus the theory of Bourdieueans in security 
studies, speech act that of the CoS and other language-prone constructivist, immanent 
critique the Critical legacy of the Frankfurt School and the limit of power Foucauldian- 
inspired engagements with theory. 
Theory and adequacy to the world 
The first chapter has discussed the literature on human trafficking as 'governmental', as 
embarking upon the adventure of defining what human trafficking is. Despite the 
numerous co-existing interpretations and descriptions (trafficking as illegal migration, 
smuggling, organised crime, prostitution, or human rights), these approaches start from 
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the premise that there is a 'correct' description of their object of study. What is most 
interesting about the literature on human trafficking is that theoretical struggles have 
immediate practical implications. In the field of human trafficking knowledge circulates 
rather rapidly between academics and practitioners. Academics are mobilised by different 
governmental or non-governmental institutions to provide conceptual tools for 
understanding the phenomenon and doing something about it. For instance, in the IOM 
Migration Research series, most of the reports have been commissioned to academic 
consultants (e. g. Anderson and O'Connell Davidson 2003). Various institutions have 
devised 'manuals of good practices' for anti-trafficking or counter-trafficking, employing 
academics and mobilising their knowledge for governmental purposes. 
What is remarkable about such reports is how they acknowledge while separating 
various descriptions of human trafficking. In a report on good practices on recovery, return 
and integration of trafficked persons, human trafficking is both an issue of illegal migration 
and a complex human rights abuse (Kvinnoforurn 2003: 5), without any contradiction 
being noticed when training of law enforcement officials and 'sensitivisation' are 
envisaged. Theory and practice do not explicitly intersect with politics. Taking the human 
rights approach is not per se exclusive of other approaches - it simply nuances and 
refines the existing descriptions of trafficking. Institutional and academic struggles over 
definitions lead to potential coalitions. Many of the reports underscore the necessity of 
institutional cooperation, especially between law-enforcing agencies and NGOs. Each 
institution will continue to do its 'old' job, while being additionally trained in a new 
approach. The effects of such practical injunctions can be understood theoretically 
through the conjunction of the human rights and the risk management approach. 
The relation between theory and practice is modelled on the concept of adequacy 
of theory to the reality to be described. The appropriateness between theory and human 
trafficking as an object is paramount. Much of the literature on migration or organised 
crime discusses the adequacy of concepts too. Is human trafficking illegal migration? Or is 
it smuggling? Are traffickers an organised network? Are they friends and family? 
Whatever answer one gives to these questions, it has important practical consequences. 
240 
Given the complexity and heterogeneity of the object, these answers need not be mutually 
exclusive, but represent various facets of the same reality. 
Therefore, these theories cannot be challenged based on their adequacy to reality. 
When human rights approaches challenge the descriptive adequacy by bringing in the 
perspective of trafficked persons, these persons need to be 'selected' so that they do not 
displace other taken-for-granted practices and descriptions. There is nothing, however, in 
reality that tells us which description is more appropriate to it. Human trafficking is and is 
not illegal migration. What counts is the political decision to use a description, in which 
context and for which ends. Nothing in the reality of prostitution tells us whether it is work, 
abuse of human rights, symptom of societal gender inequality, or a constant of human 
behaviour. It is from a political stance that these various descriptions gain meaning. Those 
focused on intervention, on re-thinking human trafficking as human rights abuse challenge 
these theories from their effects and not their appropriateness to an object or a 
phenomenon. 
The critical literature on security has undertaken a 'problematisation of 
problematisation' concerning security. It has attempted to analyse discourses or the 
conditions of discourse that make a certain construction of security 'true'. Yet, an 
important part of the literature on security is still governmental, a direct problematisation of 
what security is. Is security real or is it constructed? Whatever the answer, a certain 
adequacy to the world is implied, depending on whether the world follows a pattern of 
continuity or transformation. As there is an on-going traffic between reality and theory that 
adjusts the latter to the former, security has been theorised as either too restricted or too 
wide to be adequate to our social reality. For the former the reality to which security 
adjusts is that of national security. For the latter, reality is socially constructed and the 
concept of security reflects these historical modifications. 
Other security theories have looked at discourses and practices of security as 
social reality. The construction is the real. The agents of construction and their praxis 
acquire a prominent role and questions of adequacy are suspended. How do these agents 
bridge the gap between theory and practice? 
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Theory as habitus 
The security theory that draws inspiration from Bourdieu is the one to offer an answer to 
the question. They propose one of the most complex locations of theory/knowledge and 
its agents/practitioners. What is the role of theory and of academic writing for the 
sociology of security? Bigo has raised the question of the impotence of critical discourses 
against the securitisation of migration, 'why the production of academic and alternative 
discourses has so little effect in either the political arena or in daily life' (Bigo 2002: 65), 
implicitly raising the question of the role that theory/academics can play. His answer is 
important for placing or rather dis-placing the role of theory. First, he argues, the 
securitisation of migration is based on our conception of the state as a body or container 
of the polity. Secondly, it is structured by the habitus of security professionals and their 
new interests not only in the foreigner but in the 'immigrant'. And finally, it is based on the 
'unease' that some citizens who feel discarded suffer because they cannot cope with the 
uncertainty of everyday life. 
The second point has been normally connected with the Bourdieuean analyses of 
security. In this approach, theory is a question of intellectual praxis and not simply a 
corpus of ideas about the world. Expert knowledge mobilised by security professionals 
makes other forms of academic knowledge that are critical less legitimate. 65 As Bigo 
himself has remarked, the intellectual can have a critical role, but not as important as that 
of the security professionals. The Bourdieuean sociology of capital conversion makes the 
intellectual a player in the field of security professionals only as long as she can convert 
her own capital into knowledge that can compete with that of the security professionals. 
Yet, the more urgent question of a Bourdieuean field analysis is: how would the 
academic get her critical ideas? This question does not receive an easy answer given the 
way the field functions. The actors' positions depend upon their habitus, which is in turn 
65 To understand the relation of academic theories to expert knowledges, one can follow Bourdieu 
and consider the academic as an actor in a field of cultural production. 
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structured by stakes in the field. The ontological complicity between the habitus and the 
objective structures of the social space create a specific form of 'disinterested interest' 
about the game or the field. 66 The disinterested interest of the security professionals in the 
game of security is that of having to neutralise or manage security threats. As their 
knowledge and practices are driven by their habitus, it is unclear where/how to locate a 
critical habitus within the field of security professionals. 
In a recent series of lectures at Coll6ge de France, Bourdieu's thoughts on the 
scientific field and the scientific homo academicus (Bourdieu 2001) have shed light on the 
limitations of a critical habitus within a specific field. Without embarking upon a discussion 
of field boundaries between natural and social sciences, one could take Bourdieu's 
comments as valid for other academic fields. Being an academic is a 'job', one enters a 
field with its own nomos (rules) and regularities. The actors' strategies depend upon their 
position in the structure, as well as upon their trajectory outside the field (Bourdieu 2001: 
74). It is the second element that could open up the possibility of an interesting link 
between theory and practice. Yet, Bourdieu is more interested in the field as a space of 
struggle than the 'outside' within which the field is placed. He does not consider how an 
agent links to the 'outside', except in terms of social origin or school performance. The 
academic therefore remains captive to the interests of the field (which appear as a specific 
form of disintestedness, that of scientific knowledge). 
How does change happen? Bourdieu's answer to this dilemma is that of the 
6 struggle within the field of power' (Bourdieu 1990: 146). He places hopes of social change 
in the complexity of the social field or rather in the interaction between different fields. Yet, 
if Jacques Ranci6re is right that on Bourdieu's terrain of social exchange there is nothing 
but interests and ways of denying them (Ranci6re 2003a: 361), academic criticism has to 
confront the limit of interest. The parallel idea that there are moments of 'crisis', when the 
habitus is no longer aligned with the structures of the field and doxic assumptions can be 
66 Bourdieu analyses the field by means of an analogy with a game. Both the field and the game 
are defined by rules that the players have to obey and which represent both a constraint and 
resource to be used. 
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contested relies on an assumption of external change. 67 For example, the end of the Cold 
War spelled a change in structural positions of the military for example, who were forced 
to change their technologies for dealing with security problems. If there is a change in 
habitus, this is not a critical change. The military would just attempt to acquire a good 
structural position in the newly acquired field. In situations of crisis, the habitus is 
superseded by other principles of action, namely 'rational and conscious computation' 
(Bourdieu 1990: 108). Rational computation is linked again to the interests that define a 
field and to structural positions and not the possibility of generating a critical habitus. 
However, Bourdieu's belief in the role of sociology indicates that change can 
happen not from within but also from 'outside' the field. The sociologist has to expose the 
true functioning of a field (to those outside it? ) and show how the mechanisms of society 
function with the 'unknowing' complicity of agents (Bourdieu 1990: 70). If structures of 
domination can only function with the complicity of individuals who have internalised them 
(Bourdieu 2002: 20), then hope rests with these very individuals, the dominated who are 
complicit in their own domination. In this straightforward injunction to the weak and the 
dominated, Bourdieu eschews his own analyses of the field and the capital one needs to 
become part of a field. I have shown that NGOs had to formulate a knowledge that could 
be useful for the management of trafficking to enter the security field defined by the EU. 
A field where structural positions are occupied by security professionals has no 
space for those constructed as dangerous. Even if they understand how security 
functions, they would not have access to the field of security professionals. Bourdieu's 
social science tells us that without capital to convert it is impossible to become part of the 
field struggles. How would the dominated enter a field to enact change given that their 
actions are limited by the volume of capital to be placed on the symbolic market (Ranci6re 
2003b: 193)? Visions of the world can only be changed by those with the social authority 
and capital to do so. 
This is where the two other levels come in. By pointing to a 'structuring' metaphor 
of the state-as-container, Bigo simultaneously emphasises the role of language and 
67 de Certeau has also made this point in his analysis of Bourdieu (de Certeau 1990). 
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existing metaphors for the imaginary of security. This level can be understood as 
ontological security, the imaginary promise of security. The third point adds the materiality 
of political economy, the real unease that people feel in neo-liberal globalisation. Security 
would therefore transfer other malaise onto the figure of an enemy. Bigo's theory of 
security seems to need to go beyond a Bourdieuean field analysis by trying to make 
sense of a shared imaginary of the promise of security and 'deeper' insecurities which 
cannot be shaken by an imaginary of security. The flexibilisation of work for example is an 
intrinsic part of what neo-liberal capitalism is - there is no imaginary of security that can 
offset these practices of insecurity. 
At this point, I wonder whether Bourdieu's theory does not miss exactly the 
element of 'contradictions' from Marxist and later on critical and Foucauldian theory. As 
there are contradictions within the vision of the world, or between how this vision is 
institutionalised and other practices, the 'dominated' can hold on exactly to these 
contradictions. The vision of the world is not simply that of capitalism, but that of equal 
and free political subjects who have a say in the functioning of the community. The 
production and reproduction of groups can only function between the vision of the world 
and its reality. The production of illegal migrants is possible in a world of states as self- 
contained entities and the reality and needs of capitalism. At the same time, it is important 
to remember that these are not the only visions and realities of the world. There is a vision 
of equality and liberty as well as there is a reality of struggles against the dominance of 
capitalism. Rather than trying to open the eyes of the 'unknowing' dominated, theory 
would explore these contradictions and tensions. 
Theory as speech act 
Unlike the Bourdieueans of security studies, the CoS have eschewed questions about 
change and the role of academic theory and praxis. Nevertheless, they appear to share 
with Bourdieu a belief in the science that exposes the functioning of society (the 
mechanisms of securitisation). The CoS have advocated the role of the security analyst as 
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an observer of social reality, giving injunctions and providing tools to be seized upon by 
other societal forces. The analyst is supposed to sharpen the analytical tools to offer a 
better understanding of security, of how security happens. Politically however, the 
academic theory and praxis is not in a privileged position. And neither are other forms of 
knowledge. Politically all theories and discourses are birds of a feather, i. e. speech acts. 
This political equalisation can be inferred from the theory of securitisation. 
We have seen that securitisation takes place in the discursive interaction between 
elites and masses, within a communicative space where the elites need to convince the 
masses about their security claims. Within this communicative space, there can be other 
discourses that would compete for the (de-)construction of security. Even if the CoS do 
not undertake an analysis of which discourses enter this communicative space and which 
do not, one can assume that a relatively open public sphere would make room for 
academic discourses. The question to confront concerns the success of different speech 
acts. 
What is more important, however, is the egalitarian assumption that the audience 
could refuse to accept a securitising discourse or that somebody (anybody) could 
formulate an alternative one. One of the alternative discourses might well be an 
academicrintellectual one. Of course, one is confronted again with a question, this time 
whether an intellectual discourse can be alternative if it only shows how security happens. 
If academic theories only show the mechanisms of security, the normative dilemma is 
inescapable: 'how to write or speak about security when the security knowledge risks the 
production of what one tries to avoid, what one criticizes: that is, the securitisation of 
migration, drugs, and so forth' (Huysmans 2002: 43). The normative dilemma that 
Huysmans formulates here is that of 'governmentalising knowledge' or how knowledge 
that exposes the ways of the world only makes these ways more entrenched. 
Supposing that the free circulation of discourse and the relative freedom of 
subjects are enough to give birth to critical discourses, academic theory appears as 
another speech act, another discourse. In the public sphere, a politician's discourse could 
be interchanged with an academic theory or an NGO speech. If discourses meet 
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unhindered in the public sphere, the role of the academic can be similarly important to that 
of a politician, parliament or even media. They all convey discourses that are targeted at a 
specific audience. Even if speech act theorists drawing on Austin know that discourses 
depend upon institutional conditions or 'positions of authority' in Bourdieu's terms, Waever 
has favoured a non-conditioned theory of speech acts which draws inspiration from 
Butler's interpretation of performative speech acts. 
Butler has criticised Bourdieu for linking the 'authority' of speech acts exclusively 
to institutional positions, so that only those who are legitimate actors in the field can 
successfully'do things with words' (Austin 1975 [1962]). She is concerned with discourses 
that can be authoritative in relation to a particular subjective position. Such authoritative 
practices as Rosa Parks' (the black woman who famously refused to give her place on a 
bus to a white person) can only happen from an abject subjective position, those who 
have a different habitus. I shall not dwell on the acrimonious criticism addressed at Butler 
for having divorced the Rosa Parks' act itself from the social and legal context of 
68 mobilisation that had been going on. 
Butler's discussion of Rosa Parks is important for linking theory to a position 
absent from the social theories discussed so far. Butler's theory is harnessed to the 
resistant speech act of the abject, it does neither involve the dynamics of elites and 
audience nor the structured positions of a field. She locates insurrection within the spaces 
of abjection, by those who feel most directly and immediately the effects of 
power/domination/security. 'In laying claim to the right for which she had no prior 
authorization', Butler says about Parks, 'she endowed a certain authority on the act, and 
began the insurrectionary process of overthrowing those established codes of legitimacy 
(Butler 1997a: 141). 
In the CoS discussion of the position of the analyst, the 'normative dilemma' 
remains unsolvable. By focusing on elites, politicians, parliaments and other 'legitimate' 
actors who can speak security, the analyst runs the risk of replicating processes of 
68 For a compelling discussion of the case of Rosa Parks and of the differences in Butler's and 
Bourdieu's accounts of agency, see (Lovell 2003). 
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securitisation through description. Yet, once one brings in the 'effects' of such processes, 
especially for the constitution of subjectivity, abject subjective positions open a different 
space for theory. Theory as speech act could enact only the way the world is and thereby 
reproduce it. Similarly to Bourdieu's hope that exposing the mechanisms of domination 
will lead to change, the CoS believe that the role of theory is to expose the mechanisms of 
securitisation. For Butler however theory can only function in relation to abject positions 
and marginal speech acts. 
Theory as immanent critique 
Although not drawing on Butler, critical security studies have harnessed theory exactly to 
the marginal positions she talks about. Linking critical security studies with marginal 
positions is not done by means of a speech act approach, but through an immanent 
critique. Theory is primarily a critique of the state of the world from within, a critique that 
brings to light the tensions and contradictions existing in reality, pointing towards 
possibilities of emancipation. To appeal to an established reader of the Frankfurt School, 
immanent critique is 'a critique that worked from within the categories of existing thought, 
radicalised them, and showed in varying degrees both their problems and their 
unrecognised possibilities' (Calhoun 1996: 23). Critical security theorists have pointed out 
the falsity of the equation of state security and individual security and shown the 
contradiction that exists between the security that the state owes to all its citizens and the 
real insecurity that it can itself create. The state that claims to protect individuals 
simultaneously creates cohorts of insecure others. In claiming security for the insecure, 
CSS simultaneously seek to reorient the concept of security towards a more inclusive or 
'positive' security which does not need to be zero-sum and not limited to the state. 
The immanent critique safeguards CSS against accusations of normativism, 
moralism, and idealism. The concept of security that they endorse is neither normative nor 
moralising. It means rather, as Pinar Bilgin has argued in the case of the Middle East, 
248 
being sensitive towards conceptions of security adopted by the region's 
peoples, representing the ideas and experiences of those who have been 
marginalized by the dominant discourses and drawing up an alternative 
template for thinking about regional security that promotes emancipatory 
practices (Bilgin 2004: 28). 
The critical edge lies in the contradiction between the state's promise and its practices. As 
long as there is a contradiction at stake... 
According to Moishe Postone, one of the critical theorists whom Wyn Jones 
recommends as a source of inspiration for future CSS, 
[s]ocial contradiction ... is the precondition of both an intrinsic historical 
dynamic and the existence of the social critique itself. The possibility of 
the latter is intrinsically related to the socially generated possibility of 
other forms of critical distance and opposition - on the popular level as 
well'(Postone 1993: 88). 
The insecuring effects of security contradict the state's promise of security. Yet, as this 
thesis has shown, this is not a contradiction. The state's promise of security is not a 
universal one - it excludes exactly the dangerous, the risky, and the order disturbing. The 
promise of security is one of ordering and bordering. The contradiction located by CSS 
within security practices does not prevent a social structure from achieving stability, but 
rather supports the achievement of stability. Hence, security enters in collision with other 
concepts that disturb the social order; those who are dangerous often act against the very 
principle of security. Migrant women make themselves insecure throughout a journey 
whose purpose is a better life -a better life which could be hardly defined in terms of 
security. 
The fact that real people are insecure is not a contradiction for security; rather it is 
constitutive of what security is. The concept of security has been historically constituted in 
249 
relation to the state - or some institutional form that would do the securing and it has 
meant the creation of a boundary within societies, within populations and even within the 
self. I have shown that security is linked to a governmental definition of liberty, of what one 
can do and be. What security historically excludes is equality that can support the 
enactment of liberty. Just like the state in Marxist analyses, security is not an instrument 
that can be appropriated by a different agent. It is a dispositif of institutional practices and 
a legitimising rationality for relations of domination and exclusion within society. 
Theory as the limit of power 
The relation between theory and practice in feminist theories of security can be 
approached by looking at how they reframe the notion of social contradiction. The 
contradiction becomes difference, a difference that is still antagonistic to the stability of the 
whole and that is therefore silenced and excluded. Politics does not happen in the 
vociferous scene of struggle set up by social contradictions, but through the more muted 
resistance of those who are excluded or silenced. The contradiction that could become 
the terrain of a struggle gives room to differences that are simply excluded and 
hierarchised in dominant power relations. Hence, insecure women are the other of 
protective men, drug addicts the other of American values and so on. The power that 
subtends constructions of identity and difference functions through a dynamics of 
inclusion/exclusion. The other is included only through exclusion, through being the 
counterpart of that which is to be secured. The migrant paradoxically buttresses the idea 
of state sovereignty and societal values, while being excluded as the other of the 
community it serves to reinforce. 
Theory gives voice to all those who are excluded from dominant narratives, it 
makes visible the limit of power. Theory is first a process of visibilisation, independent of 
whether there are struggles going on or not. Despite divergences between standpoint and 
postmodern feminists, there is a common attention to particular stories, to small narratives 
in opposition to grand narratives. Some feminists listen to the stories women tell, while 
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others expose the ways in which regimes of power/knowledge function locally and how 
they constitute women. 
It is interesting that despite the focus on difference and multiple stories, the 
concept of contradiction is at least implicit. Difference needs to be translated backwards 
upon a contradiction to become relevant politically. 'Womenandchildren' in Elshtain's 
famous expression are not just the justification of the state's security policy, they are those 
who are made insecure. When the state justifies security in the name of 
I womenandchildren', their insecurity points to the contradiction between state discourses 
and practices. Although many feminists have followed the normative path of CSS, a 
feminist critical theory would not claim security for 'womenandchildren', but show how a 
particular identity of 'good'women is being created through security practices. 
The most important contribution of some of the feminist theorising could be that of 
making apparent the contradictions between justifications of power and real effects of 
power relations. The promise of security is contradictory not because it makes some 
insecure, but because it makes insecure exactly those to whom security was promised. 
Yet, when feminist theory follows the injunction to draw upon 'everyday forms of theorising 
that recuperate women and their experiences' (Sylvester 1996: 263), their recuperation of 
abject voices can obscure the contradictions that appear through an analysis of the effects 
of power relations. Their attention to spaces of abjection and the resistance to power has 
tried to bridge the gap between intellectual praxis and political praxis. Feminist theory has 
always echoed women's struggles. This is also Foucault's legacy to poststructuralist 
theories. His Discipline and Punish, for example, cannot be separated from the history of 
the activist Groupe Information Prison, which struggled for the change of prison 
conditions. 
Dilemmas 
Two dilemmas emerge out of these different understandings of theory. First, what is the 
meaning of theory? Theory as habitus would indicate that theory is the job of those placed 
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within the academic field or an academic-related field. Theory as adequacy to reality 
would also need specific tools and professionals to discover and assess this 
appropriateness. Theory as speech act would fall on the other pole of the dilemma, theory 
as any form of discourse or thought that infuses practice. This equality of discourse is 
nevertheless embedded in power relations which rarefy certain forms of thought while 
buttressing others. Second, how does the position of the intellectual or the theoretician 
relate to the subjective positions of those who struggle against domination and 
oppression? The theorist is neither directly nor immediately part of the struggles that 
excessive subjects formulate. She is often not part of the collective subjectification and 
organisation of those who struggle. If theory is abstract thought that crosses the 
boundaries of an academic field, the concepts and the rationale of struggle need to be 
made sense of in other fields. Theory at the limit of power can open contradictions that 
allow for a critical position to be formulated. Even if intellectual praxis makes theory not 
immediately part of political struggles, theory cannot equally be denied its spontaneous 
moment, the moment of reflective judgement that takes it beyond the determinations of 
habitus. Feminists have shown that theorists need to be attentive to the formulations of 
struggles in political praxis. Nonetheless, theory cannot adopt the struggle of those who 
resist, of the weak or of those who are denied access to politics. It also cannot reframe 
these struggles in the terms it has inherited from its own field, as CSS do. 
Between the historical conditionality of its own field and of political praxis, between 
an anti-governmental impulse and the spontaneous moment of judgement, theory appears 
to work with contradictions. The theories discussed appear to preserve one of the poles of 
the dilemma and supplant the other. A transformative-emancipatory theory does not only 
locate the anomalous subjects of politics, it also reflects upon their practices by thinking 
politics with the two axiomatic principles, equality and universality. It projects its reflective 
judgement upon these struggles to understand not just their history but also their politics. 
It attempts to bridge the separation between the subjective position of the theorist and 
those who struggle, while being aware that the gap cannot be eliminated. 
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Politics: re-locating the aporlas of theoty 
How does theory relate to the principles of transformative-emancipatory politics? First, 
theory needs to tackle the dilemma of inequality which is part of its location in a field of 
praxis. Second, it needs to deal with the dilemma of power relations and the inequality of 
positions between the theoretician and political subject. Third, it needs to relate the 
principle of freedom within the equality of all. The answers that Badiou and Balibar have 
provided do not solve these dilemmas, but give us a different insight into what these 
dilemmas mean. The principles of politics that I want to preserve within theory (or rather 
the role of theory) create a different entry point into the dilemmas of the other approaches. 
Politics before theory 
Badiou's thoughts on the relation between philosophy and politics are a helpful insight into 
how theory relates to praxis or philosophy to politics. Badiou does not share any of the 
concerns with intellectual praxis or the position of the academic (for him, of the 
philosopher). As he links philosophy with truth, with the possibility of deciding upon the 
truth procedures that are on-going in other spheres, questions of interest and stakes in the 
field are not immediately relevant for the philosopher. Yet, there are other loci where one 
might say that theory is created. If one sees thought and abstraction as definitory of 
theory, then theory as thought informs politics, science, art and even love (Alain Badiou 
1988). Badiou's militant in politics can hardly be imagined at a distance from any 
theoretical thought. There is a double definition of theory in Badiou: on the one hand the 
thought of all and on the other philosophy. Badiou is able to 'solve' the dilemma of 
inequality between intellectual praxis as theory and political praxis as thought only by 
making this distinction. 
As politics affirms the 'political capacity of all people', the principle that 'everyone 
can occupy the space of politics, if they decide to do so' (Badiou quoted in Hallward 2003: 
225), thought cannot be the prerogative of somebody, but is the prerogative of all. There 
is therefore a strictly egalitarian and universal approach to theory in Badiou. The militant is 
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the subject of truth par excellence. The militant thinks with concepts and abstractions as 
well as strategically. The philosopher is the meta-subject of truth, the subject that thinks 
the truth of the militant. Although theory is equally shared by all as abstract thought, 
strategisation and rationalisation, a meta-theorist is necessary. 
One could say that the militant thinks politics before the philosopher does. The 
location of theory is initially the same as the location of politics. Thought infuses all forms 
of political struggles and thinking is the inseparable unity of theory and practice. In politics, 
for example, thinking circulates between concepts, principles, certain directives and 
modalities of intervening in a situation. Building on this initial equation of theory and 
practice, one can say that theory needs to source itself from the struggles in which the 
dominated participate. Theory makes explicit the thought that infuses such struggles. An 
emancipatory theory is under the condition of an emancipatory politics. It knows it cannot 
make itself real, but it can designate the truth of a potential political orientation. Theory 
welcomes and shelters the fragile procedures of politics in thought. 
This first attempt at translating political thought at the level of theory faces us with 
a series of aporias. The first aporia is common to much feminist and poststructuralist 
writing: by expressing thought that is being formulated elsewhere, does one not silence 
that thought? In one of his early books, Can Politics be Thought? Badiou was adamant 
about the relation between political thought and action. 'Above all, it's necessary that the 
sans-papiers themselves speak out about the situation, that they speak about it politically 
and not just by bearing witness to their own misery or misfortune' (Badiou 2003a: 125). 
Politics requires presence without mediation. In trying to avoid the inequality of theory 
versus practice, of thought that 'knows better', theory is still faced with the dilemma of 
depriving the other of her capacities for thought and abstraction. At this level, the dilemma 
remains unsolvable. 
If one considers however the other location of theory - philosophy - the aporia can 
be redefined. What is the role of philosophy for Badiou? Philosophy is the place where 
politics is thought (Badiou 1992: 223). 69 Politics is one of the conditions of philosophy. 
69 '[L]e lieu ou la politique est pens6e' (translation mine). 
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Politics is deployed as immanent thought of its prescription and possible effects. 
Philosophy states that this politics will have been, if there is fidelity to it (Badiou 1992: 
222). The theoretical or philosophical statement is not the same as the political one; they 
are neither fused nor simultaneous. Philosophical thought is distinct from political thought, 
even if one can say that both pertain to theory. Philosophy needs to remain distinct from 
politics, although their de-differentiation or what Badiou calls 'suture' is not a new thing in 
the history of philosophy. Marxism most famously proposed the suture of philosophy to its 
political condition (Badiou 1999: 62). This is the idea in the famous Theses on Feuerbach: 
'Philosophers have interpreted the world. Now it's time to change it'. Suturing politics to 
philosophy means the direct transformation of the world through philosophy. In his 
analyses of the twentieth century, Badiou has discussed this desire of making theory 
immediately practicable as the century's 'passion for the real', the desire to make real, to 
inscribe in reality directly any theoretical project. 
The distinction between philosophy and politics faces us with a second aporia. 
Politics is not self-sufficient, a wager in a situation and fidelity to its truth. A meta-theory is 
needed, philosophy, whereby the truth of politics is gauged. Philosophy is 'metapolitics', 
which means the philosophical effects that philosophy can derive from thought (Badiou 
1998a). Hence, philosophy is not simply 'the locus of thinking wherein (non-philosophic) 
truths are seized as such, and seize us' (Badiou 1999: 126). Although philosophy also 
'pits thought against injustice, against the defective state of the world and life' (Badiou 
2004a: 39), it parallels politics only partially. Philosophy is not simply critique of what is. 
A political struggle is not necessarily right for being waged from a subjective 
position of domination. As Badiou has emphasised, the 'anomalous element' of a situation 
is only the site of the event and its carrier, it is not the event as the formulation of a 
political struggle. Not all struggles are right and the universal address and principles of 
equality and liberty are the emancipatory measure of struggles by the dominated. Other 
struggles can take conservative and reactionary forms. Hence, philosophy gauges the 
truth of political events and subjective fidelities. This author's challenge has been to think 
the difference between security and political struggles for equality and freedom. As a 
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practice of constituting communities and ordering societies, security can only be 
understood in relation to political challenges to and disruption of what a community is and 
how it is ordered. A theory of security would start therefore with politics, with the analysis 
of the struggles and political subjectifications of those who are deemed dangerous and 
upon whom technologies of security are to be deployed. This argument has caused some 
discontent among security theorists. 'Does the security analyst need a master political 
theorist? ' has asked Hayward Alker in response to this authors claim to the primacy of 
politics (2006). Theories of security are embedded in political struggles and contestation 
over the meaning of communities and the ordering of these communities. Analysing 
practices of security without re-embedding those within the political context which they 
structure obscures the challenges to the status quo. 
Emancipatory and transformative theory cannot simply take up the struggles and 
the analyses that the dominated provide, it embarks upon a more difficult process of 
thinking these struggles and their emancipatory potential. To make theoretical and political 
decisions, a point is needed for the decision. 'There is a moment when one must be able 
to say that this is right and that is wrong, in light of the evidence of the principle' (Badiou 
2004a: 54). An emancipatory theory will have a twofold task. It must, first of all, examine 
the statements and prescriptions of such political orientations in order to uncover the 
egalitarian nucleus which bears a universal signification. Secondly, it must transform the 
generic category of 'justice' (or one might say of 'equaliberty) by submitting it to the test of 
how such statements inscribe the egalitarian axiom in action (Badiou 2004a). Finally, 
theory also has the task to show that such a political orientation designates the figure of a 
political subject. 
By means of a simultaneous linking and de-linking of philosophy and politics, 
Badiou is able to criticise 'false' or 'evil' events and uphold 'good' or 'true' ones. 
L'Organisation politique has supported the mobilisation of the sans-papiers in the summer 
of 1996, when hundreds of African immigrants occupied the Saint Bernard church in Paris 
for several months. This mobilisation showed the sans-papiers as ordinary workers under 
extreme pressure but who manifested themselves as equal political subjects. According to 
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the journal of IOrganisation politique, La distance politique, what is needed is to finish 
once for all with the word 'immigrant' and its repressive character. By rejecting the name 
of clandestin and proposing that of sans-papiers, the movement of Saint Bernard has 
rejected the words immigrant and immigration (La distance politique 1996b). Similarly, 
POrganisation politique has continually denounced the politics that distinguishes between 
asylum-seekers and economic migrants. In the words of lOrganisation politique, it is 
obvious that 'the immense majority of immigrants are workers or people looking for work' 
(La distance politique 1996a). 
Even if Badiou starts with the hypothesis that politics is primary and has its own 
truth and thinking, philosophy is necessary as metapolitics, a meta-theory of truth and 
thinking. Philosophy thinks the thought of politics, but it does so only by thinking the 
situation from which the event springs and by holding this politics accountable to the 
principles of equality and universality. As a separate modality of thought, theory does not 
silence political subjects, but gauges the truth of their politics. What remains unclear with 
Badiou is the specificity of philosophy besides its meta-theoretical judgement on the 
principles of politics. If philosophy is defined by logical revolt against the injustices of the 
world, nothing differentiates it substantially from the thought of the militant for example. 
Theoty between conjuncture and politics 
Balibar has made explicit the similarity and difference between theory and politics that is 
only indicated in Badiou. For Balibar, theory means on the one hand, the power of ideas: 
a paradoxical power, as it derives not from the ideas themselves, but from the forces and 
circumstances which they are able to seize on. On the other, it also means the power of 
abstraction, which has to be understood in a broad sense, including liberal discourse as 
well as critical thought that contribute to excluding the people and democracy, while 
claiming to represent them (Balibar 1995c, 44). Theory partakes of a historical context in 
which ideas are formulated. Through abstraction, theory goes beyond an intellectual 
praxis to be found across society. 
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Balibar's thoughts on the relation between theory and practice infuse most 
explicitly his monographs on Spinoza and Marx. Besides this more exegetical approach, 
the relation between theory and practice is put to work in his writing on current issues. The 
problem of migration, of the sans-papiers is most interesting in this sense both as it 
speaks to the concerns of this thesis and as it has oriented Balibar's political thought. In 
an article which had prefaced his own thesis defence, Balibar has offered a definition of 
philosophy as a constant endeavour 'to untie and retie from the inside the knot between 
conjuncture and writing' (Balibar 1995b: 144). 
Spinoza, Marx as well as other philosophers can only be approached in the 
conjuncture in which they wrote. The Philosophy of Marx sees Marx as the philosopher 
who has written most in the conjuncture. The conjuncture, a term dear to Marxists (and 
especially Althusserian Marxists) clarifies the relation between philosophy and politics or 
theory and practice. As Warren Montag has put it in the Preface to Spinoza and Politics, 
4 all philosophy is political, inescapably embodied, no matter how it may strain to deny this 
fact in the practical forms of historical experience (Montag 1998: vii). 
The conjuncture is more than the historical context to which poststructuralists 
would also be attentive. The conjuncture is a moment of the social process where action, 
subjectivity and history come together. A conjuncture, as Balibar says, is not a Zeitgeist, 
'spirit', dominant ideology or even episteme (Balibar 1995b). It is not homogenous or self- 
identical, but rather is riddled with contradictions and conflicts that reflect its historical 
tensions. One could say that the conjuncture is the present traversed by the play of 
forces. Similarly to Badiou, Balibar posits the continuity of politics and theory. Theory is 
directly Immersed in politics through the contradictions and the conflicts which define it. 
In an article on the sans-papiers in France, Balibar shows the complexity of the 
concept of conjuncture. The conjuncture of the eighties and nineties in France displayed a 
series of complex contradictions: between the socioeconomic structures and state 
sovereignty, between xenophobic reactions and projects of republican refoundation, 
between the violence of administrative practices and the elementary requirements of the 
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lives of foreigners installed within the polity as workers, consumers, and users of public 
services (Balibar 2004b: 32-33). 
The bulk of the article is dedicated to making sense of the transformations that 
allow for such contradiction. First, there is the absolutisation of national values that comes 
not only from the tradition of state sovereignty, but which is exacerbated in conditions of 
socioeconomic crisis and uncertainty, in conditions of the limitation of state sovereignty 
under globalisation. Secondly, there are the practices and discourses around the colonial 
heritage. Thirdly, there is the development of a European racism in the construction of 
European identity, which separates nationals of member countries from ethnic 
communities, immigres, extracommunitari, Auslander. His analysis of the conjuncture is 
linked to two related conclusions: on the one hand the unrealised possibilities that exist in 
the conjuncture (for example, the possibility of a different definition of European 
citizenship) and on the other the struggles of the sans-papiers for regularisation and 
rights. Through the analysis of the conjuncture, Balibar proceeds to a radical redescription 
of these struggles. 
Paradoxically, the struggles of the sans-papiers, perceived by the 
government as disturbances of the public order, desperate forms of 
blackmail or products of a conspiracy whose manipulators should be 
sought among 'criminal networks', have been and are privileged 
moments in the development of active citizenship (or, if you prefer, direct 
participation in public affairs) without which there is not polity (06) but 
only a state cut off from society and petrified in its own abstraction 
(Balibar 2004b: 48). 
The 'truth' of these struggles, if I can use here Badiou's term, can only appear in the 
struggles within the conjuncture. These struggles make apparent the contradictions in the 
conjuncture and reinforce Balibar's 'consistent affirmation that only singular forces, 
unpredictable events, and dialectic evolutions actually shape history' (Balibar 2004b: viii). 
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The struggles of the sans-papiers are political inasmuch as they preserve a meaning for 
the 'principles of collective emancipation, popular sovereignty, and universality of the 
public sphere' (Balibar 2004b: 32). Theory gives the right interpretation to these struggles 
that are not its own only by placing them in relation to the contradictions of the conjuncture 
and questions of economic, social, and political conflict. 
Yet, theory is also an inegalitarian form of power, a denial of the politics of equality 
and liberty. Against the very principles of collective self-emancipation and political 
presentation, theory represents and interprets. Balibar's discussion of Marx has noted that 
Marx had made the relation between theory and practice dependent upon the 'division 
between manual and mental labour' or the intellectual difference in general (Balibar 
1995c: 49). The division of theory and practice has inbuilt the division between intellectual 
and manual labour, between reflection and technique, between execution and knowledge 
(Balibar 1994: 55). This relation can be inscribed in a relation of collective inequality (the 
elites and the masses). The division between manual and intellectual labour does not only 
entail a sociology of knowledge that links intellectual praxis with the dominant classes, but 
it also raises more profound questions about how a critical theory can think its own 
conditions. 
As Balibar has put it, critical theory has to think its own determination as an 
intellectual activity (Balibar 1995c: 120). Theory needs to think its own relation to social 
interests and ideology or 'regimes of truth' in Foucauldian terminology. Critical theory 
conducts an analysis of intellectual difference both in the register of knowledge and in that 
of organisation and power (Balibar 1995c: 52), an analysis which sheds light on the 
inequalities of knowledge and the inequalities of power. Against these inequalities, Balibar 
claims that what is needed is at the same time 'a neutralization and redistribution of 
knowledge, an "equivalence" of knowledgeable and unknowledgeable individuals with 
respect to the right of expression in public space and a symbolic dissociation of the 
institutional equivalence between "intelligence" and "knowledge" (Balibar 1994: 57). The 
inequality of knowledge is to be supplanted by the equality of intelligence. The phrase is 
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reminiscent of Rancibre's famous rejection of intellectual difference. He has argued - and 
Balibar would most likely agree - that 
there are not two levels of intelligence, that any human work of art is the 
practice of the same intellectual potential. In all cases, it is a question of 
observing, comparing, and combining, of making and noticing how one 
has done it' (Ranci6re 1991: 36). 
Balibar sees the most radical suspension of intellectual difference in the universal access 
to politics. The sans-papiers have equal rights to make politics, independent of what they 
know or do not know. Politics is a question of the equality of intelligence and not the 
inequality of knowledge. Theory can make explicit how an inequality of knowledge (those 
who know, the police, the administration, the state) supports an inequality of power (those 
who make politics, who decide upon the membership in a political community and those 
who do not). Beyond this equality of intelligence that can be seen as the abstract thought 
of all that Badiou mentioned, Balibar makes another similar move to Badiou. He re- 
describes the struggle of the sans-papiers as equal participation in politics. Therefore, the 
truth of theory is intrinsically linked with the truth of struggles. Truth, says Balibar, 
'contradicts the "dominant" forms or criteria of universality, that is, it embodies a practical 
criticism of ideology' (Balibar 1994: 170). Yet there can be no fusion between the truth of 
theory and the truth of struggles. This was also Badiou's implicit problem when he defined 
politics as a procedure of truth while simultaneously defining truth as the instrument of 
philosophy for approaching politics. It is definitely impossible to solve the dilemma of the 
truth of politics/the truth of theory. What Badiou and Balibar both point to is the necessity 
to keep theory both at a distance from and in proximity to politics. 
The existence of two 'truths' leads to the realisation that there are no guarantees in 
politics. Excessive subjects can be beyond the representations of a situation; yet, they 
need not construct equal subjectifications or engage in a universal politics. Hence Badiou 
defines the truth of politics as an opposition between good and evil in Ethics (Badiou 
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2002a). Fascism is the perversion of the truth of politics, of its principles of universality, 
equality and non-closure - and theory can gauge its falsity. Theory draws the distinction 
between truth and falseness, between politics and its perversions and distinguishes 
between politics as emancipatory and transformative on the one hand and security on the 
other. This emphasis on truth would sit awkwardly with the poststructuralist definition of 
truth as the effect of power/knowledge. I have shown that the description of human 
trafficking attempts to create a 'regime of truth', to speak the truth about what trafficking is, 
thus limiting what can be said or done about human trafficking. The truth of politics that 
Badiou and Balibar discuss goes beyond the repetition of established knowledge. It is 
linked with the new that disrupts a situation. 
Where Balibar is most at a distance from Badiou is in the recognition of the role of 
writing in philosophy or theory. Philosophers do not only write in a conjuncture, they also 
write in a conjuncture. Balibar's own writing develops from encounters both with a political 
conjuncture as well as with a conjuncture of thought. Writing is a process that confronts 
the aporias of other texts and brings out their contradictions and their limits. The 
exploration of the unrealised possibilities of a text is always related to the unrealised 
possibilities in reality. If Badiou recognised the importance of logic and reason in a 
philosophical argument, Balibar places it in the larger context of philosophical debates. In 
a beautiful turn of phrase, Balibar defines the relation to writing as 'a permanent short- 
circuit or short-cut between the immediacy of thinking and its longer history (Balibar 
1995b). Theories exist in relation to other theories. Writing exists therefore in relation to a 
conjuncture and there is also a conjuncture of writing. Theory is more than a speech act. 
Theory relates to immanent change but it is not just that. Theory functions in a field, but it 
is also a process of thinking that encounters and distances itself from politics. Theory 
makes explicit power relations without 'shedding light' on anybody. Those who struggle 
know that they struggle against power. The relation of theory to politics is not only 
mediated through the relation between intellectual praxis and political praxis, but also 
through the relation between theoretical debates and struggles in a conjuncture. 
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Conclusion: Writing with the contradictions 
Theory and practice, writing and the conjuncture, philosophy and politics exist in 
'equivocal contradiction and tension' (Bensaid and Corcuff 1998). Contradictions cannot 
be surpassed or synthesised, they function rather as aporias, propelling us to think the 
impossible in a situation and the possibility of a future. They are also not caught in an 
interminable experience of the impossible (Jacques Derrida 1993), but inform political 
decisions. 
Theory is first the thought of all. There is an element of equality of intelligence that 
would make theorists attentive to the struggles and the formulations of excessive subjects 
in a situation. The thought of politics is to be taken as 'thought', as theory. More than just 
the feminist 'everyday theories' or the attention to marginal positions, politics itself works 
with abstractions and concepts - sometimes borrowed from theory. Following Badiou, 
theory also thinks politics - it thinks these struggles from the perspective of justice, by 
making the principles of emancipatory and transformative politics stand for all forms of 
political struggles. If theory is intellectual praxis, it is not in Bourdieu's sense of a field 
inhabited by professionals. Theory is intellectual praxis only in its location in a conjuncture 
of politics and writing. While for Badiou the philosopher thinks the truth of political events, 
Balibar emphasises the conjuncture as defined by other contradictions (economic, social, 
political, which can lead to struggles or not). 
In this thesis, I have also linked theoretical thought to forms of struggle and politics 
that disrupt the situation of trafficking. The struggle for the recognition of prostitution as 
work introduced a heterogeneous claim among the governmental practices that order the 
situation of trafficking. " If theory Is to locate forms of emancipatory politics and gauge its 
truth, it cannot be at a distance from analyses of power relations. Excessive subjects and 
their political struggles can only be understood from within the dominant representations 
in a situation. To this, theory has added a metapolitical element, it has considered forms 
of resistance and struggle and has argued for the 'truth' of the struggles that allow for the 
Governmentality Is another way of analysing the multiple facets of a conjuncture. 
263 
equality and rights of illegal migrant sex workers. I have therefore claimed that the 
struggle of (legal and illegal) sex workers for equal rights is a politics of emancipation. I 
have also drawn distinctions between true and false politics, between a politics of security 
that legitimises and justifies inequality and exclusion and a politics of emancipation and 
transformation that makes equality its very principle. 
Although I have argued that a theory of politics and an understanding of struggles 
are a priori to any engagement with security, the path followed in this thesis has been the 
reverse. I have started from within conjunctures of writing, from within security theories. 
Writing places theory in an intellectual context, it makes it obey to rules of logical and 
social control. The intellectual context within which I have formulated the question of the 
effects of security (what does security do? ) appeared however to be insufficient. Critical 
theories of security are paradoxical inasmuch as there can be no critique of security 
without an understanding of the politics that security practices attempt to normalise, 
neutralise, or eliminate. This thesis has worked with a continuum of emancipatory and 
transformative politics - from what security denies or suppresses to the politics that could 
unmake security practices. While equality and freedom have been at the heart of the 
politics it has formulated, the equality and freedom of theory can be approached as 
aporetic. The recognition of abstract thought in all forms of praxis does not do away with 
the structural positions that intellectual praxis (as work) enjoys in relation to other forms of 
thought that might infuse the social. This realisation makes the need to judge forms of 
resistance and political engagements even more difficult. As theory can be mobilised in 
relations of domination, is the denial of politics not a form of domination itself? The 
freedom of the theorist is also defined through the constraints of writing, of a certain 
conjuncture and its canons. These aporias cannot be solved, but point out the necessity of 
the theory's commitment to equality and liberty, to emancipation and transformation, even 
when those appear as impossible or too difficult from within a conjuncture (be it of politics 
or of writing). 
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Conclusion 
At the time when this research approaches its necessary closure, several actions 
undertaken in relation to trafficking in women highlight once more the contradictions and 
political (im)possibilities to which this thesis has spoken. On 18 October 2005, the 
European Commission issued a communication on 'Fighting trafficking in human beings - 
an integrated approach and proposals for an action plan'. After naming 'human rights' as 
the fundamental concern in tackling human trafficking, the document immediately 
emphasises its dimensions of organised crime and illegal migration. 'High profits from 
labour and sexual exploitation, the Commission points out, are often subject to money 
laundering and may enable traffickers to engage in other criminal activities and to achieve 
economic, social or even political power' (European Commission 2005a: 4). In January 
2006, The UK government also issued a consultation paper on trafficking, which features 
a neologism, 'organised immigration crime', to refer to trafficking and other intersections 
between organised crime and illegal immigration (Home Office 2006). The securitisation of 
human trafficking, a phenomenon which, in the wording of the Home Office, 'causes great 
harm to the individuals involved and to our society as a whole' (Home Office 2006: 3), is 
paralleled by another important development. At the same time that the European 
Commission was preparing its action plans, Brussels was the location of another event: 
sex workers organised an international meeting that would lead to a Declaration of the 
Rights of Sex Workers in Europe (The International Committee on the Rights of Sex 
Workers in Europe 2005). The Declaration reiterates international rights that should apply 
to all citizens - including sex workers. In the section on 'Freedom from Slavery and 
Forced Labour, the Declaration states the following: 
Measures should be taken to ensure that sex workers enjoy full labour 
rights, are informed of them and have access to the full range of 
measures and standards to end exploitative working conditions. 
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Measures should be taken to provide appropriate assistance and 
protection to victims of trafficking, forced labour & slavery like practices 
with full respect for the protection of their human rights. Provision of 
residency permits should be provided to ensure effective access to 
justice and legal remedies, including compensation, irrespective of their 
willingness to collaborate with law enforcement. Trafficked persons must 
not be returned to situations in countries that will lead to their re- 
trafficking or result in other harms (The International Committee on the 
Rights of Sex Workers in Europe 2005: 10). 
The Declaration also points out that the non-recognition of prostitution as work has 
'adverse consequences on the working conditions of sex workers'. These two quasi- 
simultaneous declarations, the EU's and the sex workers', display two modalities of action 
and engagement with social problems. On the one hand, there is the problematisation and 
governmentality of human trafficking in a logic of security and on the other, a politics that 
verifies equality and enacts liberty. The Declaration of the Rights of Sex Workers in 
Europe verifies the equality of rights as stated in various EU and international documents. 
The Commission communication reiterates its politics of security in perfect consonance 
with a politics of human rights and concern for the particular other. 
The Commission communication and the sex workers' Declaration of rights speak 
of the two modes of politics that this thesis has explored. A politics of security, of closure, 
and of particularity versus a politics of emancipation and transformation, of equality and 
liberty. I have started this research with an exploration of what security means and does in 
the context of human trafficking. Although security was not theorised in the context of 
human trafficking, the presence of security entailed effects upon what could be said and 
done about human trafficking. As a nexus of representation and intervention, security 
creates spaces of abjection, spaces of exclusion and particularity. Security also 
depoliticises, by mobilising clinical knowledges to understand those who are threatening. 
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The management of trafficking as a security issue relied on the management of migration, 
organised crime, and prostitution. The practices that were deployed for governing human 
trafficking in all these aspects turned 'victims of trafficking' into risky beings, victims of 
earlier childhood traumas likely to undertake high-risk actions such as illegal migration. 
The medicalisation and psychologisation of trafficked women through the governmental 
practices of security depoliticises their forms of resistance. The actions of trafficked 
women fall either under the heading of illegal migration or under that of clinical reactions. 
A politics out of security has started from a shedding away of particularity, from a 
suspension of classification and representation. The concept of excess, of excessive 
subjects to a situation can inforrn a politics that transcends particularity and suspends the 
governmental vectoring of security. Excessive subjects are not seen as part of the 
situation, they are not representable, but only exist as an anomaly, as those who should 
not be there. I have argued that politics starts from the standpoint of illegal migrant sex 
workers rather than trafficked women. As victims of trafficking are caught in the 
representations mobilised for the purposes of prevention, new names and identifications 
that are heterogeneous to governmentality need to be invented to reconfigure their 
situation. The figure of the worker disrupts the representations and interventions that 
mobilise clinical and psychological knowledge for the purposes of risk management. It 
also addresses everybody in the situation and radically challenges the valence of the 
element which did not exist as positively individuated in a situation. From nothing, illegal 
migrant prostitutes can become something. The figure of the worker does not erase 
stories of abuse and violence, it also does not erase the unwillingness of foreign migrant 
women to be prostitutes. The figure of the worker redefines the situation in which illegal 
sex workers did not exist and exploited workers could only exist as victims to be 
voluntarily returned and rehabilitated. A politics of emancipation and transformation 
radically changes the way people are counted and count in a situation. 
The institutional claim by illegal migrant sex workers that they are self-employed 
workers and hence should be given residence rights is different from the forms of 
institutional struggles that a Bourdieuean analysis of fields would conceptualise. The 
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Commission communication was supposed to be a response to a document written up by 
the European Experts Group on Human Trafficking, a consultative group formed of NGO 
representatives, academics, and activists. Notwithstanding the recommendations of the 
2004 Report they presented to the Commission, the present communication reiterates the 
EU policies regarding trafficking. Even recommendations to make residence independent 
of the victim's testimony or to ensure that victims of trafficking are not deported (Experts 
Group on Trafficking in Human Beings 2004) have been ignored, despite the knowledge 
and the expertise mobilised by NGOs. Institutional struggles reproduce existing interests, 
unless considered from the standpoint of those who are excessive, who do not count in 
the situation. 
Excessive subjects formulate egalitarian prescriptions against the state. They 
challenge situations of domination and discrimination by calling into question the particular 
mode of counting and representation in a situation. A politics of unmaking security 
functions as a political event in Badiou's sense, disrupting the logic of security on the 
basis of a claim to equality and universality. The profoundly inegalitarian claim of security 
which separates those who are dangerous or risky from those who are not is therefore 
challenged on the basis of a political claim to equality. This axiomatic claim to equality 
implies a dimension of universality - equality remains by definition open, addressing 
everybody. 
The inscriptions of equality support liberty and inform insurrectional actions against 
relations of domination. Yet, the tradition that has opposed liberty to security in political 
theory has failed to analyse the practices of inequality that allow for the normalisation or 
regulation of freedom. The reading of Hobbes I have proposed has drawn on a Marxist 
concern with an insurrectional politics against situations of domination and discrimination. 
The politics of security, even when it makes room for liberty or it creates freedoms, 
disavows and attempts to prevent forms of insurrectional politics that are based on the 
enactment of equality and liberty. Rendering the other dangerous has appeared as a 
process of rendering them first unequal, taking away forms of insurrectional actions and 
reducing them to a shadowy existence. Liberty and equality are therefore inseparable, 
268 
both in their negation and in their enactment. Just as restrictions on liberty or unfreedoms 
can only function through an a priori denial of equality, a politics of equality is also a 
politics of liberty. Equality and liberty are not goals to be achieved, programmes to be 
implemented, but principles of action, maxims that are manifest in struggle. 
Through the local verifications of equality and liberty a transformative- 
emancipatory politics challenges the governmentality of security in its very logic. This 
thesis has exposed the logic of security through the effects of practices. Under the 
imaginary of a universal promise, security deploys symbolic practices that transform the 
social into situations of domination and discrimination. I have argued however that a 
politics of equality and liberty un-vectors the practices of security. How are we to think the 
relation between politics and security? Security has appeared as co-extensive to practices 
of government. Governmentality is not just a theoretical tool for understanding how 
security functions in institutional locales and creates subjects/abjects, but a mode of 
regulating populations and the social more generally. Security is the governmentality of 
particularity through classifications that create inequality and suspend the excessive use 
of freedom. 
The analysis of security in the Leviathan has linked this governmental analysis 
with a larger concern about insurrectional politics. A transformative-emancipatory politics 
is a form of insurrectional politics, the politics that practices of security have always tried 
to suspend. Practices of security do not only create spaces of abjection in Butler's terms, 
they prevent excessive subjects from making excessive claims of equality and liberty. In 
the separation from insurrectional politics, the constitution and functioning of the Leviathan 
have entrenched inequality and domination. Equality is only a point of departure in the 
constitution of the state; the inequality to the sovereign becomes the dominant relation in 
the functioning of the state. Liberty is disciplined or unequally fostered in particular 
categories of citizens. 
If security is co-extensive to the governmentality of populations, politics unmakes 
this logic through universality and the inseparability of equality and liberty. Rather than 
primary, the horizon of society, security is the negation of politics, a politics that makes 
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claims of equality and liberty against any situation of domination and discrimination. A 
problematisation of the problematisation of security would steep security back into the 
political struggles and antagonisms which it tries to silence. Politics explores ongoing 
struggles in local situations and retrieves their logic of equality, liberty and universality that 
practices of security attempt to neutralise. 
The starting point of theory should be to think politics, however rare its 
occurrences might be. How is theory to relate to these practices of security? Even a 
theory which is harnessed to a universal politics of equaliberty needs to conceptualise the 
relations of power and domination in a situation and its excessive subjects. A politics of 
equality and liberty requires the continuous application of judgement upon its conditions. 
All politics needs to be subjected to rigorous thought, to a consideration of its conditions 
and its openness. Unlike the poststructuralist theory that privileges the abject, a politics of 
equality and liberty does not immediately endorse a politics of excessive subjects. Not any 
disruption of the status quo is political and theory needs to engage with these distinctions. 
Fascism is not only a rupture, but a rupture that gives meaning to the situation, it creates 
classifications in a situation (Badiou 2005). Fascism is on the side of security and its 
ultimate particularity, the racial community and not of politics. Without considerations of 
what political struggles cut across the fabric of the social, we would be caught within the 
logic of security that creates 'legitimate' forms of exclusion in the name of order, survival, 
economic processes, welfare, etc. 
A politics of equality and universality is neither an easy not a continuous 
occurrence in various situations, but requires effort, thought, and even endurance. It 
appears more difficult than other forms of politics. Similarly, a theory that attempts to 
enact the principles of a politics of emancipation and transformation is aporetic. Theory 
creates at the same time a continuity and a dis-continuity with political praxis. While 
locating excessive subjects and egalitarian forms of politics, it places itself in an 
impossible situation: it creates divisions of true and false in the very principle of 
equaliberty that entails the participation of all in politics. A politics of emancipation creates 
divisions between adherents and opponents. Yet, it preserves the element of universality 
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in the form of a principle of equaliberty. It is not division that delegitimises either politics or 
theory, but closure. The division of prescriptive principles is a division without closure, 
while the divisions of governmentality are reified and closed in their particularity. Theory 
welcomes the thought of all and politics addresses everybody. The wager of equality and 
universality that politics makes is braced against situations of domination and 
discrimination, of inequality and unfreedom. Security is one of the modalities in which 
domination and discrimination are entrenched, legitimated and reproduced. 'Politics out of 
security has addressed this modality of structuring and counting situations and people 
and its un-vectoring, without making claims about domination more generally. Politics out 
of security un-vectors the security construction of human trafficking and draws attention to 
a particular functioning of domination. 
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